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INTRODUCTION 
The innovation process for novel medical therapies needs repair.1 The 
United States spends more than ever before on drug discovery without a 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor, Emory University School of Law. Special thanks to Paul Heald, Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Bill Church, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Chris Holman, Kevin Outterson, Cynthia Ho, Yaniv Heled, 
Emily Morris, Jacob Rooksby, and Benjamin Liu for valuable comments. Special thanks also to Dennis C. 
Liotta, Stephen D. Sencer, Jack Tillman, Susanne Hollinger, and Todd Sherer for sharing their comments, 
ideas, and work on Drug Innovation Ventures at Emory (DRIVE), to Abigail Rives and Rachel Erdman for 
their research assistance, and to the editors of the Emory Law Journal for their editorial contributions. While 
this paper and my broader project on universities and innovation respond to and benefit from the ideas shared, 
all views and in particular all shortcomings are my own. 
 1 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
(2006) (examining concerns about the productivity of the pharmaceutical industry, including escalating 
spending and declining trends in the number of new drugs approved); Francis S. Collins, Commentary, 
Reengineering Translational Science: The Time Is Right, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., July 6, 2011, at 1. But 
see Iain M. Cockburn, Is the Pharmaceutical Industry in a Productivity Crisis?, 7 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 
1, 1 (2006) (suggesting that the productivity crisis may be overstated, but agreeing that changes are needed, 
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corresponding increase in new medical therapies.2 Despite major advances in 
knowledge concerning the underlying mechanisms of disease and new 
technologies for drug discovery and design, there have been few significant 
changes in the treatment of disease.3 While this productivity crisis may be due 
in part to a move beyond low-hanging fruit and toward the pursuit of more 
complex and elusive therapies, inefficiencies inherent in the current system of 
pharmaceutical innovation are also to blame.4 The segmented, proprietary 
model of drug development that has dominated the pharmaceutical industry for 
decades is becoming not only increasingly undesirable, but also unsustainable.5 
Federal and state governments are reluctant to devote their shrinking budgets 
to basic research without more and faster tangible returns, private investors are 
unwilling to absorb the cost and risk involved in moving from early-stage 
discovery to later development stages, and pharmaceutical companies are 
retrenching their development efforts in response to soaring costs and a dearth 
of new blockbuster drug candidates. Pharmaceutical companies miss 
opportunities to control costs and reduce error rates because of failures to share 
 
particularly “[p]olicies that make ‘small’ markets more attractive, build capacity in translational medicine, 
reduce the cost, time, and uncertainty of regulatory review, maximize access to basic research, and encourage 
greater cooperation and collaborative research within the industry”). This Article focuses on the discovery and 
development of new drugs, but similar issues and opportunities arise in the discovery and development of 
other medical therapies, diagnostics, and medical devices.  
 2 The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved approximately the same number of drugs in 
2008 that were approved in 1950, while at the same time the cost of funding has continued to rise—some 
suggest by as much as 13.4% annually. See Bernard Munos, Lessons from 60 Years of Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, 8 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 959, 959, 962 (2009). 
 3 While there are about 4,500 conditions with defined molecular causes, for example, therapies now 
exist for only about 250 of them. The National Institutes of Health—A Review of Its Reforms, Priorities, and 
Progress: Hearing Before the Health Subcomm. of the H. Energy & Commerce Comm., 112th Cong. 12 (2012) 
(statement of Francis S. Collins, Director, National Institutes of Health). 
 4 See, e.g., Huda Y. Zoghbi, The Basics of Translation, 339 SCIENCE 250 (2013) (suggesting that the 
failure to translate scientific discoveries into effective treatments is largely due to the “complexity of human 
physiology, and our limited understanding of how the vast majority of genes, proteins, and RNAs work”); see 
also Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure of the Pharmaceutical Industry, HEALTH AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004, 
at 10; Collins, supra note 1; Praful Mehta & Sophia Walker, Cardiovascular R&D Model—Increasing 
Innovation?, IHS HEALTHCARE & PHARMA BLOG (Jan. 29, 2013), http://healthcare.blogs.ihs.com/2013/01/29/ 
cardiovascular-rd-model-increasing-innovation/ (“In light of the high value-driven product development 
environment, the hard-coded blockbuster strategy has become completely futile with increasing probabilities 
of failure. . . . [I]t [is] not the technology or the markets that [are] to blame here, but the broader innovation 
strategy.”).  
 5 See, e.g., Fabio Pammolli et al., The Productivity Crisis in Pharmaceutical R&D, 10 NATURE REVS. 
DRUG DISCOVERY 428, 428 (2011) (discussing an empirical examination of the decline in pharmaceutical 
productivity and its determinants); Steven M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: The 
Pharmaceutical Industry’s Grand Challenge, 9 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 203 (2010) (describing 
the productivity crisis in the pharmaceutical industry and examining the contributions of each step in the R&D 
process to overall productivity). 
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costly and valuable information, such as toxicology results and other 
information about drug candidate failures.6 Inadequate investments in industry-
wide process innovations, such as increasing data transparency and pooling 
discovery resources, lead to further missed opportunities to improve 
productivity. The promises that scientific advances in the understanding of 
disease offer for improving the treatment of disease seem increasingly out of 
reach, leading some members of Congress to question the significant 
investments being made in biomedical research.7 
Nobody is happy with a situation in which the cost of drug discovery is 
increasing while the number of novel drugs approved for human use is flat or 
falling.8 In response, federal and even state government policy makers are 
scrambling to retool the innovation process for medical therapies in ways that 
will deliver faster, better, and more cost-effective results.9 They are focusing in 
particular on strategies for increasing the speed and effectiveness of translating 
scientific knowledge into new medical technologies.10 Pharmaceutical 
companies are joining in the search for new innovation models as expiring 
patents on blockbuster drugs and thinning drug pipelines threaten their existing 
business models.11 In the pursuit of improved and cheaper ways to produce 
new drugs, both groups are turning to universities, traditionally the sources of 
early-stage drug discovery, to play an expanded role in the post-discovery drug 
 
 6 See, e.g., Julia Kollewe, Pharmaceuticals Struggle to Find Next Blockbuster Drugs as R&D Costs 
Soar, GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/nov/21/pharmaceuticals-drug-
research-costs-rise (“[T]he pharmaceutical R&D sector can do more to work together, for example, sharing 
knowledge on the science behind failed molecules and studies will help improve success rates, and ultimately 
bring down the cost to develop new medicines.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 7 See, e.g., JOHN F. SARGENT JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42410, FEDERAL RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT FUNDING: FY2013 (2012). 
 8 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
3 (2006).  
 9 See Collins, supra note 1, at 1. 
 10 Id. Attention is focused in particular on what is often referred to as the “valley of death.” The valley of 
death refers to the part of the innovation process that begins with post-discovery development and moves 
through to later stages of product development. For a discussion of the valley of death in the drug discovery 
context, see Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for 
Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1 (2008), which offers a strategy for 
addressing the valley of death in drug discovery and development that separates upstream research on 
promising genes, proteins, and biological pathways from downstream drug candidates. While this Article 
focuses on the movement from biological research to the development of drugs, the ideas have broader 
application to other fields that involve a complex combination of research and development efforts and often 
risky and lengthy product development timelines, such as nanotechnology. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 1, at 
1–2. 
 11 See Daniel Cressey, Traditional Drug-Discovery Model Ripe for Reform, 471 NATURE 17, 17 (2011). 
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development process. As a result of financial pressures and the lure of new 
funding and research opportunities, many of the larger U.S. research 
universities are reconsidering the roles that they play in the innovation process 
and experimenting with new ways of moving into spaces traditionally reserved 
for commercial actors.12 In doing so, they are pushing against implicit 
boundaries in the legal framework governing technology transfer and 
challenging traditional views of universities as sites for disinterested discovery 
and dissemination of public knowledge. 
This Article begins with the challenges that face the pharmaceutical 
industry and the related pressures on universities and investigates two 
questions. First, the Article considers whether universities offer any advantages 
over firms and governments in managing not only drug discovery, but also 
post-discovery drug development. Second, this Article considers the 
implications of an expanded university role in drug development for the 
existing institutional framework governing university technology development 
and transfer. The Article uses an experiment with drug development capacity 
currently underway at Emory University as a case study with which to explore 
these questions. This experiment takes Emory much further along the path of 
drug development than most universities have ventured. It relies on Emory’s 
ability to create and manage a number of separate but closely related public 
knowledge and proprietary development projects within a single organizational 
system. The case study illustrates the comparative advantages that the 
university, as a unique organizational form, might offer over firms and 
government labs in managing drug development. At the same time, the case 
study illustrates the challenges of protecting the public interest in access to and 
use of publicly funded research results without jeopardizing product 
development goals. The Article concludes that the governance structure of the 
university may offer certain advantages over both government and industry in 
managing the kinds of translational research and development activities that 
are becoming a critical part of downstream drug development.13 But realizing 
 
 12 Fiscal challenges are forcing many, if not most, higher education institutions to rethink their purpose 
and modes of operation. The nature and direction of the changes taking place will, or at least should, vary 
tremendously based on existing institutional capabilities and strengths. This Article focuses on the shifts taking 
place in universities with well-established biomedical research capabilities, particularly those with existing 
experience in drug discovery. This limits the focus to a relatively small number of large U.S. research 
universities, primarily those with significant NIH and National Science Foundation (NSF) funding.  
 13 See, e.g., Julie Frearson & Paul Wyatt, Drug Discovery in Academia: The Third Way?, 5 EXPERT 
OPINION ON DRUG DISCOVERY 909 (2010) (suggesting opportunities that universities offer for creating new 
drug discovery paradigms). But see R. L. Juliano, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Public Policy: The Case for 
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the potential of these advantages may require changes in the legal and 
regulatory framework governing universities and their involvement in 
processes of innovation.14 
In the current economic and political environment, it is highly likely that 
some of the largest research universities, which are also the recipients of the 
bulk of federal research funding,15 will continue to experiment with expanded 
roles in product development.16 This experimentation will exacerbate existing 
tensions between public science and private development interests in a way 
that merits a thoughtful policy response. Instead of leaving the regulation of 
development activities to an outdated technology transfer framework, the law 
should address the tensions between open science and proprietary development 
directly.17 Existing rules and regulations need to be sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate alternative models of university activity that permit at least some 
 
a New Strategy for Drug Discovery and Development, 40 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2013) (suggesting 
creation of nonprofit drug development corporations as an alternative approach). 
 14 Throughout this Article I use the term university loosely to include both universities and academic 
medical centers, some of which are highly integrated into their affiliated universities and some of which 
remain fairly autonomous. Most academic medical centers are owned by their affiliated universities and have a 
reporting structure that involves oversight by the university. But the relationship between academic medical 
centers and the rest of the university is one that needs further exploration in the context of the changing 
university role and appropriate legal structure explored here. See generally Arthur S. Levine et al., The 
Relationship Between the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine and the University of Pittsburgh 
Medical Center—A Profile in Synergy, 83 ACAD. MED. 816 (2008); Joseph V. Simone, Understanding 
Academic Medical Centers: Simone’s Maxims, 5 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 2281 (1999) (illustrating, through a 
personal account of working within an academic medical center, the many different organizational challenges 
of an institution with combined goals of research, patient care, and revenue). 
 15 See, e.g., NIH Awards by Location & Organization, NIH RES. PORTFOLIO ONLINE REPORTING TOOLS, 
http://report.nih.gov/award/index.cfm (last updated Apr. 29, 2013); see also CHRISTINE M. MATTHEWS, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R41895, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH (2012); Brandon Glenn, Top NIH 
Grant Funding by Institutions, States for 2010, MEDCITY NEWS (Mar. 7, 2011, 3:10 PM), http://medcitynews. 
com/2011/03/top-nih-grant-funding-by-institutions-states-for-2010/. 
 16 The combination of increasingly expansive industry–academic partnerships, funding pressures 
requiring public–academic–private collaborations, continued investment by policy makers in fostering 
translational research capacity at universities, and changing skill sets and research and development 
capabilities within the university make this a shift that is likely to continue for quite some time. See, e.g., 
Shreefal Mehta, Commentary, The Emerging Role of Academia in Commercializing Innovation, 22 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 21 (2004). 
 17 As used in this paper, the “public knowledge” function of the university refers to the mission-driven 
roles of academic research universities to “create, preserve, teach, and apply knowledge” for the public good. 
See University Mission Statement, EMORY U., http://www.emory.edu/president/governance/mission_statement. 
html (last visited May 8, 2013). Both public and private research universities receive significant public 
support, including direct funding, special tax treatments, and philanthropic support, in return for their 
commitment to these public knowledge functions. For example, consider Emory University’s mission, which 
should be kept in mind when we discuss the Emory experiment in Part III of this Article: “Emory University’s 
mission is to create, preserve, teach, and apply knowledge in the service of humanity.” Id. 
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kinds of proprietary drug development activity. But they also need to provide 
for greater transparency, accountability, and responsibility on the part of the 
university in the use of public funds and the safeguard of public knowledge.18 
The primary piece of legislation dealing directly with universities and their 
management of the fruits of federally funded research is the Bayh–Dole Act, 
passed in 1980 as an amendment to the U.S. Patent Act.19 The nonprofit tax 
status of research universities brings with it additional obligations on the 
management and use of university resources,20 and publicly owned universities 
have still another layer of regulation.21 As a first step in adapting the legal 
framework to changing university roles, I suggest some modest changes to the 
Bayh–Dole Act and related tax rules that are designed to enhance the 
governance advantages of the university in mixed processes of scientific 
research and drug development. The patent-focused, technology-transfer-
oriented mandate of the Bayh–Dole Act should be replaced with a broader 
mandate of managing and supporting innovation in the public interest. 
Flexibility in the types of income that can be earned and the ways in which 
Bayh–Dole funds can be used should be accompanied by university 
monitoring, disclosure, and reporting requirements designed to increase the 
transparency, accountability, and responsibility of universities in the 
management of drug development activities. Universities should have clear 
guidelines about how the funds they receive from drug development activities 
can be used and the volume of development-versus-research activities that they 
can engage in. Collective action problems among competing universities with a 
shared interest in open access to scientific knowledge should be addressed 
through limits on the use of patents in ways that impede competing research 
efforts. 
 
 18 The need for greater accountability in the management of federally funded research was highlighted in 
a recent National Academies report on university management of intellectual property. See NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
(Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2011); see also Arti K. Rai & Bhaven N. Sampat, 
Accountability in Patenting of Federally Funded Research, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 953 (2012) (finding 
underreporting of federal funding by universities).  
 19 See Bayh–Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6, 94 Stat. 3015, 3018–27 (1980) (codified as amended at 
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006)). 
 20 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).  
 21 Most public universities are founded and operated by state government entities, and they are subject to 
state-specific laws. For a list of major public and land-grant institutions and descriptions of issues specific to 
public universities, see ASS’N PUB. & LAND-GRANT U., http://www.aplu.org (last visited May 8, 2013).  
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Part I of this Article begins by describing the challenges facing modern 
drug development and the pressures that government and industry are placing 
on universities to expand their role in drug development. Part II explains why 
universities with existing drug discovery capabilities might have a comparative 
advantage in undertaking the kinds of mixed discovery and development 
efforts that are needed to reinvigorate pharmaceutical innovation. This 
advantage will be particularly large in areas of pharmaceutical innovation 
where the benefits to science and the satisfaction of unmet medical needs are 
not accompanied by expectations of a blockbuster drug. It goes on to examine 
some of the current experiments with expanding university innovation 
capacity. Part III investigates the shifting role of the university through the lens 
of an experiment in drug development currently underway at Emory 
University. This Part explores the intertwined organizational and legal 
structure and some of the motivating goals and assumptions underlying this 
project, and then considers the implications of this changing university role for 
the existing institutional framework governing universities and technology 
transfer. Part IV suggests potential directions of change in the legal framework 
designed to support and improve university governance of university-
controlled drug development activities. While recognizing the opportunities 
that some universities may offer for advancing publicly beneficial drug 
development goals, this Article does not suggest that all universities should be 
experimenting with moving downstream into product development. Rather, it 
concludes that the relatively small number of universities that have strong 
capabilities in drug discovery and development may have comparative 
advantages in moving further downstream in drug development, and that the 
legal framework should respond directly to both the challenges and the 
opportunities that this changed university role might provide. 
I. THE PRODUCTIVITY CRISIS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
Consider two numbers: 800,000 and 21. The first is the number of 
medical papers that were published in 2008. The second is the 
number of new drugs that were approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration [in 2010].22 
The past 60 years have seen huge advances in many of the scientific, 
technological and managerial factors that should tend to raise the 
 
 22 David Bornstein, Helping New Drugs out of Research’s ‘Valley of Death,’ N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR 
(May 2, 2011, 9:15 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/helping-new-drugs-out-of-
academias-valley-of-death.  
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efficiency of commercial drug research and development (R&D). Yet 
the number of new drugs approved per billion US dollars spent on 
R&D has halved roughly every 9 years since 1950, falling around 80-
fold in inflation-adjusted terms.23 
Few question the need for change in the pharmaceutical industry. What this 
change should look like, however, is a matter of debate. To understand the 
challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry and the role of U.S. research 
universities in helping to address these challenges, it is helpful to have some 
understanding of the traditional drug discovery and development process and 
the legal framework that helped to shape it. 
A. The Traditional Approach to Drug Development 
Creating a new drug is a complicated, iterative process, but at a basic and 
highly simplified level it can be understood as follows: Drug discovery 
typically begins with the identification of a drug target, such as a protein, that 
research has shown to play a role in disease.24 Basic research into the 
underlying mechanisms of disease and the nature of disease pathways 
contributes to the discovery of new drug targets.25 After identifying a 
promising drug target, investigators search for or create drug candidates that 
can block or activate that target.26 Processes of drug discovery increasingly 
employ new technologies, such as high-throughput screening, to identify drug 
candidates.27 Once promising drug candidates have been identified, next steps 
include synthesis, characterization, screening, and testing of the candidate to 
evaluate its therapeutic effectiveness.28 The hoped-for result is a drug 
candidate that shows promise in addressing an unmet medical need. Drug 
development starts with the drug candidate and involves the steps required to 
seek transformation of the candidate into an approved drug. This involves 
 
 23 Jack W. Scannell et al., Diagnosing the Decline in Pharmaceutical R&D Efficiency, 11 NATURE REVS. 
DRUG DISCOVERY 191, 191 (2012). 
 24 For an accessible description and characterization of the drug development and discovery process, see 
Jens Eckstein, Drug Discovery Tutorial, ALZHEIMER RES. F., http://www.alzforum.org/drg/tut/ISOATutorial. 
pdf (last visited May 8, 2013).  
 25 Id. at 3.  
 26 Id. at 6.  
 27 See id. at 7. An increasingly important way of finding promising drug candidates is to investigate how 
the target interacts with randomly chosen compounds, typically done through high-throughput screening 
(HTS) facilities with the use of compound libraries. See id. Hits, or compounds that show binding capacity to 
the target, become the subject of further study and refinement. Id. at 7–8, 11. 
 28 See Making a Drug, BIG PICTURE, Jan. 2008, at 4, 4, available at http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/ 
groups/corporatesite/@msh_publishing_group/documents/web_document/wtx042416.pdf.  
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preclinical testing, primarily in microorganisms and animal models, followed 
by clinical testing in humans to determine the safety and efficacy of the 
proposed drug, and finally regulatory approval.29 
In the traditional model of drug discovery, private sector organizations rely 
on universities and publicly funded researchers, along with their own internal 
research efforts, to generate basic knowledge about disease mechanisms and to 
identify leads for new drug candidates. Biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies use this publicly funded knowledge to isolate promising drug 
candidates for further development work.30 The traditional process of drug 
development has been a closed one, relying not just on legal mechanisms such 
as patents and data exclusivity, but also on organizational strategies such as 
internalizing core development activities to limit information sharing.31 
Pharmaceutical companies look for exclusive intellectual property rights to 
promising drug candidates, and then engage in a closed, resource-intensive 
process of screening, testing, refining, and engaging in clinical trials for those 
drug candidates that have the potential to become approved drugs with 
significant economic markets.32 Universities have come to play a greater role 
in early phases of drug discovery over the past several decades because the 
lines between research and early-stage development have blurred and 
discovery tools, such as high-throughput screening, have become more 
accessible to academic researchers.33 Yet the private sector has continued to 
dominate later phases of drug development.34 Moreover, much of this 
 
 29 See, e.g., About Drug Discovery and Development, PPD, http://www.ppdi.com/About/About-Drug-
Discovery-and-Development.aspx (last visited May 8, 2013); Drug Development and Review Definitions, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedand 
Approved/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/ucm176522.htm (last updated Feb. 
22, 2010). There is an additional complicated transition from regulatory approval to effective use by the 
patient with the unmet medical need. This second part of the translational medicine process is also an area in 
which universities can play an important role.  
 30 See, e.g., B. Michael Silber, Commentary, Driving Drug Discovery: The Fundamental Role of 
Academic Labs, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., May 5, 2010, at 1, 1. 
 31 See, e.g., Cressey, supra note 11, at 17.  
 32 See, e.g., KI Kaitin, Deconstructing the Drug Development Process: The New Face of Innovation, 87 
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 356 (2010). 
 33 Silber, supra note 30, at 1, 3 (discussing the importance of academic labs in the development of 
innovative new medicines, particularly through discoveries arising from basic research). 
 34 See, e.g., Cockburn, supra note 4 (describing changing industry structure but persistence of private 
sector in controlling downstream development). 
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development activity has been concentrated inside of a relatively small group 
of very large pharmaceutical companies.35 
This distribution of responsibilities between publicly funded research 
institutions and the private sector is largely a function of the U.S. legal and 
regulatory framework. Public funds are channeled through the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) and other federal and state funding agencies, such as 
the National Science Foundation (NSF), to support scientific research.36 These 
public funds support research on the underlying mechanisms of disease and 
potential targets for therapies, as well as discoveries in other areas with 
potential application to drug discovery and development.37 This research is 
conducted mainly at universities, government laboratories, and other research 
institutions.38 Large pharmaceutical companies and biotechnology companies 
pick up the resulting discoveries through licensing of underlying intellectual 
property rights.39 These commercial entities engage in extensive drug 
 
 35 For an example of an overview of pharmaceutical industry output based on different measures of 
concentration, see Joseph A. DiMasi, New Drug Innovation and Pharmaceutical Industry Structure: Trends in 
the Output of Pharmaceutical Firms, 34 DRUG INFO. J. 1169 (2000). See also LARRY DAVIDSON & GENNADIY 
GREBLOV, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005) (examining major players in 
the pharmaceutical industry and industry trends). 
 36 See SARGENT, supra note 7; see also About NIH, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/ 
(last updated Feb. 6, 2013) (“NIH is the largest source of funding for medical research in the world . . . .”). 
 37 The mission of the NIH, for example, is to “seek fundamental knowledge about the nature and 
behavior of living systems and the application of that knowledge to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce 
the burdens of illness and disability.” Mission, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/mission.htm 
(last updated Mar. 3, 2011). It has grown into the single largest funder of biomedical research in the world. 
About NIH, supra note 36.  
 38 See, e.g., MATTHEWS, supra note 15. This approach reflects a post-World War II vision of U.S. 
innovation in which public funding supports basic research at universities and other research institutions, 
which is later picked up and commercialized by the private sector. Universities are seen as the engines of 
innovation, generating public goods that serve as the inputs for private goods produced by the private sector. 
Id. at 1.  
 39 See, e.g., Gary P. Pisano, The Governance of Innovation: Vertical Integration and Collaborative 
Arrangements in the Biotechnology Industry, 20 RES. POL’Y 237 (1991) (examining the evolution of the 
organizational structure of the biotechnology industry, highlighting governance choices as responding to the 
special nature and challenges of the technology, and noting the evolution of the biotechnology industry as a 
specialized R&D supply market). While a variety of other players have emerged in the pharmaceutical market 
alongside pharmaceutical companies, including biotechnology companies that venture downstream into drug 
development and contract research organizations that perform various phases of the development process, the 
characteristics of the process of concern here have remained largely unchanged. Drug development is still 
largely a proprietary process requiring significant scale economies, although outsourcing is increasing. See, 
e.g., Cockburn, supra note 4, at 13; David Maris, What’s Really Driving the Pharma M&A Frenzy, FORBES 
(Apr. 27, 2012, 11:42 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidmaris/2012/04/27/pharma-feeding-frenzy/ 
(discussing trend of consolidation in the pharmaceutical sector).  
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development efforts in the hope of finding and marketing a blockbuster drug.40 
They incur the significant cost of pushing promising drug candidates through 
the rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive process of clinical testing 
required by the Food and Drug Administration in order to obtain approval for 
new drugs.41 
Two key pieces of legislation, the Bayh–Dole Act and the Stevenson–
Wydler Technology Innovation Act, were enacted in 1980 to facilitate the 
transfer of federally funded inventions from university and government labs to 
the private sector for applied research and development.42 The Bayh–Dole Act, 
an amendment to the U.S. Patent Act, allows universities and other entities to 
elect title to inventions developed at least in part through the use of federal 
funds. If they elect title to the intellectual property rights in these inventions, 
these entities are then obligated to seek patent protection and engage in efforts 
to ensure the commercialization of the invention.43 The Stevenson–Wydler 
Technology Innovation Act and the subsequent Federal Technology Transfer 
Act of 1986 granted new authority to federal laboratories, such as the NIH 
Intramural Research Program, to engage in technology transfer and partner 
with industry.44 These Acts were designed with the key goal of facilitating the 
movement of ideas into the marketplace.45 They leave the post-discovery piece 
of the innovation process largely to the private market. The Bayh–Dole Act in 
particular pays little attention to the innovation-related activities of the 
 
 40 See Cressey, supra note 11, at 17.  
 41 For a description of the FDA drug approval process, see Development & Approval Process (Drugs), 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/default.htm (last updated 
Oct. 15, 2012); Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 
22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003). For critiques of the FDA process and its impact on drug costs, see for 
example, Gary S. Becker, Get the FDA Out of the Way, and Drug Prices Will Drop, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 15, 2002), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2002-09-15/get-the-fda-out-of-the-
way-and-drug-prices-will-drop; and Avik Roy, How the FDA Stifles New Cures, Part I: The Rising Cost of 
Clinical Trials, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2012, 5:19 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2012/04/24/how-the-fda-
stifles-new-cures-part-i-the-rising-cost-of-clinical-trials/, which reviewed a Manhattan report on FDA costs. 
 42 Stevenson–Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3714 (2006)); Bayh–Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6, 94 Stat. 3015, 3018–
27 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006)). The Stevenson–Wydler Act is codified in 
the U.S. Code under the heading “Technology Innovation.” 
 43 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(3) (2006) (amended 2011). 
 44 For a summary of these major pieces of technology transfer legislation, see Howard Bremer, U.S. 
Laws Affecting the Transfer of Intellectual Property, in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH 
AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION: A HANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES 265, 266 (Anatole Krattiger et al. eds., 
2007). 
 45 David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. Sampat, University Patents and Patent Policy Debates in the USA, 
1925–1980, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 781, 796 (2001).  
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university beyond its initial disclosure, patenting, and minimal reporting 
requirements. While the Act includes march-in rights as a mechanism for 
ensuring that publicly funded inventions are not shelved, these march-in rights 
are poorly specified and have never been used.46 
Technology transfer legislation, along with significant public funds 
directed at research but not at development activities, has reinforced the 
existing distribution of drug discovery and development activities between 
research institutions and the private sector. The growth of technology transfer 
offices across most, if not all, of the major U.S. research universities has 
further entrenched this model of university technology transfer.47 While 
additional federal programs have since been developed to support the private 
sector in moving early-stage technologies out of universities, these programs 
remain small in comparison to the amount of public funding directed at basic 
research.48 Moreover, where public funds are targeted at development 
activities, they are directed primarily at commercial entities rather than at 
universities.49 
This model of proprietary drug development fueled by public biomedical 
research has dominated the biomedical industry for decades.50 The apparent 
success of this model has served as the poster child for government policies 
supporting public funding of biomedical research and strong, privately owned 
patent rights on the fruits of this research.51 Against this background, a small 
group of large pharmaceutical companies has been able to retain its dominance 
in the pharmaceutical industry and has limited changes in downstream 
processes of drug development and distribution.52 The pharmaceutical industry 
 
 46 See 35 U.S.C. § 203 (describing the march-in rights).  
 47 See DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY–INDUSTRY 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH–DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 144–47 (2004); 
Bhaven N. Sampat & Richard R. Nelson, The Evolution of University Patenting and Licensing Procedures: An 
Empirical Study of Institutional Change, in 19 THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 135, 
150–56 (Paul Ingram & Brian S. Silverman eds., 2002). 
 48 See Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) 
Programs, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH OFF. EXTRAMURAL RES., http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/sbirsttr_ 
programs.htm (last updated Mar. 6, 2013). 
 49 See id. Both the SBIR and STTR programs involve seed funding to private companies—in the case of 
STTR, private companies working in partnership with research institutions. See id.  
 50 See, e.g., Making a Drug, supra note 28, at 4. 
 51 Indeed, even Michele Boldrin and David Levine, in their arguments for abolishing the patent system, 
have suggested that patents may play a useful role in the pharmaceutical industry. MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID 
K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008). 
 52 See DiMasi, supra note 35; see also DAVIDSON & GREBLOV, supra note 35 (examining major players 
in the pharmaceutical industry and industry trends). 
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is a highly regulated industry, and lack of change in the regulatory 
infrastructure may also have contributed to the lack of innovation in the 
process of making drugs. Despite the many advances that have taken place in 
the science and technology of drug discovery, the subsequent process of drug 
development has changed relatively little.53 What has changed dramatically is 
the cost and risk of moving from an early-stage idea to a commercial drug 
candidate.54 
B. The Need for Change 
Diverse commentators have expressed serious concerns about the 
sustainability of the current translational process. However, as can 
sometimes happen in the midst of crisis, this uncertainty is inspiring 
creative ideas among the various stakeholders and fueling quests for 
ground-breaking translational models.55 
– Francis Collins, Director of the NIH 
Moving from early stages of the discovery process to late stages of 
development has become more and more expensive. The cost of developing a 
new drug is estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars, commonly 
believed to be over $800 million based on reported industry data, with some 
estimates at over $1 billion.56 Much of the expense arises in later stages of drug 
development, particularly during the preclinical studies and clinical trials 
 
 53 See Collins, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing the need for innovation in the process of drug development, 
e.g., in how clinical trials are conducted). 
 54 See Cockburn, supra note 1, at 2 (evaluating changes in productivity in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 55 Collins, supra note 1, at 2.  
 56 See, e.g., JORGE MESTRE-FERRANDIZ ET AL., OFFICE OF HEALTH ECON., THE R&D COST OF A NEW 
MEDICINE, at v (2012); Roger Collier, Drug Development Cost Estimates Hard to Swallow, 180 CMAJ 279, 
279 (2009) (discussing Tufts Center of Drug Development figures of cost of drug discovery and development); 
DiMasi et al., supra note 41 (attempting to measure the total capitalized costs of sixty-eight randomly selected 
new drugs); John Carroll, Economists Cite Soaring Costs Behind Average $1.9B Price Tag on Drug R&D, 
FIERCEBIOTECH (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.fiercebiotech.com/story/economists-cite-soaring-costs-behind-
average-19b-price-tag-drug-rd/2012-12-03. But see Donald W. Light & Rebecca Warburton, Demythologizing 
the High Costs of Pharmaceutical Research, 6 BIOSOCIETIES 34, 46–47 (2011) (critiquing current reports on 
R&D costs for new drugs and seeking to show how much lower actual drug development costs may be and 
suggesting the true cost may be closer to $43.4 million); James Love, Evidence Regarding Research and 
Development Investments in Innovative and Non-Innovative Medicines 6–7 (Sept. 23, 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/rnd/evidenceregardingrnd.pdf; Timothy Noah, The 
Make-Believe Billion, SLATE (Mar. 3, 2011, 9:19 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the_customer/ 
2011/03/the_makebelieve_billion.html (discussing studies critiquing high estimates of drug discovery and 
development costs).  
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needed to obtain regulatory approval of a new drug.57 Fewer than one in ten 
medical therapies that move into human clinical trials succeed.58 An estimated 
82% of drugs fail phase II clinical trials,59 only an estimated 50% of phase III 
studies are successful, and only about 60% of drugs submitted to the FDA get 
approved.60 The high failure rate at these late stages of development produces 
massive financial losses for pharmaceutical companies engaged in drug 
development.61 Moreover, many of the drugs that end up failing in late-stage 
clinical trials fail due to lack of efficacy or safety based on issues that should 
have been discoverable long before phase III clinical testing.62 The high cost 
and risk of failure, along with average timelines from target discovery to new 
drug approval averaging thirteen years, deters the private sector from 
supporting many promising drug development projects. Those projects 
involving really new, and therefore risky, approaches to the treatment of 
disease are especially hard to finance.63 
The huge cost and time required to get a new molecular entity approved as 
a drug, coupled with the high number of late-stage failures and the increasing 
regulatory demand for more tailored therapeutics, has made drug development 
less profitable for pharmaceutical companies. These realities, combined with 
patent expirations of blockbuster drugs and thinning drug pipelines, have 
produced a cumulative loss of $626 billion in the market capitalization of the 
 
 57 See, e.g., Paul et al., supra note 5, at 206 fig.2; F.M. Scherer, R&D Costs and Productivity in 
Biopharmaceuticals (Harvard Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Faculty Research Working Paper No. 11-046, 2011). To 
obtain regulatory approval for a new drug in the United States, clinical testing is required to show safety and 
efficacy of the new drug. The process of regulatory approval by the FDA, the agency charged with approving 
new drugs, involves Phase 0, which involves testing the properties of the drug in a small number of individuals 
to study its properties, Phase I, which involves testing the drug in small numbers of people for safety, Phase II, 
which involves larger clinical trials to study efficacy and safety, and Phase III trials, which evaluate efficacy. 
Some drugs also go through Phase IV, post-approval studies. For a simple description of these phases, see 
Clinical Trials: What You Need to Know, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/acs/groups/cid/ 
documents/webcontent/003006-pdf.pdf (last updated Sept. 21, 2012); FDA’s Drug Review Process: 
Continued, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm289601. 
htm (last updated Mar. 13, 2012). 
 58 Matthew Herper, The Truly Staggering Cost of Inventing New Drugs, FORBES, Mar. 12, 2012, at 38.  
 59 John Arrowsmith, Phase II Failures: 2008–2010, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 328, 328 
(2011). 
 60 See Bernard Munos, In Defense of the FDA, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2012, 8:04 AM), www.forbes.com/ 
sites/bernardmunos/2012/12/19/in-defense-of-fda/. 
 61 See Silber, supra note 30, at 1 (discussing financial impact of failed drugs). 
 62 See Munos, supra note 60 (reporting that the combined failure rate for phase III clinical trials and 
submission to the FDA is estimated to be 70%, and approximately “87% of these failures are due to lack of 
efficacy (66%) or safety (21%)”).  
 63 See Collins, supra note 1, at 1. 
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pharmaceutical industry from 2001 to 2009 with further substantial losses 
expected ahead.64 Between 2012 and 2015, for example, patents on drugs 
accounting for more than $250 billion in annual sales will expire, and many of 
the largest pharmaceutical companies have already seen more than $60 billion 
in lost annual sales due to competition from generics.65 
Barriers to the flow of knowledge and technology also help to explain why 
major advances in knowledge about the underlying mechanisms of disease, 
along with breakthroughs in technologies for molecular modeling, drug 
screening, and drug synthesis, have not produced corresponding breakthroughs 
in the treatment of disease.66 Early-stage discoveries may be difficult to 
translate into downstream applications for a variety of reasons. Discoveries 
may be difficult to transfer across organizational boundaries due to both legal 
and cultural differences between university and industry, particularly where the 
transfer of tacit knowledge held by academic scientists is also needed to make 
sense of and implement early-stage discoveries.67 In addition, discoveries may 
be difficult to attach to a particular drug development project because they 
illuminate general disease mechanisms rather than specific drug candidates, 
requiring translational work that is a combination of basic and applied research 
to narrow down promising next steps for developing a particular drug. As 
described by Francis Collins, the Director of the NIH:  
 
 64 Kaitin, supra note 32, at 359. 
 65 See, e.g., Jack DeRuiter & Pamela L. Holston, Drug Patent Expirations and the “Patent Cliff,” U.S. 
PHARMACIST, June 2012, at 12, 20. 
 66 See Bornstein, supra note 22. As noted by David Bornstein: 
Consider two numbers: 800,000 and 21. 
The first is the number of medical research papers that were published in 2008. The 
second is the number of new drugs that were approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
last year.  
That’s an ocean of research producing treatments by the drop. Indeed, in recent decades, 
one of the most sobering realities in the field of biomedical research has been the fact that, 
despite significant increases in funding—as well as extraordinary advances in things like 
genomics, computerized molecular modeling, and drug screening and synthesization—the 
number of new treatments for illnesses that make it to market each year has flatlined at 
historically low levels. 
Id. 
 67 See, e.g., Ajay Agrawal, University-to-Industry Knowledge Transfer: Literature Review and 
Unanswered Questions, 3 INT’L J. MGMT. REVS. 285, 291–96 (2001); Lynne G. Zucker et al., Commercializing 
Knowledge: University Science, Knowledge Capture, and Firm Performance in Biotechnology, 48 MGMT. SCI. 
138, 138–43, 149–51 (2002). See generally Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009, 1012, 1014–16 (2008) (discussing tacit knowledge); Peter Lee, Patent Law and 
the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010); Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, 
Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503 (2012). 
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Scientific advances have moved us from an era in which most drug 
development was based on a short list of a few hundred targets with 
great depth of understanding to an era in which molecular 
technologies provide thousands of new potential drug targets but 
limited information about their mechanisms and potential 
“druggability.”68 
Advances in science may generate too many promising clinical avenues. They 
may challenge the existing medical taxonomy in ways that fit poorly with 
traditional disease-specific development paths.69 Changes in the nature of the 
scientific knowledge reinforce the need for a changed model of drug discovery 
and development that includes a greater integration of research institutions into 
development processes. 
Integrating research and development might improve upstream knowledge 
flows, but difficulties in managing and sharing information efficiently also 
plague downstream development efforts. A lack of data transparency at all 
stages of the drug development process contributes to a duplication of drug 
development efforts and wasted resources as firms pursue drug candidates that 
end in failure.70 The challenge of moving a promising discovery from early-
stage discovery to phase II clinical studies is often referred to with dread by 
stakeholders in drug discovery and development as moving across the “[v]alley 
of [d]eath.”71 Common themes emerging from the growing literature on 
translational research and technology transfer in biomedicine include 
inadequate private investment in drug development due to cost, duration, and 
risk of the development process; breakdowns in the flow of information 
between different entities in the innovation process; and underinvestment in 
 
 68 Collins, supra note 1, at 1–2.  
 69 Id. In discussing the challenges confronting translational research, Francis Collins has suggested that 
new research approaches “have revealed that diseases once considered quite distinct can share similar 
molecular pathways . . . suggest[ing] that the entire framework of medical taxonomy requires rethinking and 
that therapeutics of the future likely will be designed with cellular networks in mind, rather than being limited 
by historical designations of disease category.” Id. at 2. 
 70 See, e.g., Michel Goldman et al., Public–Private Partnerships as Driving Forces in the Quest for 
Innovative Medicines, CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL MED. 2 (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.clintransmed.com/ 
content/pdf/2001-1326-2-2.pdf (discussing the importance of tackling knowledge fragmentation through 
public–private collaborations that foster areas of data sharing). 
 71 See, e.g., EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., THE NEW ROLE OF ACADEMIA IN DRUG DEVELOPMENT 
7, 11 (2010), available at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedfiles/town_hall_white_paper_12-10.pdf 
(discussing the valley of death and efforts to address it in a report based on town hall meetings with experts in 
the field); see also Rai et al., supra note 10, at 3–4, 8–9 (pointing out that big pharmaceutical companies tend 
to focus on a few hundred validated targets because they are safe and thus primarily produce “me-too” drugs 
instead of novel therapies). 
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and too little sharing of information that has a net public benefit due to limits 
on the private appropriation of value. 
But cost, duration, risk, and barriers to the flow of information and 
knowledge are not the only problems facing the pharmaceutical industry. The 
dominance of the blockbuster-drug business model in the pharmaceutical 
industry has contributed to a growing disconnect between the therapeutic areas 
of concentrated industry focus and the types of treatments that are needed to 
address unmet medical needs.72 The prevalence of clusters of drugs that have 
only minor differences from an existing drug, known as “me-too” drugs, and 
the prevalence of expensive technologies with limited proven clinical 
effectiveness have prompted some health law scholars and advocates to 
propose interventions designed to tie the rewards of innovation more closely to 
health outcomes.73 
That this segmented, proprietary, blockbuster model of drug development 
is no longer either desirable or sustainable is increasingly well recognized and 
well documented.74 “[T]he triple frustrations of long timelines, steep costs, and 
high failure rates bedevil the translational pathway” from dramatic advances in 
biomedical science to new drugs.75 Stakeholders are coming to realize that a 
more radical change is needed. It is time to reengineer the drug development 
process.76 These efforts must include increased interaction between different 
stages of discovery and development in support of a “fail earlier and more 
often and tell people about it” model of drug development involving greater 
collaboration, cooperation, and data sharing. Both government and research-
 
 72 See, e.g., Carl Nathan, Commentary, Aligning Pharmaceutical Innovation with Medical Need, 13 
NATURE MED. 304 (2007).  
 73 See, e.g., THOMAS POGGE, AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV. DEV. POLICY CTR., THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MORE 
JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY IN GLOBAL HEALTH (2011). 
 74 See, e.g., Alex Kandybin & Vessela Genova, Big Pharma’s Uncertain Future, STRATEGY & BUS., 
Spring 2012, at 1, 3–4; see also Ben Hirschler, Data Shows Declining Productivity in Drug R&D, REUTERS, 
June 27, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/27/us-pharmaceuticals-rd-idUSTRE65 
Q3IM20100627 (“The 2010 Pharmaceutical R&D Factbook, compiled by CMR International . . . painted a 
gloomy picture of the global pharmaceuticals sector. New drugs launched within the last five years accounted 
for less than 7 percent of industry sales in 2009, down from 8 percent in 2008 . . . .”).  
 75 Collins, supra note 1, at 1. 
 76 See Arti K. Rai, “Open and Collaborative” Research: A New Model for Biomedicine, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 131 (Robert W. 
Hahn ed., 2005); Jeff Cohen et al., Strategic Alternatives in the Pharmaceutical Industry, KELLOGG SCH. 
MGMT., http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/biotech/faculty/articles/strategic_alternatives.pdf (last visited 
May 6, 2013).  
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based nonprofit organizations will play an important role in facilitating these 
efforts. As noted by the Director of the NIH: 
[M]any of the most crucial challenges confronting translational 
science today are precompetitive ones. The development of 
systematic approaches for target validation, the reengineering of rate-
limiting and failure-prone steps in the therapeutic development 
process, and the urgent need to increase the critical mass of well-
trained individuals to drive innovations are among the various 
translational challenges that are ill-suited for solutions derived solely 
from the private sector.77 
C. Public and Private Sector Responses Impacting University Roles 
The question for both public and private stakeholders in the pharmaceutical 
industry has thus become not whether but how to reconfigure the organization 
of pharmaceutical innovation. But despite the recognized need for change, new 
models of cost, risk, and information sharing have been slow to emerge. 
Entrenched organizational interests in the status quo often limit the kinds of 
shifts in development efforts between different stages of the innovation process 
that are needed to respond to the knowledge produced. This is especially true 
when the knowledge indicates that existing projects should be abandoned. 
Moreover, private sector competitors find it hard to open their labs and 
compound libraries to their competitors. Collective action problems among 
pharmaceutical firms may discourage the kind of transparency and information 
sharing needed to sustain new models of interactive discovery and 
development. Antitrust concerns may also discourage private sector 
competitors from collaborations amongst themselves.78 Barriers to private 
sector restructuring combined with recognition of the collaborative capabilities 
that already exist in research universities explain why both the public and the 
private sectors are looking to universities to play an expanded role in drug 
development.79 
 
 77 Collins, supra note 1, at 2. 
 78 See, e.g., Jason Clay, Precompetitive Behaviour—Defining the Boundaries, GUARDIAN (June 2, 2011, 
6:46 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business/precompetitive-behaviour-defining-boundaries 
(discussing European Commission antitrust ruling that raises important questions about balance between 
precompetitive behavior and collusion). For an example of industry navigation of the antitrust rules, see for 
example, Antitrust Policy and Guidelines, BIOMARKERS CONSORTIUM, http://www.biomarkersconsortium.org/ 
pdf/Antitrust_Policy.pdf (last modified Mar. 1, 2011). 
 79 See, e.g., Cressey, supra note 11 (discussing emerging collaborative models of drug discovery and 
development involving greater university role). 
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Public sector views about what universities should be doing in the area of 
pharmaceutical innovation are by no means uniform, however.80 Congressional 
responses to the perceived pharmaceutical productivity crisis and the valley of 
death have fallen largely into two silos. One response has been to question the 
amount of federal money currently being spent on biomedical research, with 
the suggestion that the rate of return is too low and the federal funding for this 
research should be cut.81 In other words, solve the “valley of death problem” 
by reducing the money spent on biomedical research.82 The second response 
has been to seek more support for translational science—the science of 
transforming knowledge about underlying mechanisms of disease into novel 
and effective medical therapies—as a way of bridging the gap between new 
ideas and economic returns.83 This approach was reflected in the Obama 
Administration’s 2011 Strategy for American Innovation, which highlighted 
the goal of commercializing research performed at U.S. research universities.84 
 
 80 See, e.g., Steve Usdin, Lost in Translation, BIOCENTURY, Feb. 14, 2011, at A1 (describing the many 
competing views about federal spending on R&D). 
 81 The search for alternative forms of governance that will improve the system of biomedical innovation 
is driven in part by the beliefs of some members of Congress that the existing system of university technology 
transfer is broken, beliefs fueled by proponents of a more free-market, free-agency approach to technology 
transfer. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON JOBS & COMPETITIVENESS, TAKING ACTION, BUILDING CONFIDENCE: 
FIVE COMMON-SENSE INITIATIVES TO BOOST JOBS AND COMPETITIVENESS 21–22 (2011), available at 
http://files.jobs-council.com/jobscouncil/files/2011/10/JobsCouncil_InterimReport_Oct11.pdf (describing 
strategies for the private sector to foster entrepreneurship); Matt Erskine, NACIE Promotes Innovative Lab-to-
Market Strategies to Spur Economic Growth, U.S. DEPARTMENT COM. (Mar. 13, 2012, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.commerce.gov/blog/2012/03/13/nacie-promotes-innovative-lab-market-strategies-spur-economic-
growth (describing the National Advisory Council on Innovation and Entrepreneurship’s lab-to-market 
strategies). Of even more concern, perceived failures to translate public investments in biomedical science into 
tangible economic gains has fuelled pressures within Congress to alter, and even dramatically reduce, public 
spending on biomedical research even as costs for conducting biomedical research increase.  
 82 See, e.g., SARGENT, supra note 7; Congress Shifting into FY2013 Spending Debate, AM. ASS’N FOR 
CANCER RES. (Jan. 2012), http://www.aacr.org/home/public--media/science-policy--government-affairs/aacr-
cancer-policy-monitor/aacr-cancer-policy-monitor---january-2012/congress-shifting-into-fy2013-spending-
debate.aspx (discussing partisan stalemate that impacts spending on basic science); Jeffrey Mervis, Making the 
Case for Science: Representative Randy Hultgren Sees Room for Improvement in Federal Role, SCI. INSIDER 
(Nov. 13, 2012, 1:25 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2012/11/making-the-case-for-science-
repr.html (arguing against what some have called “luxury science” and advocating for the critical need to 
support science spending in Congress); see also T Randolph Beard et al., A Valley of Death in the Innovation 
Sequence: An Economic Investigation, 18 RES. EVALUATION 343 (2009) (suggesting that spending decisions 
that do not reflect later-stage investment patterns contribute to the valley of death). 
 83 See Collins, supra note 1, at 3–5. 
 84 See, e.g., Memorandum from Ass’n of Am. Univs. et al. to the Office of the Chief Economist, U.S. 
Dep’t of Commerce (Apr. 1, 2011), available at www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=12038 
(discussing models and strategies for university involvement in translational research and commercialization, 
including proof-of-concept centers, and highlighting the university position that the ownership provisions 
provided for under the Bayh–Dole Act should be maintained). 
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The result of these sometimes conflicting policy responses has been a moderate 
decline in the inflation-adjusted budget of the largest funder of biomedical 
research, the NIH, with looming threats of much larger cuts and a shift of 
existing NIH efforts and funding toward translational research projects, many 
of them involving universities.85 
The NIH has taken the lead among public policy makers in trying to 
reengineer the drug development process, and its views and actions have had a 
significant impact on the U.S. research university community. U.S. research 
universities with significant biomedical research capabilities watch NIH policy 
changes closely, since a substantial part of their research funding comes from 
the NIH and since their reputation is determined in part by the amount of NIH 
and NSF funds attracted by university investigators.86 Expanding translational 
science capacity—the facilities, skills, and other resources needed to promote 
post-discovery efforts at pushing drug candidates through later-stage 
discovery, preclinical testing, and clinical testing—forms the core of the NIH’s 
reengineering strategy.87 In 2004 the NIH launched its Roadmap for Medical 
Research, making collaboration in the production, sharing, and application of 
knowledge its central theme.88 This roadmap was the precursor to the NIH 
Common Fund, an institutional step toward creating translational science 
capacity by supporting crosscutting, trans-NIH programs targeted at specific, 
identified roadblocks in translational science.89 The newest manifestation of 
 
 85 See, e.g., MATTHEWS, supra note 15; SARGENT, supra note 7; Usdin, supra note 80. As part of the 
translational research efforts, there is also a push to increase the amount of work done by government agencies 
themselves in the development of medical therapies. See, e.g., Cures Acceleration Network, NAT’L CENTER 
FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/funding-and-notices/can/can.html (last 
visited May 8, 2013).  
 86 See, e.g., The Top American Research Universities, CENTER FOR MEASURING U. PERFORMANCE, 
http://mup.asu.edu/research.html (last visited May 8, 2013) (noting the important role of federal research 
dollars in ranking); see also Joel Norris, The Crisis in Extramural Funding, ACADEME, Nov./Dec. 2011, at 28, 
30–31 (suggesting “greater amounts of extramural funding appear to be associated with more prestige”); 
ASS’N AM. U., http://www.aau.edu (last visited May 8, 2013) (outlining organization of leading research 
universities where membership is by invitation and based largely on nature and amount of research funding). 
 87 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 1, at 1; see also Re-Engineering Translational Sciences, NAT’L CENTER 
FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/reengineering.html 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2012). 
 88 See About the NIH Common Fund, NIH COMMON FUND, http://commonfund.nih.gov/about.aspx (last 
updated May 7, 2013). The roadmap was designed to “address roadblocks to research and to transform the way 
biomedical research is conducted by overcoming specific hurdles or filling defined knowledge gaps.” Id. 
 89 See id. The Clinical and Translational Science Awards (CTSA) Consortium was initially created as a 
roadmap program, and the Molecular Libraries and Imaging Program is a current common fund program. 
These initiatives are designed to support and link a network of clinical and translational research centers, each 
of which is involved in public–private collaborations targeted at different parts of the drug development 
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these efforts at institutional reengineering is the National Center for Advancing 
Translational Science (NCATS).90 
NCATS was officially established in fiscal year 2012 with a budget of 
$575 million, comprising programs and funds that were redirected from other 
units at NIH.91 In 2013 it will have an estimated budget of $639 million, based 
on FY 2013 budget requests.92 NCATS includes both program support for 
institutions engaging in translational research and public facilities for pursuing 
different parts of the drug development process.93 NCATS is now entering its 
second year and is focusing primarily on developing preclinical and clinical 
capabilities that can reduce the cost and risk of drug development for the 
private sector.94 In some cases, the NIH provides translational research 
capacity directly, through creating facilities, compound libraries, or other 
resources that are open to the public.95 In other cases, the NIH programs seek 
to build university capacity, either through funding university infrastructure or 
through opportunities for university investigators.96 The intellectual property 
 
process. See About the CTSA Consortium, CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. AWARDS, 
https://www.ctsacentral.org/about-us/ctsa (last visited May 8, 2013); Molecular Libraries and Imaging, NIH 
COMMON FUND, https://commonfund.nih.gov/molecularlibraries/ (last updated Mar. 18, 2013).  
 90 See NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/ (last visited May 
7, 2013). 
 91 NCATS was created on December 23, 2011 by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, which 
amended the Public Health Service (PHS) Act to include NCATS. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, 
Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 479, 125 Stat. 786, 1086–88 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
The stated mission of NCATS is to “catalyze the generation of innovative methods and technologies that will 
enhance the development, testing, and implementation of diagnostics and therapeutics across a wide range of 
human diseases and conditions.” Department of Health and Human Services National Institutes of Health 
Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Labor-HHS-Educ. Appropriations, 
112th Cong. 8 (2012) (statement of Thomas R. Insel, Acting Director, National Center for Advancing 
Translational Sciences).  
 92 See Budget, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/about/ 
budget/budget.html (last visited May 8, 2013).  
 93 See Research, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/ 
research/research.html (last visited May 8, 2013).  
 94 See id. It is organized into a Division of Clinical Innovation that supports later stages of translational 
research, much of it done in academic medical centers, and a Division of Pre-Clinical Innovation with projects 
aimed at bridging gaps in investment in early development phases for new drugs that address unmet medical 
needs. The Division of Pre-Clinical Innovation includes the Therapeutics for Rare and Neglected Diseases 
(TRND) program and the Bridging Interventional Development Gaps (BrIDGs) program to assist both 
academic and private researchers and companies working on developing novel therapies for unmet medical 
needs. Program Index, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/ 
about/program-index/program-index.html (last visited May 8, 2013).  
 95 For a fact sheet, including a description of programs, see NCATS Fact Sheet, NAT’L CENTER FOR 
ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI. (Summer 2012), http://www.ncats.nih.gov/files/factsheet.pdf.  
 96 Id. 
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structures supporting the different NCATS initiatives vary, but many of the 
infrastructure-based programs, such as developing open-source research tools, 
screening facilities, and compound libraries, seek to leave nongovernment 
parties in control of any inventions arising from contributions that they make.97 
These kinds of publicly funded and supported collaborations to develop drugs 
are already raising important questions about the fit of the existing legal 
structure governing federally funded research. The NIH is exploring special 
approaches to contracting and intellectual property ownership in the context of 
such programs in the hope of improving the governing structures for these 
projects.98 Experiments such as the NIH pilot program on Discovering New 
Therapeutic Uses for Existing Molecules include proposed collaboration 
agreements designed to support project objectives, but these proposed 
agreements also include provisions that may run afoul of university norms and 
policies, such as broad development options to private sector developers.99 
The main NIH translational research efforts to date, which extend well 
beyond the domain of NCATS, are largely responses to the high costs, risks, 
and other barriers that deter drug discovery and development work. NIH 
responses have focused on providing public infrastructure for various aspects 
of the drug discovery and development process, such as government-owned 
screening facilities and compound libraries that are made publicly available,100 
 
 97 See, e.g., Preclinical Drug Development Services for the NIH Center for Translational Therapeutics 
(NCTT), National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS), FED. BUS. OPPORTUNITIES (May 2, 
2012), https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&tab=core&id=4c78cc3b9fd7d503ff94b9ff39c1 
6812&_cview=0. The proposed IP strategy for the NCATS Preclinical Drug Development Services program 
proposes to use the “Determination of Exceptional Circumstances” provided for under the Bayh–Dole Act to 
allow assignment of ownership to the private-party contributor. Id. 
 98 For an NIH description of its Discovering New Therapeutic Use for Existing Molecules program and 
its use of template agreements and specific approaches to collaboration and intellectual property ownership, 
see Discovering New Therapeutic Uses for Existing Molecules, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING 
TRANSLATIONAL SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/rescue-repurpose/therapeutic-uses/ 
therapeutic-uses.html (last visited May 8, 2013). For concerns about this approach and responses to the NIH 
proposal for the preclinical programs, see for example, Letter from Anthony P. DeCrappeo, President, Council 
on Governmental Relations, to Nat’l Insts. of Health (June 1, 2012) [hereinafter Letter from Anthony P. 
DeCrappeo, June 1, 2012], available at www.cogr.edu/viewDoc.cfm?DocID=151925. See also Letter from 
Anthony DeCrappeo, President, Council on Governmental Relations, to Kelli T. Broda, Contracts Specialist, 
Office of Acquisitions (May 17, 2012), available at www.cogr.edu/viewDoc.cfm?DocID=151911 (expressing 
concerns with NIH efforts to use the “exceptional circumstances” provision in Bayh–Dole to reshape IP 
ownership rules for one of its programs).  
 99 See, e.g., Letter from Anthony P. DeCrappeo, June 1, 2012, supra note 98 (expressing concerns with 
NIH dictating terms of contracts involved in the program that conflict with university policies).  
 100 See, e.g., Rescuing and Repurposing Drugs, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., 
http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/rescue-repurpose/rescue-repurpose.html (last visited May 8, 
2013). An example is the NCATS Drug Rescuing and Repurposing program that focuses on finding new uses 
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and encouraging partnerships between academic and industry players oriented 
around the movement from lab to market.101 Some of the newer NIH programs 
have focused on incentivizing the creation of public–private and public–
academic–private collaborations, often referred to as PPPs, in targeted areas of 
drug discovery and early-stage development. These efforts have mainly taken 
the form of tailored grant opportunities and the creation of NIH-hosted drug 
discovery centers and consortiums.102 These initiatives have been supported by 
other key government players in the pharmaceutical industry, such as the 
FDA.103 
As noted above, universities are expected to play a central role in many of 
these translational science initiatives since they have the scientific capabilities 
and often the facilities and human capital needed to support earlier stage 
translational work. Moreover, pharmaceutical companies may be more willing 
to share their proprietary drug discovery and development resources with 
universities than with private firms because universities are not direct 
competitors. Universities provide a comparatively neutral site for what policy 
makers are optimistically referring to as precompetitive collaborations 
designed to share resources central to drug discovery efforts.104 Even if 
 
for existing medicines. As part of this repurposing program, NCATS has created the NCATS Pharmaceutical 
Collection, a publicly accessible database that includes 3,800 approved and investigational medicines available 
for screening to find new uses. Id. 
 101 See, e.g., Erskine, supra note 81 (suggesting using lab-to-market strategies to promote economic 
growth). These initiatives are designed to support cost and risk sharing, facilitate the transfer of knowledge 
among participants in the innovation process, and subsidize the production of socially valuable information. Id. 
 102 See, e.g., Lili M. Portilla & Barbara Alving, Commentary, Reaping the Benefits of Biomedical 
Research: Partnerships Required, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., June 9, 2010, at 1 (noting the importance of 
academic collaboration among industry, academia, and government and the role of NIH in increasing the 
efficiency of the translational process through support of various partnerships). 
 103 The FDA, another key government player in regulating the introduction of new drugs, outlined its own 
views in response to the problems experienced by the biomedical industry with the introduction of the Critical 
Path Initiative. The initiative was launched in March 2004, with the release of FDA’s landmark report 
Innovation/Stagnation: Challenge and Opportunity on the Critical Path to New Medical Products. See FDA’s 
Critical Path Initiative, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/ 
CriticalPathInitiative/ucm076689.htm (last updated Dec. 28, 2012). This initiative was launched with the 
release of a report that diagnosed reasons for the translational valley of death and highlighted the need for 
collective action to modernize scientific and technical tools and harness information technology to help 
evaluate and predict the effectiveness and feasibility of medical products. The report “called for a national 
effort to identify specific activities all along the critical path of medical product development and use, which, 
if undertaken, would help transform the critical path sciences.” Id. By encouraging collaborations between 
public and private players throughout the drug discovery and development process, both the FDA and NIH 
hope to increase the output of effective new medical therapies.  
 104 See, e.g., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., DIFFUSION AND USE OF GENOMIC INNOVATIONS IN 
HEALTH AND MEDICINE: WORKSHOP SUMMARY (2008); INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ESTABLISHING 
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universities take on a bigger role in downstream drug development, they are 
likely to do so in partnership with pharmaceutical companies rather than in 
competition with them. 
The NIH roadmap and the initiatives that followed in its wake have 
prompted experiments with university innovation capacity by universities with 
established biomedical research facilities that are eager to protect and even 
augment their NIH funding.105 The push for new ways of organizing drug 
development processes that include expanded university roles comes not just 
from government, however, but also from industry. After decades of pursuing 
a highly centralized, proprietary approach to drug development, 
pharmaceutical companies are restructuring their own research and 
development activities in the face of unsustainable business models.106 They 
are retrenching their drug discovery and development efforts and looking for 
alternative ways to fill their drug pipelines. Recognizing that new models of 
knowledge production and knowledge sharing are critical to solving the 
productivity crisis in the biomedical industry, they are radically changing their 
operations, moving away from centralized R&D, and instead relying on 
outsourcing, joint ventures, and other ways to decentralize the drug discovery 
and development process.107 One way of reducing costs is to share 
development infrastructure wherever possible. This requires either 
collaboration or outsourcing of various steps in the development process.108 
Another way of reducing costs is to shift from a process in which there are 
late-stage drug development failures to a system in which there are frequent 
 
PRECOMPETITIVE COLLABORATIONS TO STIMULATE GENOMICS-DRIVEN PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT: WORKSHOP 
SUMMARY (2011).  
 105 All of the top U.S. research universities depend heavily on NIH and NSF funding to support their 
biomedical research efforts. See, e.g., E. Ray Dorsey et al., Funding of US Biomedical Research, 2003–2008, 
303 JAMA 137, 140 (2010) (“Federal sources remain the largest contributor to academic biomedical research 
expenditures, accounting for 65% of expenditures, followed by institutional funds (18% of expenditures).”). 
NIH and NSF funding also contributes heavily to the reputations of U.S. research universities, intensifying the 
interest of the top ranked schools in retaining and attracting new federal funds. See, e.g., The Top American 
Research Universities, supra note 86; see also Margaret E. Blume-Kohout et al., Federal Life Sciences 
Funding and University R&D (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15146, 2009) (noting 
empirical evidence suggests that success in attracting federal funds may be interpreted as signal of recipient 
quality by nonfederal funders). 
 106 See Pammolli et al., supra note 5, at 428 (discussing an empirical examination of the decline in 
pharmaceutical productivity and its determinants); Paul et al., supra note 5, at 203 (describing the productivity 
crisis in pharmaceutical industry and examining the contributions of each step in R&D process to overall 
productivity).  
 107 See, e.g., Cressey, supra note 11; see also Jackie Hunter, Is Open Innovation the Way Forward for Big 
Pharma?, 9 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 87, 87 (2010).  
 108 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 107, at 87. 
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early failures.109 This requires more interaction between different stages of the 
discovery and development process, such as more experimentation with a 
larger number of potential drug candidates at early stages of development.110  
Pharmaceutical companies are pursing both strategies, resulting in 
increased interaction between academic researchers and industry scientists and 
a closer integration of the scientific aspects of drug discovery with the 
commercial aspects of drug development.111 The increasingly dual nature of 
many discoveries as both basic knowledge and commodities with commercial 
application further intertwines research and development efforts. University–
industry partnering in different components of the drug discovery and 
development process is therefore expanding in frequency and scope.112 While 
strategies have varied among pharmaceutical companies, most if not all of the 
larger ones have increased their proximity to and reliance on universities in 
some way.113 Sometimes this has involved outsourcing discrete tasks in the 
drug discovery and development process to universities or limited public–
academic–private collaborations around a discrete research project.114 In other 
cases it has led to the creation of translational research centers involving 
 
 109 Paul et al., supra note 5, at 211; see also Failed Alzheimer’s Clinical Trial Data Made Public, 9 
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 505, 505 (2010). 
 110 See, e.g., Eric Bonabeau et al., A More Rational Approach to New Product Development, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Mar. 2008, at 96 (discussing problem with focusing disproportionately on late-stage development and 
lack of adequate early-truth-seeking functions in drug development); Paul et al., supra note 5, at 211 
(discussing quick-win, fast-fail models in contrast to traditional approaches to drug discovery and 
development). 
 111 See, e.g., Todd B. Sherer, Money Without Collaboration Won’t Bring Cures, 19 NATURE MED. 127 
(2013). 
 112 See, e.g., Bethan Hughes, Pharma Pursues Novel Models for Academic Collaboration, 7 NATURE 
REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 631 (2008) (discussing pharma’s search for new models of industry–academic 
collaboration); see also Jerry Thursby & Marie Thursby, University–Industry Linkages in Nanotechnology and 
Biotechnology: Evidence on Collaborative Patterns for New Methods of Inventing, 36 J. TECH. TRANSFER 605 
(2011) (exploring emergence of new methods of collaborative inventing in nanotechnology and 
biotechnology).  
 113 See Goldie Blumenstyk, Big Pharma Finds a Home on Campus, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (D.C.), July 
29, 2011, at A1 (examining the status and trends of pharmaceutical research in the United States in 2011, 
particularly highlighting the shift in project spending from large industries to research universities); Heidi 
Ledford, Drug Buddies, 474 NATURE 433 (2011) (discussing increasing ties between pharmaceutical industry 
and academia in an effort to speed up drug development).  
 114 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER-PAUL MILNE & ASHLEY MALINS, TUFTS CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF DRUG DEV., 
ACADEMIC–INDUSTRY PARTNERSHIPS FOR BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT: ADVANCING 
MEDICAL SCIENCE IN THE U.S. (2012), available at http://csdd.tufts.edu/files/uploads/tuftscsdd_academic-
industry.pdf (describing various types of university–industry partnerships and documenting recent trends).  
VERTINSKY GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/3/2013  10:13 AM 
766 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:741 
varying degrees of joint research and development.115 New high-profile 
pharma–academic partnerships have sprouted at many if not all of the leading 
U.S. research universities.116 Pfizer, one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical 
companies, has relocated many of its facilities next door to universities that 
have well-developed drug discovery capabilities and is seeking to create 
common campuses for collaborative work.117 
In the search for new ways of reengineering the drug discovery and 
development process, pharmaceutical companies have been more willing to 
experiment with open-access models of academic collaboration.118 In some 
cases, pharmaceutical companies have partnered with universities to make 
preemptive investments in the public domain in efforts to preserve open access 
to research inputs.119 Merck’s investment in the creation of the Merck Gene 
Index, developed in partnership with Washington University in St. Louis, 
provides an early example of this effort to preserve access to key inputs in drug 
development.120 More recent efforts by both the private sector and the NIH 
 
 115 See, e.g., id.; see also Stewart Lyman, Pharma–Academic Alliances: What the Numbers Don’t Tell 
You, XCONOMY (May 10, 2011), http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2011/05/10/pharma-academic-alliances-
what-the-numbers-dont-tell-you/?single_page=true (discussing changes in pharma–university partnerships, as 
well as concerns with trends toward broader umbrella arrangements between pharma and academia).  
 116 See supra notes 113, 114; see also Martin Lehr, Pharma–Academic Partnerships & the Impact on 
Venture Funds, OSAGE U. PARTNERS BLOG (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.blogoup.com/blog/2011/4/2/pharma-
academic-partnerships-the-impact-on-venture-funds.html (providing links to news stories covering recent 
high-profile university–industry collaborations); Alan Scher Zagier, Drug Companies Partnering with Top 
Schools, DRUG DISCOVERY & DEV. (Jan. 10, 2013, 2:54 PM), http://www.dddmag.com/news/2013/01/drug-
companies-partnering-top-schools. 
 117 See Pfizer: Creating a Biomedical Engine for Upstream Innovation, PARTNERING NEWS (Aug. 29, 
2011), http://ebdgroup.com/partneringnews/2011/08/pfizer-creating-a-biomedical-engine-for-upstream-
innovation/ (discussing Pfizer’s new Centers for Therapeutic Innovation, which include new common 
campuses for collaborative work at highly ranked universities in San Francisco, Boston, San Diego, and New 
York, funding, access to its databases, and other resources, and in return Pfizer’s first rights to license potential 
products coming out of the networks it has supported); see also Lisa M. Jarvis, Pfizer’s Academic Experiment, 
CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 1, 2012, at 28, 28 (describing the Centers for Therapeutic Innovation 
that Pfizer has established as an experiment in “building a different R&D ecosystem,” each center being a unit 
in the company that focuses on developing drug candidates through collaborations with academic partners 
through colocation of labs and broad collaboration arrangements). 
 118 See, e.g., B Munos, Can Open-Source Drug R&D Repower Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 87 CLINICAL 
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 534 (2010) (discussing proliferation of open-source R&D initiatives, 
including many public–private partnerships, but noting some challenges with this approach). 
 119 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 188 
(2004) (describing private efforts to protect the public domain).  
 120 See, e.g., Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., First Installment of Merck Gene Index Data Released to 
Public Databases: Cooperative Effort Promises to Speed Scientific Understanding of the Human Genome (Feb. 
10, 1995), available at http://www.bio.net/bionet/mm/bionews/1995-February/001794.html. Concerns about 
patents on short snippets of the genetic code (SNPS), which were seen as important inputs in the development 
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have focused on identifying and supporting areas of precompetitive 
collaboration between academia and industry in which at least certain kinds of 
knowledge can be developed and shared more freely.121 Examples include the 
growth of compound libraries and high-throughput screening centers made 
available to academics on open-access terms, with the goal of spurring drug 
discovery and fueling pharmaceutical company product pipelines.122 Even 
broader experiments with open access are taking place in areas where 
proprietary commercial interests are low, such as the search for cures to 
neglected diseases. The Tropical Disease Initiative123 and the open-access 
Malaria Box124 are both examples of open-source drug development initiatives. 
In some cases pharmaceutical companies have taken the lead in promoting 
open-source initiatives. GlaxoSmithKline, for example, spearheaded formation 
of a patent pool for neglected diseases and made one of its facilities available 
to academic researchers interested in working on projects targeting neglected 
disease areas.125 These open-source efforts remain focused on neglected 
disease areas, however, and are reliant on philanthropic and government 
support. 
 
of diagnostics and drugs, prompted a pharmaceutical-company response led by Merck with the creation of the 
Merck Gene Index. See Merges, supra note 119, at 187–88. This was a collaboration with Washington 
University that involved the creation of a public database of gene sequences corresponding to expressed 
human genes. See id. at 188.  
 121 See, e.g., About Us, BIOMARKERS CONSORTIUM, http://www.biomarkersconsortium.org/about.php (last 
visited May 8, 2013); see also BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED 
RESOURCES (2012) (discussing the importance of public infrastructure in innovation processes); DISCOVERY 
PARTNERSHIPS WITH ACADEMIA, www.dpac.gsk.com (last visited May 8, 2013); OPEN INNOVATION DRUG 
DISCOVERY, https://openinnovation.lilly.com/dd/ (last visited May 8, 2013). 
 122 See, e.g., Anuradha Roy et al., Open Access High Throughput Drug Discovery in the Public Domain: 
A Mount Everest in the Making, 11 CURRENT PHARMACEUTICAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 764 (2010) (discussing 
emergence of high-throughput screening centers in the public domain, including the large Molecular Libraries 
Probe Centers Network Centers funded by the NIH roadmap initiative); Bayer Supports Innovative Drug 
Discovery in Europe, PHARMANEWS.EU (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.pharmanews.eu/bayer/1213-bayer-
supports-innovative-drug-discovery-in-europe (reporting that Bayer initiated a pan-European consortium, 
European Lead Factory, to enhance early drug discovery through creation of small molecule library collection, 
with pharma contributions of at least 300,000 substances, supported by the Innovative Medicines Initiative, 
which is a large global public–private partnership focusing on improving pharmaceutical innovation in Europe 
through supporting academic–industry collaboration). 
 123 See, e.g., Stephen M. Maurer et al., Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source an Answer?, 
PLOS MED. 183 (Dec. 2004), http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0010056. 
 124 See, e.g., Open Access Malaria Box, MEDS. FOR MALARIA VENTURE, http://www.mmv.org/malariabox 
(last visited May 8, 2013) (describing the Malaria Box, which has 400 compounds with antimalarial activity 
available to researchers in return for publishing and placing resulting data in the public domain). 
 125 See, e.g., Tres Cantos, GLAXOSMITHKLINE, http://www.gsk.com/partnerships/open-innovation/tres-
cantos.html (last updated Nov. 28, 2012) (describing the company’s open lab at its Tres Cantos drug discovery 
and development facility). 
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While these various initiatives are promising ways of improving the 
productivity of pharmaceutical innovation, more change is needed. The push 
for new models of university involvement in drug development continues as 
resources remain scarce and concerns for the future of pharmaceutical 
innovation remain unabated. 
II. EXPERIMENTING WITH UNIVERSITY INNOVATION CAPACITY 
Universities are experiencing pressures from government and industry 
partners to move beyond their traditional sphere of producing knowledge about 
disease mechanisms and targets for new therapies and toward a more active 
role in transforming their ideas into tangible economic goods.126 The 
combination of increasing costs in supporting biomedical research and more 
competitive and uncertain funding for such research has made this move 
attractive for even those research institutions with little prior interest in moving 
downstream into more applied development work. In response to these 
pressures and corresponding funding, partnering, and research opportunities, 
many leading U.S. research universities are actively experimenting with proof-
of-concept centers, translational research centers, and other ways of 
broadening their involvement in drug discovery and development.127 Although 
universities have collaborated with industry in drug discovery for decades, this 
kind of experimentation with post-discovery drug development is a relatively 
new phenomenon.128 
While these experiments are relatively small in comparison with the scale 
of more traditional academic biomedical research, they are paving the way for 
broader organizational changes. Indeed, undertaking many of these 
experiments has already required modifications to existing university 
intellectual property policies and the development of guidelines, contracting 
practices, and organizational structures to support multidisciplinary centers and 
different kinds of public–academic–private collaboration. Development-
focused initiatives prompt not only administrative changes, but also norm 
 
 126 See Anthony M. Boccanfuso, Commentary, Why University–Industry Partnerships Matter, SCI. 
TRANSLATIONAL MED., Sept. 29, 2010, at 1, 1; Blumenstyk, supra note 113; Jennifer A. Henderson & John J. 
Smith, Academia, Industry, and the Bayh–Dole Act: An Implied Duty to Commercialize 1 (Oct. 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cimit.org/news/regulatory/coi_part3.pdf. 
 127 See Stephen Frye et al., US Academic Drug Discovery, 10 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 409, 409 
(2011); Joanne Kotz, Small (Molecule) Thinking in Academia, SCIBX, June 2, 2011, at 1, 1. 
 128 See, e.g., Frye et al., supra note 127, at 409 (analyzing small molecule drug discovery in academia and 
documenting a large jump in activity); Kotz, supra note 127, at 1 (examining potential impact of academic 
drug discovery and trends in academic involvement). 
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changes operating among researchers both inside and outside of academic 
medical centers, administrators, technology transfer professionals, and 
governing bodies engaged in oversight of university activities.129 As research 
universities already involved in drug discovery become more engaged in 
development activities, beliefs among these constituencies concerning the 
ways in which knowledge should be produced and applied, the role of the 
university within the innovation process, and understandings of how academic 
productivity should be evaluated and rewarded are shifting to accommodate 
these activities. This raises concerns that universities may be shifting too 
much, and without appropriate safeguards on the public knowledge function of 
the university. 
This Article suggests that there may be benefits to expanding the role of 
universities with established drug discovery capabilities in the pharmaceutical 
innovation process, provided that this expansion is managed carefully. These 
benefits stem from certain advantages that universities may have over firms 
and government labs in managing dual processes of producing knowledge and 
producing products. Since this expansion of the university role into the 
commercial domain of product development is not without significant costs 
and risks, it should not be taken lightly.130 But where a university is already 
successfully involved in drug discovery, pushing the involvement of the 
university further into the development process may have advantages that are 
in the public interest. This is particularly true for areas of drug discovery and 
development that do not fit the blockbuster-drug profile and are therefore 
neglected by the industry. Section A of this Part describes the potential 
advantages of the university in managing drug discovery and development, and 
 
 129 See generally Jeannette A. Colyvas & Walter W. Powell, From Vulnerable to Venerated: The 
Institutionalization of Academic Entrepreneurship in the Life Sciences, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 219, 220, 231, 255 (Martin Ruef & Michael Lounsbury eds., 2007) (studying the origins, 
acceptance, and spread of academic entrepreneurship in the biomedical field at Stanford); Toby E. Stuart & 
Waverly W. Ding, When Do Scientists Become Entrepreneurs? The Social Structural Antecedents of 
Commercial Activity in the Academic Life Sciences, 112 AM. J. SOC. 97, 98 (2006) (examining the conditions 
prompting university-employed life scientists to become entrepreneurs and finding evidence that the 
orientation toward commercial science of individuals’ colleagues and coauthors, as well as a number of other 
workplace attributes, significantly influences transition to for-profit science).  
 130 See, e.g., Zoghbi, supra note 4 (discussing concerns that the pressure to develop treatments and the 
bias in NIH funding toward practical outcomes will crowd out support for basic research that is critical to the 
future of biomedicine). “In recent years, however, the pressure to develop treatments at an ever more rapid 
pace has attenuated enthusiasm for deciphering the language of life. . . . [T]oday, many highly qualified basic 
scientists feel compelled to jump on the ‘translational medicine’ bandwagon.” Id. at 250. 
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section B examines the directions that some universities are taking in 
experimenting with expanded innovation capacity. 
A. Comparative Advantages of Universities as Drug Developers 
As discussed above, the innovation process for new drugs needs to include 
greater interaction between discovery and development efforts; greater pooling 
and sharing of knowledge, data, materials, and facilities; and collaborative 
pathways for developing clusters of new drugs. This Article suggests that 
universities have certain organizational characteristics that may give them a 
comparative advantage over firms and government labs in managing the mixed 
research and development activities required of modern pharmaceutical 
innovation in ways that serve the public interest.131 These characteristics are 
(1) the ability of universities, as specialized entities with a public knowledge 
function, to sustain different systems of knowledge production with varying 
levels of openness; (2) the disciplining influence of multiple stakeholders in 
the knowledge production process on university decision making; and (3) the 
flexibility, varying levels of autonomy, and alternative incentive schemes that 
are available within the university’s relatively decentralized governance 
structure.132 
This combination of characteristics is beneficial for mixed processes of 
scientific research and product development in at least two ways. First, the 
organizational structure allows for the creation of semiautonomous projects, or 
units, that can vary in terms of their level of openness and their end goals while 
 
 131 For a broader discussion of the organizational attributes employed in this paper, see Liza Vertinsky, 
Universities as Guardians of Their Inventions, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1949. Nicholas Argyres and Julia Porter 
Liebeskind have put forward a different organizational perspective. See Nicholas S. Argyres & Julia Porter 
Liebeskind, Privatizing the Intellectual Commons: Universities and the Commercialization of Biotechnology, 
35 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 427, 429 (1998) (“[T]he standardization of universities’ governance arrangements, 
required by their social–contractual commitments to practice open science, limits their ability to maintain 
separate incentives and contracting policies for biotechnology on the one hand, and for the rest of the 
intellectual commons on the other.”). For contrasting views, see studies emphasizing the greater incentives, 
knowledge, and resources that industry scientists have to make cumulative discoveries and to push discoveries 
into development, such as Phillipe Aghion et al., Academic Freedom, Private-Sector Focus, and the Process of 
Innovation, 39 RAND J. ECON. 617 (2008); Zucker et al., supra note 67, at 138–43, 149–51. For a discussion 
of the tensions between the commercial and noncommercial aspects of university patenting, see Jacob H. 
Rooksby, Innovation and Litigation: Tensions Between Universities and Patents and How to Fix Them, 15 
YALE J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2013). 
 132 These characteristics are discussed in Vertinsky, supra note 131, and this Article seeks to apply them 
to the context of drug discovery and development. In a subsequent paper, I explore the role of universities as 
innovators in agriculture, where universities have historically played an important role in downstream 
development of their discoveries.  
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remaining loosely connected as a single innovation process. These separable 
units can be restructured, or outsourced, without requiring major changes to the 
other units. This Article borrows from the organizational literature on 
modularity and asset partitioning to describe why this organizational capacity 
might be advantageous in managing drug development.133 Second, these 
characteristics make universities comparatively good organizations for 
providing the kinds of semipublic infrastructure, such as drug discovery 
facilities and software tools, and the diversified intellectual capital needed to 
increase translational research capacity. Universities can harness a combination 
of public and private funds, they can take advantage of the mixed knowledge 
and development benefits of innovation activities, and industry players will be 
more willing to share their own resources with a university than with each 
other. 
The first organizational advantage stems from the ability of the university 
to pursue a modularizing strategy in its organization of different tasks in drug 
discovery and development. Modularity, as used in the organizational 
literature, refers to the ability to decompose a production process into 
“components that are highly interdependent within sub-blocks, called modules, 
and largely independent across those sub-blocks.”134 Within each module, 
elements of the system—which may be decisions, tasks, or components—are 
interdependent, and changing one will require changes in many others. Across 
modules, elements are more independent and changes in one element need not 
 
 133 The growing literature on modularization, property, and intellectual property has a number of 
applications to this analysis. While a systematic application of the insights from this literature to analyze 
partitioning approaches within universities is beyond the scope of this Article, the discussion draws directly 
and indirectly on much of this literature. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual 
Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2083 (2009) [hereinafter Smith, Institutions and Indirectness] (applying 
information cost theory to IP and explaining how difficulty in measuring inputs and identifying likely outputs 
creates advantages for placing a given activity within a module and giving control over local remodularization 
to private actors, with IP allowing for this modularization through the right to exclude); Henry E. Smith, 
Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742 (2007) 
[hereinafter Smith, Intellectual Property] (applying information cost theory to explain how intellectual 
property works, albeit imperfectly, in addressing complex coordination problems of attributing outputs to 
inputs, and how exclusionary rights work by keeping entitlements over information modular); Carliss Y. 
Baldwin & Joachim Henkel, The Impact of Modularity on Intellectual Property and Value Appropriation 
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-040, 2011), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication% 
20Files/12-040_895ee04c-1533-4cac-9a4a-69ffbf794edd.pdf; Carliss Y. Baldwin & Eric von Hippel, 
Modeling a Paradigm Shift: From Producer Innovation to User and Open Collaborative Innovation 7 
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 10-038, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1502864. For insights on asset partitioning as applied to patent law, see Paul J. Heald, A 
Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 480–84 (2005).  
 134 Baldwin & Henkel, supra note 133, at 3. 
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be coordinated with changes in others.135 This can reduce the complexity of a 
system and allow for greater flexibility of the system to adjust to changing 
circumstances by changing one part of the process rather than by reconfiguring 
the whole.136 Organizations become increasingly modular when they start to 
replace hierarchical, integrated structures with more loosely connected forms 
of organization.137 When a firm starts to outsource different parts of its product 
development process, for example, it is shifting to a more modular production 
system. The outsourced components are independent in the sense that they 
need not be modified when changes are made in other parts of the production 
process, and the firm can select from a range of alternative component 
suppliers to satisfy its outsourced needs. In more general terms, modularity 
involves breaking a process into separable blocks, referred to as modules, that 
have inputs and outputs that are sufficiently well-defined such that the modules 
can be “fit together and recombined into a complete process.”138 This 
organizational strategy can be used to reduce complexity, allow for 
specialization, minimize the effects of changes in one part of a process on the 
other parts, and economize on the use of information within a production 
process. 
While it has been used primarily to analyze the organizational structures 
and strategies of firms, modularity has also been applied to understand the 
changing organizational structures and functions of universities as they pursue 
different areas of focus within education and research.139 Universities 
frequently create new projects, centers, interdisciplinary institutes, and 
sometimes even new departments to take advantage of changes in science, 
technology, or higher education.140 Existing capabilities are grouped together 
in different ways as research goals change or new fields emerge. Similarly 
universities dissolve these units when their functions are no longer needed or 
the research or teaching is better performed elsewhere. Faculty members 
within universities form their own labs, research groups, collaborations, and 
 
 135 Id. For an in-depth discussion of the concept of modularity and its application, see 1 CARLISS Y. 
BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF MODULARITY (2000). 
 136 See Eric von Hippel, Task Partitioning: An Innovation Process Variable, 19 RES. POL’Y 407 (1990). 
 137 See, e.g., Melissa A. Schilling & H. Kevin Steensma, The Use of Modular Organizational Forms: An 
Industry-Level Analysis, 44 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1149 (2001). 
 138 Lloyd Armstrong, Modularity in University Higher Education, CHANGING HIGHER EDUC. (June 16, 
2006), http://www.changinghighereducation.com/2006/06/modularity_in_u.html. 
 139 See, e.g., Lloyd Armstrong, Modularity in University Higher Education: Research, CHANGING HIGHER 
EDUC. (June 16, 2006), http://www.changinghighereducation.com/2006/06/modularity_in_u_1.html. 
 140 See id.  
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other arrangements in response to changing opportunities and the needs of the 
problems they are working on. 
This Article uses the concept here to illustrate how universities can 
rearrange and partition their activities in ways that can support dual processes 
of scientific discovery and drug development.141 Some aspects of drug 
discovery and development may be conducive to open systems of innovation; 
others may be more conducive to proprietary, hierarchically managed 
development.142 Different funding sources will have different requirements 
attached, with private investors requiring at least some forms of proprietary 
development and public funders more open to alternative development modes 
and goals. The nature of universities as specialized entities with knowledge 
production and dissemination functions, combined with their decentralized 
structure, can sustain divergent governance approaches for different kinds of 
projects while leaving in place some level of shared oversight and imposing 
limits on the proprietary nature of project results.143 A single innovation 
process can be organized into separate projects, each project with its own 
membership and rules of access to the results generated. Where the projects are 
nested within a single organization, the costs of sharing information and 
resources between these projects will be lower than it would be with an 
 
 141 Although beyond the scope of this paper, the ways in which universities generate and manage 
intellectual property for very different purposes has interesting implications for the types of distributed 
innovation systems that can be sustained. Joachim Henkel, Carliss Baldwin, and Willy Shih argue that 
“managing a system’s modular structure in conjunction with its IP . . . can reconcile opportunities for 
distributed innovation with . . . value [capture].” See Joachim Henkel et al., IP Modularity: Profiting from 
Innovation by Aligning Product Architecture with Intellectual Property 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
No. 13-012, 2012), available at http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/9369296/13-012.pdf?sequence=1. 
This Article suggests that perhaps the university can capture and retain value in different ways and can worry 
less about the appropriability of the intellectual assets of different projects where the projects take place under 
the organizational umbrella of the university. 
 142 Differences in the innovation process may be a factor of different funding models (e.g., drug with 
commercial potential funded by private sector versus drug project that is largely supported by public funders), 
different starting points in the drug development process (e.g., repurposing drugs versus starting with a new 
drug candidate), and different technologies.  
 143 This touches on a related and very relevant literature on intellectual property and the boundaries of the 
firm, including work by Robert Merges, Dan Burk, Joe Miller, Scott Kieff, Paul Heald, and many others. See, 
e.g., Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights 
at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575 (examining the role of IP in balancing resource 
allocation needs within the firm and between firms); Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and 
Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351 (2007) (discussing the role 
of IP in allowing access lock-in to facilitate the joint development and use of standards).  
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outsourcing approach, and the projects can be more readily reconfigured as 
dictated by the needs of the innovation process.144 
This flexibility allows for the possibility of reengineering the drug 
discovery and development process in ways that protect both the development 
of knowledge and the development of drugs. Information and discoveries may 
have applications for both further research and narrower drug development 
objectives, and these different uses can be simultaneously pursued by different 
units within the university. “[S]eparate modules can be worked on 
independently and in parallel” without costly communication across 
modules.145 Where knowledge is sticky—costly and difficult to move between 
locations—efforts can be made to shift the locus of innovation to where the 
knowledge is the stickiest by designing the different modules in light of this 
constraint.146 Where the research opportunities offered by a particular project 
are reduced, or the project requires capabilities that the university does not 
have, the university can collaborate with a third party or outsource the project 
without having to revisit and reorganize the structure of other connecting 
projects. Moreover, the university can adapt the modules and the boundaries 
between the modules in ways that reflect both commercial and public 
knowledge production processes.147 Intellectual property licensing, rules 
governing access to and sharing of information created within a module, and 
flexibilities in the design of incentive structures and working spaces 
characterizing different modules provide important tools for adjusting these 
boundaries. 
 
 144 This is not to say that reorganization of activities within the university is either easy or costless, and 
universities exhibit institutional inertia just as private firms do—in some ways even more inertia than private 
firms. But where we think of innovation processes that take advantage of existing institutional structures, such 
as research facilities and a development facility, it may be relatively easier to break up a larger project into 
pieces that occur within the university rather than to divide them between different entities. Moreover, 
universities have some institutional competence to support fluid research projects and research portfolios. 
 145 Baldwin & von Hippel, supra note 133, at 7. 
 146 See Eric von Hippel, “Sticky Information” and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for 
Innovation, 40 MGMT. SCI. 429 (1994). 
 147 By focusing on the innovation process as a process of knowledge production and sharing, we can take 
advantage of the insights from a growing literature on knowledge commons. From this literature we get ideas 
of why universities might offer comparative advantages as organizations for conducting drug development in a 
process that is increasingly focused on new ways of producing and sharing knowledge. See, e.g., Elinor 
Ostrom & Charlotte Hess, A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons, in UNDERSTANDING 
KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 41 (Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2007). 
Universities can also incorporate public interest terms into the conditions that they impose on downstream 
developers of their technologies. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An 
Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1039 (2005) (proposing 
that public-sector institutions adopt equitable access principles when licensing medical technologies).  
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If we take seriously the increasingly dual nature of the knowledge 
generated in drug development as socially and commercially valuable, then 
regarding drug development as not just a commercial process but also a 
science—a “translational science”—makes sense. In this case, the university—
as knowledge commons, knowledge curator, knowledge producer, and industry 
partner—becomes a natural site for locating translational science.148 As 
translational science becomes more established and accepted as an academic 
pursuit, we can imagine ways of judging the results of processes that have both 
scientific and commercial applications in new ways. Efforts at expanding 
tenure standards to reward patents and start-up activities is only one way, and 
perhaps not the best way, of adapting incentive schemes to reflect the dual 
nature of activities in translational spaces.149 By clearly identifying activities as 
falling in the translational space, perhaps universities will also be better able to 
protect spaces for research directed solely at adding to the body of 
foundational knowledge. As research projects change, the ways in which they 
are governed can also change, allowing for shifts between different kinds of 
basic and applied research and development. 
In addition to advantages in managing the needs of dual-natured activities, 
universities may be better placed than firms and the government to make 
decisions about how to handle the results of such activities, particularly where 
they are involved in both discovery and development. They have the potential 
to make more balanced decisions about patenting, licensing, and preserving 
access than private firms and government. This advantage stems from the fact 
that universities can and must reconcile competing interests in financial 
sustainability, practicality, and future research interests when managing each 
 
 148 The idea of translational research as a science has been a centerpiece of the NIH vision of modern drug 
discovery and development. See Collins, supra note 1, at 2. For the notion of university as knowledge curator, 
see Michael J. Madison, Knowledge Curation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957 (2011) [hereinafter Madison, 
Knowledge Curation]. For the notion of university as cultural or knowledge commons, see Michael J. Madison 
et al., The University as Constructed Cultural Commons, 30 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 365 (2009). For the role 
of universities in creating infrastructure critical in science and technology policies, see Brett M. Frischmann, 
Commercializing University Research Systems in Economic Perspective: A View from the Demand Side, in 
UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 155 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2005). 
 149 Texas A&M University became one of the first public universities in the United States to formally 
incorporate commercialization factors into its tenure process. Commercialization Added to Tenure Criteria, 
Boosts Flow of Inventions, TECH. TRANSFER TACTICS, Oct. 2007, at 82. The University of Maryland also 
recently adapted its tenure criteria to include reflections of patenting. See Best Practices in Transforming 
Research into Innovation: Creative Approaches to the Bayh–Dole Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Tech. & Innovation of the H. Comm. on Sci., Space, & Tech., 112th Cong. 7–8 (2012) (statement of Robert A. 
Rosenbaum, President & Executive Director, Maryland Technology Development Corporation). 
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stage of the discovery and development process.150 They can use 
organizational strategies to manage tensions between these competing interests 
and to protect core knowledge production processes. The university’s ability to 
pursue separate operations with different orientations under a single umbrella 
can be harnessed, for example, to balance the needs and demands of both open 
science and proprietary drug development by choosing the least restrictive 
knowledge management practices necessary to preserve development 
opportunities. 
Given the range of funding sources and the mix of monetary and 
nonmonetary benefits that universities have available, they may also be able to 
pursue research and development activities that are focused more on unmet 
medical needs and less on commercial market size.151 To the extent that the 
governing mission can remain directed at knowledge production rather than 
profit maximization, project decision making can and will diverge from that of 
a private firm. The university and its principal investigators will benefit from 
nonmonetary by-products, such as a paper in a top peer-reviewed journal about 
a path-breaking advance in treating malaria, in a way that commercial firms do 
not. Publication of a new scientific advancement can count for more in the 
university than in either government or the private sector, making risk taking in 
markets with limited commercial potential more feasible. Other forms of 
nonmonetary benefits, including intrinsic benefits to principal investigators 
motivated to pursue humanitarian goals and scientific interests, can offset 
lower economic rewards. 
Even with the best of intentions, requiring development activities to be 
financially self-sustainable will inevitably slant project selection toward more 
lucrative projects. The bias toward money-making ventures in a time of 
shrinking university budgets may dominate unless significant philanthropic or 
government money is provided and sufficient mechanisms for policing and 
rewarding efforts to pursue projects with high social returns, but potentially 
low or lower commercial returns, are put in place. While economic concerns 
will be impossible to escape, universities nevertheless remain good places to 
experiment with alternative ways of pursuing and funding development for 
 
 150 Peter Lee, Interface: The Push and Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2225, 2230–31 (2009) 
(exploring the ways in which the unique institutional contexts of universities can inform their patenting and 
technology transfer practices in ways that can reflect a “push” of nonmarket goals). 
 151 The role of philanthropic funding will be particularly important in supporting this avenue of 
development. See Fiona Murray, Evaluating the Role of Science Philanthropy in American Research 
Universities, 13 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 23 (2013).  
VERTINSKY GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/3/2013  10:13 AM 
2013] MAKING KNOWLEDGE AND MAKING DRUGS 777 
those drugs with limited economic returns but high social welfare payoffs. 
Their public knowledge function, combined with their flexibility to pursue 
focused development projects, will make universities attractive to funders 
providing the kinds of socially oriented funding needed to support socially 
important projects. 
This is not to say that universities will get the balance between public and 
private interests in drug discovery and development right, and indeed what 
balance is the “right” one is itself a contested subject. This Article’s claim is 
only that the organizational structure of the university provides opportunities 
for decision making that is more informed by the interest of balancing financial 
sustainability, socially beneficial project choice, and public access than the 
same decisions would be if made by firms, government entities, or even 
existing forms of public–academic–private collaborations.152 
The second advantage conferred by the combination of characteristics 
discussed above is that the distinctive characteristics of universities give them 
the capability to be good at creating and providing access to the kinds of public 
infrastructure—inventions and other kinds of knowledge, data, and physical 
resources and facilities—needed to increase translational research capacity.153 
Images of paths, roads, and bridges—traditional sources of public 
infrastructure—pervade the recent roadmaps of government agencies charged 
with seeking ways to improve the outlook of the biomedical industry.154 This is 
no surprise, as many of the government efforts currently underway to support 
drug development are essentially investments in public infrastructure, 
construed broadly to encompass not just physical facilities but also intangibles 
that are inputs into research and development processes. The NIH Chemical 
Genomics Center—with its assay development, high-throughput screening, and 
chemistry technologies—and the NCATS Pharmaceutical Collection—a 
publicly accessible database of small-molecule compounds useful in 
 
 152 Interesting parallels can be drawn to the considerations that inform university enforcement of their 
intellectual property rights. See, e.g., Jacob H. Rooksby, When Tigers Bare Teeth: A Qualitative Study of 
University Patent Enforcement, 46 AKRON L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 153 See generally Brett M. Frischmann, The Pull of Patents, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2143, 2167 (2009) 
(exploring how “university science and technology research systems perform economically as infrastructural 
capital”); Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39 (2008) (exploring the 
concept of intellectual infrastructure in IP law and suggesting IP laws can be used to provide access to 
productivity-enabling intellectual infrastructure). 
 154 See NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL ET AL., A STRATEGY FOR AMERICAN INNOVATION: SECURING OUR 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 3 (2011) (describing a national innovation strategy based on public 
investments in physical and human capital as “infrastructure” to support innovation).  
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repurposing strategies—provide important examples of this kind of public 
infrastructure.155 In many ways universities are themselves public 
infrastructure.156 They produce and disseminate knowledge that forms the 
foundation for both further knowledge creation and the development of new 
products. They develop research facilities that the private sector can take 
advantage of through sponsored research, collaborations, or other forms of 
formal and informal academic–industry partnerships and networking. They 
train students who go on to become part of the workforce. 
The case for public support of traditional kinds of public infrastructure, 
such as roads and bridges, and to a lesser degree newer forms of intangible 
public infrastructure, such as basic scientific research, is well understood.157 
Federal government involvement in research and development stems largely 
from the policy view that technological innovation is a key determinant of 
economic growth and that some of the inputs into technological innovation are 
public goods that will be undersupplied by the private market.158 The U.S. 
government is estimated to have invested $147.4 billion for research and 
development in 2010, excluding American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
funding.159 This funding is used not just for specified missions of federal 
departments, such as defense, public health, and environmental quality, but 
also to support work in areas where there is an identified need for research and 
development that is not being performed by the private sector.160 Providing the 
capacity to move certain kinds of inventions through the innovation process, 
particularly those with significant public benefit but inadequate private returns, 
is increasingly viewed as having a public-good component. But finding 
publicly acceptable and socially efficient ways of supporting the existing, 
primarily private, drug development process has proven difficult. Many policy 
 
 155 See generally NCATS Pharmaceutical Collection, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL 
SCI., http://www.ncats.nih.gov/research/tools/preclinical/npc/pharmaceutical-collection.html (last visited May 
8, 2013); NIH Chemical Genomics Center, NAT’L CENTER FOR ADVANCING TRANSLATIONAL SCI., 
www.ncats.nih.gov/research/reengineering/ncgc/ncgc.html (last visited May 8, 2013). 
 156 Frischmann, supra note 153. 
 157 See generally FRISCHMANN, supra note 121. 
 158 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE IN CONSULTATION WITH NAT’L ECON. COUNCIL, THE 
COMPETITIVENESS AND INNOVATIVE CAPACITY OF THE UNITED STATES, at v (2012), available at http://www. 
commerce.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2012/january/competes_010511_0.pdf. 
 159 See, e.g., SARGENT, supra note 7; WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32324, FEDERAL 
R&D, DRUG DISCOVERY, AND PRICING: INSIGHTS FROM THE NIH-UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY RELATIONSHIP 2 
(2011). 
 160 WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33528, INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT: DEBATE OVER GOVERNMENT POLICY 1–2 (2009). 
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makers and their taxpaying constituents object to injections of public money 
into a process that will yield private drugs owned and sold by private 
companies.161 While taxpayers have become accustomed to paying for 
university research, even when the university is able to retain rights to resulting 
discoveries and license them to private companies, they are less comfortable 
with subsidizing the development costs for a pharmaceutical company 
pursuing a new drug.162 
Efforts to subsidize private development costs have therefore taken the 
more subtle form of public support for university and government development 
capacity that is made available for private use. The NIH has focused its 
translational research efforts on the development of NIH-supported public 
infrastructure. A good example is the NIH Common Fund’s Molecular 
Libraries and Imaging program.163 This program provides biomedical 
researchers with access to large-scale screening facilities needed to identify 
small molecules that can be refined and used as chemical probes to study the 
functions of genes, cells, and other aspects of disease pathways.164 The 
facilities can also be used by public- and private-sector researchers to validate 
new drug targets.165 Universities, with their nonprofit status and public 
knowledge mission, are palatable sites for this kind of public investment in 
development infrastructure. In some cases, it is private actors that are taking 
the lead in building their own shared resources.166 But in many cases research 
 
 161 Indeed, this view that publicly funded research should remain open and available to the public was one 
of the biggest hurdles to the passage of the Bayh–Dole Act in 1980. See Mowery & Sampat, supra note 45. 
The same sentiment has supported proposals for payback provisions in federal funding legislation and 
proposals to limit the prices of prescription drugs that were developed using federal funds. Ashley J. Stevens, 
The Enactment of Bayh–Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93, 96 (2004).  
 162 See, e.g., Scott J. Wallsten, The R&D Boondoggle, REGULATION, Winter 2000, at 12; see also 
Taxpayer Access to Research, ALLIANCE FOR TAXPAYER ACCESS, http://www.taxpayeraccess.org/issues/ 
access/index.shtml (last visited May 8, 2013).  
 163 See Molecular Libraries and Imaging, NIH COMMON FUND, www.commonfund.nih.gov/ 
molecularlibraries (last updated Mar. 18, 2013) (describing the NIH Common Fund Molecular Libraries and 
Imaging program). 
 164 Id.  
 165 Id. 
 166 Examples include pharmaceutical company collaborations to share information about failures in 
clinical testing as a way of allowing all of the companies to identify their own failures earlier in the 
development process, as well as “precompetitive” collaborations such as the Biomarkers Consortium. The 
Biomarkers Consortium is a public–private biomedical research partnership managed by the Foundation for 
the NIH. This consortium is designed to develop and qualify biomarkers that will be useful in diagnosing and 
treating disease. The results of the project are to be made broadly available to the entire scientific community. 
See, e.g., JA Wagner et al., The Biomarkers Consortium: Practice and Pitfalls of Open-Source Precompetitive 
Collaboration, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 539 (2010) (evaluating Biomarkers 
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collaborations involve universities because industry players are more 
comfortable sharing their data with a university than with a competitor, or 
because universities provide the complementary skills that other industry 
partners do not. Moreover, the public investments made in such university 
projects can be justified in terms of dual contributions to research and to 
development, and the costs of such investments can be spread over many 
different projects.167 This role of universities as neutral sites for industry 
collaboration contributes to the drug development infrastructure. 
B. University Experiments with Changing Roles in Pharmaceutical 
Innovation 
While many U.S. research universities are experiencing pressures and 
exploring opportunities to move beyond traditional roles, there is significant 
variation in the nature and scope of their responses.168 The experiments that 
universities undertake are determined largely by their existing resources and 
areas of expertise, although their institutional histories and cultures also play a 
determinative role. Most, if not all, of the significant experiments in drug 
development are being undertaken by a relatively small number of large 
research universities. While a survey and categorization of all the university 
experiments in drug discovery and development currently taking place is 
beyond the scope of this Article, this section briefly canvasses some of the 
initiatives to illustrate the ways in which universities are experimenting with 
innovation capacity. 
This section loosely categorizes these experiments in terms of levels of 
ownership in, control over, and financial commitment to the drug development 
process as a way of illustrating the degree of departure from traditional 
university roles.169 The first level simply extends the research capabilities that 
 
Consortium as an example of precompetitive collaboration among pharmaceutical companies); RL Woosley et 
al., Commentary, The Critical Path Institute’s Approach to Precompetitive Sharing and Advancing Regulatory 
Science, 87 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 530 (2010) (discussing shift among pharmaceutical 
companies toward data sharing).  
 167 This relates to the notion of university investments in systems of technology development and transfer 
as public infrastructure. See Frischmann, supra note 148. 
 168 Research universities vary significantly in terms of how they approach and engage in post-discovery 
development initiatives. See, e.g., Argyres & Liebeskind, supra note 131; Rosa Grimaldi et al., 30 Years After 
Bayh–Dole: Reassessing Academic Entrepreneurship, 40 RES. POL’Y 1045 (2011) (examining aspects of 
academic entrepreneurship). 
 169 There are many different ways in which university experiments with drug discovery and development 
capacity could be organized, and alternative schematics for understanding university–industry involvement 
have been provided in the literature. See Bronwyn H. Hall, University–Industry Research Partnerships in the 
VERTINSKY GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/3/2013  10:13 AM 
2013] MAKING KNOWLEDGE AND MAKING DRUGS 781 
universities already have to explore some low-hanging fruit in drug discovery. 
It involves relatively little ownership of, control over, or financial 
responsibility for the post-discovery development process on the part of the 
university, and applications to drug development are largely byproducts rather 
than project goals. The second level involves some form of cost sharing and 
risk sharing for projects which have a development focus and some level of 
decision making, particularly in the early stages of post-discovery 
development. But ownership and control of the development process are still 
largely managed outside the university. The third level of experiments takes 
the university into a position of financial and managerial responsibility for, and 
governance of, development projects, although this position may be shared 
with other actors. Along with the greater control and financial responsibility 
come opportunities for a larger share of the returns from products that succeed. 
Expansion of university control over development projects, as well as 
university discretion in selecting which projects to push downstream, is in 
many cases limited by the need to retain industry interest in the projects being 
undertaken. Some universities are engaged at multiple levels, often focusing on 
one or two disease areas at a deeper development level while engaging in 
applied research and developing certain drug discovery and development 
capabilities more generally across other areas. This section describes a small 
sample of university initiatives here to illustrate the different levels of 
university governance of drug development and the opportunities and limits of 
these different levels.170 
The first and most common level of involvement is investment in specific 
types of discovery capacity that expand on the university’s underlying research 
strengths. Where a university has strengths in medicinal and synthetic 
chemistry, for example, developing facilities that support hit-to-lead chemistry 
 
United States 5–6 (Feb. 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/ 
BHH04_Kansai.pdf (exploring recent U.S. experience with the various types of university–industry research 
relationships, including reasons they have increased, the evidence on their performance, and the tensions that 
have emerged between public and private interests in the academic research process, focusing in particular on 
tensions between appropriating and diffusing knowledge). The levels of involvement discussed here are 
designed to correlate with the degree of financial investment and control that the university has in the drug 
development process.  
 170 The framework used here is based on how much development activity the university assumes and 
controls, but there are many other ways of categorizing and comparing universities and their development 
roles. Universities may be effective at creating start-up companies, for example, or at generating entrepreneurs. 
See, e.g., MILNE & MALINS, supra note 114 (categorizing landscape of academic–industry partnerships). 
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is a natural investment with payoffs for both research and development.171 
Where the university has strengths in computational chemistry, molecular 
modeling capacity may be a natural extension.172 Increased availability and 
familiarity and reduced cost of certain technologies, such as high-throughput 
screening, have bridged the gap between drug research and drug discovery and 
spurred university investments in discovery capacity.173 Screening centers for 
small molecules, many of which include a variety of expensive screening and 
computational design facilities and corresponding capabilities, have been 
developed in a number of the major U.S. research universities.174 The Penn 
Center for Molecular Discovery at the University of Pennsylvania is one such 
example.175 These facilities are used by researchers from the University of 
Pennsylvania to further drug-discovery-related research. The center draws on 
and contributes to a large public domain database, PubChem, where 
interactions between an NIH small-molecule repository and thousands of 
biological candidates can be data mined. Northwestern University has 
developed ChemCore, an equipment-intensive shared facility that provides 
medicinal and synthetic chemistry, molecular modeling, and compound 
purification services to research investigators both within Northwestern 
 
 171 Hit-to-lead chemistry refers to the move from finding chemical compounds that modify a particular 
target relevant to a disease process (hits) to selecting and refining the most promising compound in the hopes 
of turning it into a drug. See, e.g., Hit-to-Lead Chemistry, SMALL MOLECULE DISCOVERY CENTER, 
https://smdc.ucsf.edu/chemistry/hit.htm (last visited May 8, 2013) (describing hit-to-lead chemistry by the 
Small Molecule Discovery Center at the University of California San Francisco (UCSF)).  
 172 See, e.g., Gerald M. Maggiora, Is There a Future for Computational Chemistry in Drug Research?, 26 
J. COMPUTER-AIDED MOLECULAR DESIGN 87 (2012). 
 173 See, e.g., Ricardo Macarron et al., Impact of High-Throughput Screening in Biomedical Research, 10 
NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 188, 194 (2011) (noting high-throughput screening uses for experimental as 
well as purely commercial purposes and the role of university facilities). The shift of knowledge from industry 
into universities has contributed to the expansion of academic drug discovery capacity. See Kotz, supra note 
127; Macarron et al., supra, at 193. “‘The expertise in small molecule drug discovery that has traditionally 
resided in industry is being integrated into academia. The result is that you’ve brought what industry is good at 
and juxtaposed it with innovative targets and disease-specific knowledge,’ both of which are areas of strength 
for academia,” according to Stephen Frye, previously the worldwide vice president of discovery medicinal 
chemistry at GlaxoSmithKline PLC and now director of the Center of Integrative Chemical Biology and Drug 
Discovery at the University of North Carolina Eshelman School of Pharmacy. See Kotz, supra note 127, at 1.  
 174 See, e.g., Kotz, supra note 127, at 1 (discussing study done by Stephen Frye); High-Throughput 
Screening, JP SULZBERGER COLUM. GENOME CENTER, http://genomecenter.columbia.edu/index.php?q=node/ 
20 (last visited May 8, 2013); High Throughput Screening (HTS), SCRIPPS RES. INST., www.scripps.edu/ 
florida/technologies/hts/index.html (last visited May 8, 2013); High Throughput Screening Laboratory, U. 
KAN., www.hts.ku.edu (last visited May 8, 2013); Penn Center for Molecular Discovery, U. PA., 
www.seas.upenn.edu/~pcmd/ (last visited May 8, 2013). 
 175 See Penn Center for Molecular Discovery, supra note 174.  
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University and externally.176 Many of the facilities and capabilities that are 
developed are supported in part by government and philanthropic 
organizations, and many are made available to users outside of the university 
on a fee-for-service basis.177 In these kinds of experiments with drug discovery 
capacity, the university ultimately ends up with relatively little control over 
and stake in the downstream drug development process. 
Experiments at this first level can be successful at reducing the costs of 
certain activities by taking advantage of scale economies in facilities that can 
be used for more than one research program. Universities can also support 
facilities that have high research value combined with practical product 
development value, addressing problems of private sector undersupply. By 
increasing the physical proximity of different users of a facility to each other 
and by reducing organizational barriers to their interaction, these initiatives 
may foster greater information sharing and can be used as the basis for 
collaborations between entities with complementary skills. Ultimately, 
however, experiments at this level are unlikely to do much to move drug 
candidates past the early discovery stage. They are limited in scope to specific 
parts of the drug discovery process—often those parts that are in closest 
proximity to traditional university research functions. They do not 
fundamentally change the cost and risk profiles of drug development. 
Moreover, they do not address the challenges of incentivizing and promoting 
information production and transfer in later stages of development where 
research benefits are more limited and departures from traditional university 
research activities are more significant. 
 
 176 ChemCore, CENTER FOR MOLECULAR INNOVATION & DRUG DISCOVERY, http://www.cmidd. 
northwestern.edu/chemcore (last visited May 8, 2013). 
 177 See, e.g., MILNE & MALINS, supra note 114 (categorizing landscape of academic–industry 
partnerships). Although the focus of the discussion in this Article is on discovering new therapeutics, 
universities can and do play interesting roles in other aspects of drug innovation. As one example, 
approximately five universities have been able to leverage their capabilities in industrial and physical 
pharmacy in university-affiliated pharmaceutical facilities. These include the Chao Center for Industrial 
Pharmacy and Contract Manufacturing, linked to Purdue University, and the University of Iowa 
Pharmaceuticals Development Consortium. See Chao Center for Industrial Pharmacy and Contract 
Manufacturing, United States of America, PHARMACEUTICAL-TECHNOLOGY.COM, http://www.pharmaceutical-
technology.com/projects/chao (last visited May 8, 2013); UI Development Consortium Develops Drugs, 
Dosages for Clinical Studies, INST. FOR CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. U. IOWA (May 7, 2009, 2:58 PM), 
http://www.icts.uiowa.edu/content/ui-development-consortium-develops-drugs-dosages-clinical-studies. As 
processes of drug discovery and development change, these kinds of downstream university involvement are 
likely to expand as well.  
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In the second category are universities that have moved beyond investment 
in facilities to support research and academic–industry collaborations, and 
have invested in establishing and financially supporting one or more central 
locations for drug discovery and development. The creation of academic drug 
discovery and development centers within universities is a relatively new and 
emerging phenomenon, and much of our knowledge about these initiatives 
takes the form of anecdotal data.178 A web search reveals that 92 out of the top 
114 U.S. research universities claim to have some kind of translational 
research initiative.179 Many of these claims, however, simply reflect a 
relabeling or recharacterization of existing research projects. About 37 of these 
universities have a drug discovery or development center that has its own 
administrative staff, faculty, and a concerted drug discovery and development 
strategy.180 These centers generally involve, at a minimum, bringing together 
in a common space a group of university employees who are engaged in 
different aspects of drug discovery and development. The University of 
Pittsburg (Pitt), currently the sixth-ranked NIH-funded institution, was a 
relatively early mover.181 It created a Drug Discovery Institute in 2006 that 
draws on multiple schools and departments within the university as well as its 
affiliated academic medical center to generate the capacity to translate basic 
research into clinical practice.182 The institute provides a centralized facility 
and core staff with a combination of academic and industrial experience that 
are designed to help both academic and industry collaborators translate 
promising ideas from basic science into a form useful for more focused drug 
 
 178 This is starting to change. A recent survey of seventy-five such entities provided some interesting 
insights into these organizations and how they are funded, how they operate, and other aspects of their drug 
discovery efforts. See Frye et al., supra note 127, at 409.  
 179 The 114 institutions are selected based on data collected by the Center for Measuring University 
Performance. See CENTER FOR MEASURING U. PERFORMANCE, http://mup.asu.edu (last visited May 8, 2013). 
These rough numbers are calculated based on whether the university web site includes a drug discovery 
initiative, either in the form of an institute or a center. See Frye et al., supra note 127, at 409–10 (noting study 
done at the University of North Carolina analyzing status of small molecule drug discovery in academia).  
 180 This is an approximate measure based on information provided by the 114 institutions on their web 
sites. The Drug Discovery Institute at the University of Pittsburgh provides one such example. It has its own 
space, a range of facilities, and an administrative and lab staff focused on drug discovery capabilities. See U. 
PITT. DRUG DISCOVERY INST., http://www.upddi.pitt.edu (last visited May 8, 2013). 
 181 UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH SCH. OF MED., UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE 2011/12 
FACT BOOK 3 (2011). 
 182 See About UPDDI, U. PITT. DRUG DISCOVERY INST., http://www.upddi.pitt.edu/index.php?page= 
overview2 (last visited May 8, 2013). 
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discovery.183 In addition to this collaboration function, the core staff also 
supports experiments with drug development through projects such as 
developing and applying technologies in the design and synthesis of drugs.184 
Intellectual property generated by university participants is managed by the 
university office of technology management according to regular university 
policy.185 Vanderbilt University’s activities with drug development provide 
another example of efforts to provide the kind of drug development 
infrastructure traditionally found only in pharmaceutical companies.186 Most of 
the academic drug discovery centers, such as the Center for Integrative 
Chemical Biology and Drug Discovery at the University of North Carolina 
(UNC), stop at earlier stages of the discovery process.187 
As the private business model of drug development shifts to a fail-early-
and-often model, one that is more discovery intensive and experimental, the 
overlap between the facilities important in research and facilities important to 
 
 183 Shannon Barnes, Spotlight on Research: Top-Notch Researchers Propel Pitt’s Drug Discovery 
Institute, PITTCHRONICLE (July 18, 2011), http://chronicle2.pitt.edu/?p=8922 (“Over the years, DDI has 
expanded to a high-production facility, capable of holding as many as five million chemical compounds and 
equipped with more than 10 robots for automated assay plating, giving researchers virtually infinite drug- 
screening opportunities. Its faculty members hail primarily from three Pitt schools—the School of Arts and 
Sciences, the School of Medicine, and the School of Pharmacy—and create a unique mosaic of scientists, from 
organic chemists to clinical scientists, who work along the continuum of drug discovery.”). 
 184 See U. PITT. DRUG DISCOVERY INST., supra note 180.  
 185 Intellectual Property, U. PITT. DRUG DISCOVERY INST., http://www.upddi.pitt.edu/index.php?page=ip 
(last visited May 8, 2013). 
 186 Vanderbilt’s efforts include the Vanderbilt Center for Neuroscience Drug Discovery (VCNDD) and 
the Vanderbilt Clinical and Translational Research Center (VICTR). See Clinical Research Center Overview, 
VAND. U. MED. CENTER, http://www.mc.vanderbilt.edu/crc/ (last visited May 8, 2013); VAND. CENTER FOR 
NEUROSCIENCE DRUG DISCOVERY, http://www.vcndd.com (last visited May 8, 2013) (describing the center as 
a “new model for neuroscience drug discovery”). VCNDD’s stated mission is to “promote translation of 
advances in basic science to novel therapeutics by [de-risking] efforts focused on novel approaches for 
treatment of serious brain disorders.” P. Jeffrey Conn, Translation of Research Across Disciplines to Impact 
Patient Care, VAND. CENTER FOR NEUROSCIENCE DRUG DISCOVERY, http://www.vcndd.com/presentations/ 
Translationofresearchacrossdisciplinestoimpactpatientcare.pdf (last visited May 8, 2013). This center has 100 
full-time employees and investment in drug development infrastructure traditionally found only in 
pharmaceutical companies. It draws on Vanderbilt’s other research capabilities, including a number of centers 
that are relevant to different aspects of drug development. Its funding is predominantly from NIH but also 
includes major private and philanthropic funding. The VICTR, which is funded in part by the NIH CTSA 
program, is a virtual home for Vanderbilt’s clinical and translational research—in other words, it is not a 
physical space, but a coordinating mechanism for linking together relevant Vanderbilt projects and facilities. 
 187 See Center for Integrative Chemical Biology and Drug Discovery, UNC ESHELMAN SCH. PHARMACY, 
http://www.pharmacy.unc.edu/research/centers/center-for-integrative-chemical-biology-and-drug-discovery/ 
(last visited May 8, 2013). The capabilities of this center include assay development, medicinal chemistry, 
computational chemistry, and compound screening. Target proposals seeking use of these capabilities come 
from the UNC faculty. Id.  
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more commercially focused drug discovery and development increases. As a 
result, drug discovery research collaborations between the university and 
pharmaceutical companies have increased in size and scope.188 Some of these 
academic–industry collaborations have raised concerns among stakeholders in 
public science because of the expansive intellectual property rights that are 
sometimes conferred on industry partners.189 An interesting question for 
further exploration is whether the conflicts between public knowledge and 
private knowledge are larger or smaller when the university is itself in control 
of development rather than only the recipient of funding and shared resources 
in exchange for broad option rights. Another question for further exploration is 
whether a change in the university’s role in commercial activities will 
negatively impact its relationship with industry partners that currently view 
them as noncompetitors. 
In contrast to the more limited experiments at the first level of involvement, 
these broader initiatives begin to address challenges of cost and risk sharing by 
supporting later stages of drug discovery using a mix of public, private, and 
university resources. The creation of a university-governed or joint university–
industry-governed center focused on biomedical translational research, if done 
properly, can be used to reduce both geographical and organizational barriers 
to the translation of knowledge into products and to take advantage of the 
organizational capabilities that universities have in managing mixed processes 
of public and private knowledge creation.190 Collaborative structures that deal 
effectively with intellectual property ownership and use rights at the start of 
the collaboration may be able to create joint research spaces that foster greater 
sharing of information while also ensuring that investments in the 
 
 188 See, e.g., Frye et al., supra note 127, at 409–10 (noting study done at University of North Carolina 
analyzing status of small molecule drug discovery in academia); Ashley J. Stevens et al., The Role of Public-
Sector Research in the Discovery of Drugs and Vaccines, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 535 (2011) (examining 
expanded role of public sector in applied research phase of drug discovery).  
 189 See, e.g., Josephine Johnston, Conflict of Interest in Biomedical Research, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH 
AND BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, 
AND CAMPAIGNS 31, 31–34 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008); Richard S. Saver, Is It Really All About the Money? 
Reconsidering Non-Financial Interests in Medical Research, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 467 (2012) (discussing 
both financial and nonfinancial conflicts of interest in medical research); see also Lyman, supra note 115 
(discussing the dangers inherent in trends toward broader umbrella arrangements between pharma and 
academia, including pharma–university department alliances). 
 190 See, e.g., Donna M. Huryn, Drug Discovery in an Academic Setting: Playing to the Strengths, 4 ACS 
MEDICINAL CHEMISTRY LETTERS 313 (2013) (highlighting the unique ability of universities to engage in drug 
discovery because of their ability to engage in risky projects and to bring deep expertise to bear, but expressing 
caution about universities simply recreating the pharma model inside the university). 
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collaboration can be captured and allocated more easily.191 Development-
oriented research centers can provide mechanisms for rewarding continued 
participation by both university investigators and industry participants. 
Despite the promise of these collaborative models, however, disconnects 
between the ultimate interests of the university and its researchers and the 
interests of the commercial partners often remain.192 While organizational 
barriers to the sharing and transfer of information may be reduced through 
collaborative structures, they are difficult to remove completely. Differences in 
incentive structures, motivations, and cultures between academic and industry 
participants reinforce these barriers.193 These problems make many university–
industry collaborations difficult to sustain and challenging to expand beyond 
focused areas in which research and development interests are substantially 
aligned. Finally, these kinds of collaborations do not adequately address the 
tensions between appropriability of knowledge and disclosure of knowledge, 
and in many cases the private development interests in appropriability of 
knowledge win out over the more diffuse, and in many cases unidentified, 
public interests in disclosure.194 Moreover, the agenda for research and 
development will still be largely determined by the industry partner, since the 
university has to attract and retain the industry partner. 
In the third category are the very small number of universities that are 
trying to internalize the financial and managerial aspects of moving from 
 
 191 See, e.g., Sherer, supra note 111 (noting the critical role of collaboration between stakeholders, 
including industry and academic researchers, at every stage of therapeutic development in enabling 
translational research and development). Greater sharing of information between universities and their industry 
partners may also create risks, however, particularly if research results are treated as proprietary and access is 
limited. How the collaborations are structured becomes critical in determining whether the collaboration 
enhances or detracts from the university’s public knowledge mission. See LAWRENCE BUSCH ET AL., INST. FOR 
FOOD & AGRIC. STANDARDS, EXTERNAL REVIEW OF THE COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
NOVARTIS AGRICULTURAL DISCOVERY INSTITUTE, INC. AND THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
50, 142–43 (2004) (using a controversial collaboration between Novartis Agricultural Discovery Institute and 
the University of California, Berkley to examine broader challenges of university–industry collaboration and 
the need to protect the core principles of the university, identified as creativity, autonomy, and diversity, when 
engaging in such collaborations).  
 192 See, e.g., Michael Rosenblatt, How Academia and the Pharmaceutical Industry Can Work Together, 
10 ANNALS AM. THORACIC SOC’Y 31 (2013) (discussing some of the barriers to academic–industry 
collaboration from an industry perspective); John Hudson & Hanan F. Khazragui, Into the Valley of Death: 
Research to Innovation, 18 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY (forthcoming 2013) (noting the challenges of academic–
industry collaboration). 
 193 See Rosenblatt, supra note 192; see also Huryn, supra note 190 (noting that culture in academia that 
encourages and rewards individual accomplishments makes collaboration challenging and conflicting views of 
goals, priorities, and credit often difficult to resolve).  
 194 See Merges, supra note 119, at 183. 
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discovery through development. These efforts are most pronounced in public 
universities that work in cooperation with, and experience more pressures 
from, local and state governments as part of a concerted economic 
development plan. One example of this more holistic approach to moving from 
discovery to market through collaborative support structures is the Maryland 
Drug Discovery and Development Network and its member institutions, which 
include Johns Hopkins University and the University of Maryland.195 The 
network pieces together and provides support for various activities involved in 
drug development. Member institutions such as the University of Maryland 
also offer incubator lab and office space and other business-related support 
services.196 Similarly, the Georgia Institute of Technology has adopted a 
comparatively holistic approach toward translational research. Its efforts 
include proof-of-concept centers and incubator spaces designed to move 
promising discoveries to a point where they are more attractive to private 
investors.197 
The University of California San Francisco (UCSF) goes further than most 
other research institutions in its involvement in the entire drug discovery and 
development process.198 UCSF’s Institute for Neurodegenerative Diseases in 
 
 195 See The Maryland Drug Discovery and Development Network, MD. BIOTECHNOLOGY CENTER, 
http://marylandbiocenter.org/businessdevelopment/Pages/marylanddrugdiscoverynetwork.aspx (last visited 
May 8, 2013). 
 196 Id. 
 197 See, e.g., Translational Research, GA. TECH. C. ENGINEERING, http://www.coe.gatech.edu/content/ 
translational-research (last visited May 8, 2013). Georgia Tech has a number of initiatives geared toward the 
development of medical devices and medical therapies, many of them involving collaborations with Emory 
University and other local medical centers. These initiatives include the Georgia Tech Translational Research 
Institute for Biomedical Engineering and Science (TRIBES). TRIBES is a collaborative entity that has as its 
focus the provision of early-stage engineering, product development expertise, and other support services 
targeted at developing and implementing engineering solutions needed to move medical technology into 
clinical practice. See id. 
 198 See About Us, CTSI UCSF, http://ind.ucsf.edu/ind/aboutus (last visited May 8, 2013). UCSF branches 
out into multiple aspects of drug discovery and development. See, e.g., About CDDS, CENTER FOR DRUG DEV. 
SCI., http://bts.ucsf.edu/cdds/about/ (last updated Mar. 21, 2007) (“The overall mission of the center is to 
establish clinical drug development science as a rigorous academic discipline for advancing new scientific 
methodologies, to contribute to the education of scientists engaged in clinical evaluation of drugs, and to 
provide solutions to real-world drug development problems.”); Kristen Bole, UCSF Enters Drug Discovery 
Agreement with Genentech, UCSF (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.ucsf.edu/news/2010/02/4369/ucsf-enters-drug-
discovery-agreement-genentech (noting collaboration between UCSF and Genentech with intent of generating 
drug candidates, different from traditional licensing and collaboration arrangements); Jeffrey Norris, UCSF 
Scientists Play Key Role in Success of Yervoy, a New Cancer Drug, UCSF (May 5, 2011), http://www.ucsf. 
edu/news/2011/05/9803/ucsf-scientists-play-key-role-success-yervoy-new-cancer-drug; Research Excellence 
1, UCSF, http://www.ucsf.edu/research/research-excellence (last visited May 8, 2013). 
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particular focuses on the entire drug discovery process.199 The institute aims to 
discover new medicines for neurodegenerative diseases by performing steps 
from the hypothesis-generation stage of drug discovery to phase II clinical 
trials.200 UCSF has also fashioned new joint departments, such as its 
Department of Bioengineering and Therapeutic Sciences, with a focus on the 
issues that arise along the full continuum of the drug development process.201 
This redesign of disciplines in light of both research and development 
objectives is a hallmark of those universities most actively engaged in 
expanding their downstream capabilities in biomedicine. 
This last level of involvement takes the university farthest along the drug 
development path. Universities assume some level of ownership, control, 
responsibility, and risk for selecting which projects to pursue and for directing 
at least some parts of the post-discovery drug development process. In return, 
universities have greater control over the intellectual property generated and 
also reap a larger share of the rewards from the development of successful 
medical therapies. Rather than a university-directed initiative, however, most 
involve collaboration with and decision-making input from government and 
industry partners.202 Multiple players with divergent interests and incentives 
share the decision making about which projects to support at early stages of 
innovation, and once in the commercial pipeline, private interests are likely to 
dominate. Moreover, the processes of academic research and commercial 
development are still largely divided between different organizations, and the 
boundaries around projects are established at least in part as a result of the 
different organizations and their cultures, norms, and interests rather than as a 
result of the characteristics of the innovation process. Breakdowns in 
information transfer and inadequate incentives to engage in incremental 
improvements are difficult to avoid in collaborative models of production 
because of challenges in appropriating the benefits from nonpatentable data. 
Moreover, the goal underlying this approach often remains to push university 
developments into the hands of the private sector, simply at later stages of the 
development process. Where it is the private sector that is selecting and 
directing development projects, even indirectly, the result is likely to be 
underinvestment in projects that have a large net public benefit but lack the 
 
 199 See About Us, supra note 198.  
 200 Id. 
 201 Drug Development Sciences, U.C.S.F. DEPARTMENT BIOENGINEERING & THERAPEUTIC SCI., http://bts. 
ucsf.edu/research/drug-development-sciences/ (last visited May 8, 2013). 
 202 MILNE & MALINS, supra note 114. 
VERTINSKY GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/3/2013  10:13 AM 
790 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:741 
promise of blockbuster profits. Moreover, there is likely to be less 
experimentation with alternative ways of developing drugs, such as open-
source drug development initiatives. 
As universities develop innovation capabilities, their interests in setting the 
drug development agenda, controlling the development process, and sharing in 
the rewards of development are also changing. A few universities are now 
experimenting with different ways to control a larger piece of the drug 
development process. It is one such approach that is the subject of the case 
study examined in Part III. This case study gives us the opportunity to explore 
whether some universities may indeed offer any advantages over firms and 
governments in managing post-discovery drug development and, if so, how 
they need to change in order to do so. The implications of such an expanded 
university role for the legal framework are explored in Part IV. 
III.  A CASE STUDY: EMORY UNIVERSITY AS DRUG DEVELOPER 
Emory University has been actively engaged in academic drug discovery 
and its efforts have resulted in a relatively high number of drug candidates.203 
Part of its success is attributable to principal investigators on its faculty who 
have both interest and experience in drug discovery.204 These investigators, 
along with other members of the university community, are interested in 
leveraging Emory’s expertise in drug and vaccine development to move 
promising drug and vaccine candidates successfully through relatively late 
stages of drug development.205 They want to move the university into areas of 
the innovation process previously reserved for the private sector.206 They also 
hope to attract a combination of public and private resources to push forward 
innovations in important but neglected areas, such as finding cures for 
 
 203 See Stevens et al., supra note 188, at 539. A study published in the New England Journal of Medicine 
in 2011 found that Emory University was the fourth largest contributor in the United States to the discovery of 
new drugs and vaccines by public sector research institutions. This ranking was based on a comparison with 
federally funded universities, research hospitals, and federal laboratories. Id. 
 204 See, e.g., Mary J. Loftus, The Dream Team, EMORY MAG. (Spring 2005), http://www.emory.edu/ 
EMORY_MAGAZINE/spring_2005/aids_sidebar.htm. The importance of role models for engaging in 
academic entrepreneurship has been the subject of interest for a number of organizational scholars. See Janet 
Bercovitz & Maryann Feldman, Academic Entrepreneurs: Organizational Change at the Individual Level, 19 
ORG. SCI. 69, 70 (2008); Janet Bercovitz & Maryann Feldman, Entrepreneurial Universities and Technology 
Transfer: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Knowledge-Based Economic Development, 31 J. TECH. 
TRANSFER 175, 180 (2006).  
 205 See Mike King, Molecular Match Game, EMORY HEALTH, Spring 2011, at 2, 4 (describing the 
motivations and goals of the Emory Institute for Drug Development).  
 206 See, e.g., Huryn, supra note 190.  
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neglected diseases.207 This interest in neglected diseases is motivated both by 
existing research capacity and by a desire to solve public-interest-oriented 
problems in drug development.208 This group has spearheaded and helped to 
fund the initiative described below, which for ease of reference is referred to as 
the “Project.”209 
The Project clearly falls in the third category of experiments discussed 
above, involving university selection and ownership of, control over, and 
responsibility for managing the post-discovery development process. While 
various stakeholders may disagree on what “success” ultimately entails, the 
Project must at a minimum achieve financial self-sustainability. It must also 
advance medical therapies with an expected net public benefit in a way that is 
consistent with the university’s public knowledge mission. If successful in 
meeting these requirements, the approach to university innovation capacity 
embodied in this Project could mark a new model for university-driven drug 
development. If not successful, we can at least learn more about the nature and 
source of the barriers that impede the transition of university discoveries into 
products and move on to alternative strategies. The Project thus offers an 
excellent pilot study from which to extrapolate ideas about how the 
organizational structure of universities, as supported or impeded by the legal 
framework, may be harnessed to expand innovation capacity. 
This Part begins with a detailed description of the corporate and intellectual 
property structures underlying the Project, with the goal of uncovering the 
ways in which the characteristics of the university can support or impede 
development activities. It then analyzes the potential of this approach as an 
effective way of improving pharmaceutical innovation.210 
 
 207 See, e.g., Emory Institute for Drug Development Is Awarded the Global Health Primer, EMORY NEWS 
CENTER (Nov. 7, 2012), http://news.emory.edu/stories/2012/11/global_health_primer/ (noting award of 
“unique on-line resource that tracks drug, vaccine and diagnostic products for 25 of the world’s most 
devastating yet neglected tropical diseases” to be managed and expanded by EIDD and to be used to facilitate 
Emory’s “direct engagement with pharmaceutical companies, academic institutions, foundations and others 
pursuing preventives, diagnostics and therapeutics for neglected diseases worldwide”). 
 208 Id.  
 209 The description of the Project is based on a combination of internal documents such as the Project’s 
business plan, presentations made to the Emory University trustees, and descriptions of the Project provided by 
its management and leadership team. 
 210 The description of the legal and corporate structure of the Project is drawn from the DRIVE business 
plan, the organizational documents governing DRIVE and the Emory Institute for Drug Discovery, and 
presentations prepared for the board of directors of Emory in May 2012. 
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A. The Organizational Framework 
Motivated by a key faculty member, Dr. Dennis C. Liotta, the governing 
body of Emory University approved a plan for a self-sustaining, not-for-profit 
operating model to translate scientific discoveries into global health solutions 
in the spring of 2012.211 The stated goal of this plan was to discover and 
develop therapeutic agents to treat infectious diseases, particularly viral 
diseases, building on existing research interests and capabilities.212 The 
proposal that Emory’s board of directors approved provides for the 
development of three entities designed to work together to create a sustainable, 
not-for-profit operating model for drug discovery and development. These 
entities are wholly owned by Emory University, which is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
organization, and the rules attaching to Emory pursuant to its 501(c)(3) status 
cover the actions of Emory’s subsidiaries.213 But these subsidiaries have their 
own distinct governance structures and supporting intellectual property 
policies. Emory Innovations Incorporated, Drug Innovation Ventures, and the 
Emory Institute for Drug Development were all developed using Bayh–Dole 
funds generated from past successes with drug discovery.214 This funding 
approach opens up interesting questions about whether the entities are now 
also constrained by Bayh–Dole Act provisions, and if so, what these 
 
 211 Professor Dennis C. Liotta is the Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of Chemistry at Emory University. 
He has been a coinventor of a number of drugs, including Emtricitabine, which is a breakthrough HIV drug 
marketed under the name Emtriva, widely used as part of the treatment for HIV-positive patients. Dr. Liotta, 
along with other Emory faculty such as Dr. Raymond Schinazi, have helped to create a number of commercial 
spin-off companies to further the development of their discoveries. Recognizing the considerable resources 
that Emory University has in certain areas of drug discovery and development, Dr. Liotta has been pivotal in 
pushing forward and providing start-up funds for the Project. See Dennis C. Liotta, Jim P. Synder, EMORY U. 
DEPARTMENT CHEMISTRY, http://www.chemistry.emory.edu/faculty/liotta/ (last visited May 8, 2013).  
 212 See Emory Institute for Drug Development Is Awarded the Global Health Primer, supra note 207.  
 213 Emory University is a 501(c)(3) organization—an American tax-exempt nonprofit organization as 
defined under the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). This tax-exempt status is 
accompanied by certain obligations, such as limits on the activities of the organization, reporting requirements, 
and limits on how its assets are transferred. See IRS, PUB. 557, TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR 
ORGANIZATION (2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf. 
 214 Pursuant to the Bayh–Dole Act, universities must share with the inventor(s) a portion of any revenue 
received from licensing an invention developed using federal funds. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B) (2006). Any 
remaining revenue, after expenses, must be used to support scientific research or education. Id. § 202(c)(7)(C). 
Emory University has an intellectual property policy that provides for a distribution of funds received from an 
invention between the inventor(s), the department, the school, and the general university funds. The 
inventor(s) have some discretion over how a portion of the department’s share is used. See EMORY UNIV., 
POLICY 7.6: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY § 7.6.05 (2011), available at http://policies.emory.edu/policy/ 
index_pdf.php?policy_number=7.6.  
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constraints would mean in operational terms.215 The entities must become 
financially self-sustainable before their seed funds run out. 
The first entity, Emory Innovations, Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary 
company of Emory University.216 It operates as a holding company for a 
single-member limited liability company called Drug Innovation Ventures at 
Emory (DRIVE) and for what could be many future portfolio companies, each 
directed toward a different innovation goal.217 
The second entity is a single-member limited liability company called Drug 
Innovation Ventures at Emory that has Emory Innovations, Inc. as its single 
member. DRIVE operates as the business arm of the drug development system 
and is organized like a virtual drug development company, with no internal 
development facilities of its own. It has a management team drawn largely 
from industry, with a chief executive officer experienced in commercial drug 
development. It has an advisory board drawn primarily from industry, its own 
employment objectives, and its own intellectual property policies, modeled 
largely on standard commercial practices. The entity has full control over its 
budget, but is also solely responsible for becoming self-sustaining once its 
initial seed funding is exhausted. It will retain 80% of any net intellectual 
property revenues earned up to $10 million and 60% of any net intellectual 
property revenues earned beyond $10 million, such revenue to be used in the 
continuing operations of the company in accordance with its mission. The 
remaining percentage of revenue will go back to the university. This structure 
marks a departure from the revenue-sharing model governing the university’s 
mainstream research activities, a model that has its roots in the Bayh–Dole 
 
 215 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(C) (creating “a requirement that the balance of any royalties or income 
earned by the contractor with respect to subject inventions, after payment of expenses (including payments to 
inventors) . . . be utilized for the support of scientific research or education”). Part IV suggests ways in which 
the legal framework should be clearer about the ability of universities to conduct drug development activities 
such as those explored here.  
 216 Holding companies, sometimes created as subsidiaries and sometimes as separate affiliates, have been 
used by many research universities to manage their intellectual property. See David C. Mowery & Bhaven N. 
Sampat, Patenting and Licensing University Inventions: Lessons from the History of the Research 
Corporation, 10 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 317, 318 (2001); see also Sampat & Nelson, supra note 47, at 148, 
151. 
 217 The use of holding companies, with separate projects run in subsidiaries of the holding company, is a 
commonly used structure in many types of business activities. Reasons for this structure include tax 
advantages, limiting overall liability of risky projects, and protecting core assets in the event of individual 
project failures. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Transformation of Modern Corporation Law: The Law of 
Corporate Groups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 605 (2005).  
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Act.218 It allows for a much larger reinvestment of any proceeds made from 
successful drug development back into drug development than would occur 
under the university’s general intellectual property policies.219 
DRIVE negotiates to obtain the development rights for early-stage 
discoveries from Emory and from outside of Emory. It manages the drug 
development process that starts with the discovery of a drug candidate and 
moves from refining and optimizing this candidate through to Phase II clinical 
testing. The business plan for DRIVE is to license potential drug candidates 
from Emory University or from other academic or private institutions. DRIVE 
will then contract with the Emory Institute for Drug Development and other 
Emory-affiliated or third-party institutions or companies for drug development 
services, and license out the resulting drug candidate to third parties such as 
pharmaceutical companies once favorable clinical results have been generated. 
In other words, DRIVE would push the drug candidate through the drug 
development process until late-stage clinical testing and then move it into the 
hands of commercial drug developers. 
While DRIVE has a number of characteristics that resemble a private drug 
development company, it diverges from an industry counterpart in important 
ways. It is the wholly owned subsidiary of Emory University, a nonprofit 
organization, and its decision-making structure gives weight to the research 
and educational missions at Emory.220 While DRIVE is designed to operate as 
a drug development business, because of its nature as a nonprofit organization 
it is not constrained to focus only on profitable development opportunities. It 
must become financially self-sustaining, but need not select projects based 
only on their economic value.221 The company is expected to reinvest earnings 
 
 218 Under the Bayh–Dole Act, the university is required to share royalties from inventions developed 
through the use of federal funds with its inventors. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B).  
 219 See EMORY UNIV., supra note 214, § 7.6.05. Under Emory’s intellectual property policy, any proceeds 
from licensing are shared between the inventor(s), department, school, and general university funds. For 
proceeds $4 million and above, the shares are 25% to the inventor, 33% to the department, 17% to the school, 
and 25% to the university. See id. Up to 50% of the department share or a maximum of $500,000 per year may 
be held in a discretionary account to support the inventor(s) lab expenses. See id. § 7.6.05(B).  
 220 See supra note 211.  
 221 While making a profit is not the mission of the unit, earning revenue is an undeniable part of its 
continued existence and operation. The ability of this unit to balance concerns about revenue with the relative 
social merits of alternative projects will depend largely on the resources it is able to attract and the 
management decisions made by the entity’s CEO as influenced by the entity’s board of advisors and 
constrained by the oversight of Emory’s board of directors. As a pragmatic matter, project choice will also be 
influenced by the types of projects that present themselves and the types of investors that this Project is able to 
attract. 
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from out-licensing or sale of assets into new development opportunities that 
are selected by its chief executive officer with advice from the advisory 
board.222 The focus of DRIVE is thus on financial self-sustainability rather 
than profit maximization. In addition, it is physically located in Emory and has 
a governance structure that includes Emory personnel responsible to Emory 
University as a whole. This physical and organizational proximity reinforces 
the role of the university’s public knowledge mission in constraining and even 
guiding project decisions made at DRIVE. It does so by increasing the 
likelihood and ease of oversight over DRIVE activities by the university’s 
governing body, and by reducing the contractual, intellectual property, 
physical, and cultural barriers between DRIVE, the Emory Institute for Drug 
Development, and the other parts of the university. 
The third entity, the Emory Institute for Drug Development (EIDD) 
established in 2009, has drug development capabilities designed to carry out 
the kinds of tests and reporting needed to progress from an interesting drug 
candidate into serious drug development.223 EIDD’s stated mission is to 
“promote and support drug discovery research at Emory University, translate 
promising technological advances from the bench-top to the bedside and train 
future generations of pharmaceutical scientists by leveraging in-house drug 
discovery and development expertise.”224 More specifically, EIDD is intended 
to focus on the early-stage development of therapeutic agents to treat infectious 
diseases, particularly viral diseases, which occur in populations throughout the 
developed and developing world.225 This encompasses treatments that do not 
have commercially viable markets, with the idea that given the lower margins 
needed for this kind of model, funding might be attracted from public and 
charitable sources. The focus of this institute is on small molecule therapeutics, 
 
 222 The selection of projects will be an area in which the tensions between public health and public 
knowledge interests and private commercial interests become evident. While the university retains general 
oversight, the board and other members of the university administration are not expected to intervene in daily 
management and project decisions. Key researchers from Emory, particularly those instrumental to the 
formation of the Project, will doubtless play an important role in project selection. Moreover, the selection will 
depend on the opportunities made available both within and outside of Emory.  
 223 The EIDD has the capabilities to design and conduct nonhuman clinical testing needed to examine the 
efficacy, toxicology, and other important properties of a drug candidate. It has significant physical and human 
resources devoted to the preclinical studies needed to ascertain whether a drug candidate is ready for testing in 
humans. Laboratory Capabilities, EMORY INST. FOR DRUG DEV., http://eidd.emory.edu/laboratory-capabilities 
(last visited May 8, 2013). 
 224 Mission Statement, EMORY INST. FOR DRUG DEV., http://eidd.emory.edu/mission-statement (last visited 
May 8, 2013). 
 225 World Health and Neglected Diseases, EMORY INST. FOR DRUG DEV., http://eidd.emory.edu/world-
health-and-neglected-diseases (last visited May 8, 2013). 
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and its lab spaces are scattered across the Emory campus to utilize both 
Emory’s specialized resources and available space. The growth of this project 
will take place in a pragmatic way, taking advantage of existing resources 
within the university. 
EIDD is technically organized as a department within Emory University, 
but it is structured and operated in a manner closer to a private drug 
development contract research organization than a traditional academic 
department. It has the lab space, equipment, and personnel needed to conduct 
preclinical activities that move from target identification through preclinical 
activities. It does not have the capability to conduct clinical trials, however. 
EIDD will not be funded in the way that traditional university biomedical 
research activities are funded, which is largely through the use of NIH grants, 
but rather will be funded on a fee-for-service type model. DRIVE contracts 
with EIDD and other academic and commercial parties for drug development 
services, and EIDD in turn can contract with third parties to provide drug 
development services. Unlike other departments of Emory University, 
employees of EIDD are not—at least according to the proposal for the 
Project—governed by Emory intellectual property policies. They are hired as 
non-tenure-track employees who assign their intellectual property rights to the 
University without retaining a percentage share of any revenues generated by 
their inventions. 
EIDD retains important differences from its industry contract research 
organization counterpart, however. As a department of Emory University, it is 
subject to Emory’s general university policies, with the proposed exception of 
Emory’s standard intellectual property policies. It is located on the university 
campus in proximity to Emory’s research facilities and is integrated with the 
Emory research and development community. Its leadership team is headed by 
an Emory professor, and it is structured in a way that facilitates, and relies on, 
collaboration with members of the Emory research community. Although 
EIDD in its current form is unlikely to generate inventions, those that do 
emerge would be owned by Emory University and managed by Emory’s Office 
of Technology Transfer. This ensures that the university retains control over, 
and responsibility for, the knowledge-intensive byproducts of development 
work. 
There are at least two distinctive features of this four-part structure (Emory 
University, Emory Innovations, Inc., DRIVE, and EIDD), which differentiate it 
from a private drug development company. The first feature is the governance 
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structure, which tries to balance general university oversight with some degree 
of autonomy for project-focused decision makers. University oversight of drug 
development activities is provided at the board level. Emory Innovations, Inc. 
has a board of directors appointed by the president of Emory that includes the 
university’s three executive vice presidents. The board is required to include a 
minimum of three and a maximum of seven members, with additional 
members drawn from the university trustees and the Emory community. All of 
the existing Emory University board governance parameters apply to the 
Emory Innovations board. In addition, the operations of the entity and its 
disposition of assets are subject to the restrictions imposed on its parent 
company, Emory University, by virtue of its tax-exempt status as an 
educational entity.226 What this means is that Emory University has ultimate 
control over, and responsibility for, the activities of Emory Innovations, Inc. 
and its subsidiary, DRIVE. Autonomy is preserved, however, by leaving 
operations and management decisions to a chief executive officer and staff for 
DRIVE and each additional subsidiary, with personnel drawn primarily from 
industry. Practical decisions about innovation projects are made by the chief 
executive officer with advice from an advisory board that is also drawn 
primarily from industry. This distances decisions about project choice and 
management from the central university decision-making structure. As a 
contract research organization designed to pay its own way, EIDD is also 
somewhat removed from the normal systems of academic governance and 
central administration control despite its organizational status as a department 
of Emory University. 
Ideally, this governance structure means that the activities of Emory 
Innovations, Inc. and its subsidiaries and the activities of EIDD will be 
consistent with and supportive of the public knowledge mandate of the 
university while also supporting efficient commercial development. The 
autonomy left to the individual subsidiaries, however, combined with the 
management focus on achieving financial self-sustainability, leaves open the 
potential for project choices and project management decisions that reflect 
localized profit interests rather than generalized public knowledge and public 
health interests. Moreover, if the subsidiaries are successful in attracting 
significant funds, this could influence how the university thinks about resource 
 
 226 These restrictions include limits on unrelated business income, limits on the amount of space that can 
be devoted to commercial activities, and a requirement to run the entity’s operations in accordance with its 
stated nonprofit mission. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).  
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allocation and intellectual property management. Discretion in this context is a 
double-edged sword. 
A second important feature of this structure is the way it partitions assets, 
including intellectual property rights and projects. The partitioning of assets 
and decision making may allow for the financing and operation of 
economically valuable ventures that would not be feasible within the existing 
organizational structure of the university. The creation of semiautonomous 
management units may facilitate nimble decision making about specific 
commercialization projects. Decisions about the drug development path can be 
made faster, and with the focused goal of drug development in mind, when the 
entity is operated and controlled by its own industry-trained chief executive 
officer. Making decisions through the normal university channels, by contrast, 
could be slow, cumbersome, and encumbered with conflicting interests and 
incentives that are likely to interfere with effective development strategies. 
Moreover, potential investors would be reluctant to invest in the development 
process without some security that decisions would be made with their 
development projects foremost in mind. Centralizing intellectual property 
rights and management decisions necessary to post-discovery drug 
development within such an entity will make this an attractive vehicle for 
private investors, nonprofit funders with drug development objectives, and 
collaborators. 
This partitioning also has the effect of separating development resources 
and decisions from the university’s central administration of funds and 
intellectual property. In its current set up, Emory Innovations and its 
subsidiaries will not be financed by general university funds. They are 
supported with seed funds—albeit seed funds that are proceeds from the 
licensing of Bayh–Dole-supported inventions—and must adopt a strategy to 
become financially self-sustaining. Moreover, this plan involves a clean break 
between the intellectual property policies that apply to discoveries made by 
Emory researchers and those that apply to work performed at EIDD and other 
entities that DRIVE contracts with as part of a drug development program. 
DRIVE negotiates with the Emory Office of Technology Transfer for Emory’s 
intellectual property rights based on discoveries made by Emory inventors, and 
this license is negotiated by Emory in the same way a license with a private 
party would be. Emory’s Office of Technology Transfer retains control over 
decisions concerning the patenting and licensing of inventions emerging from 
its faculty. Early-stage patenting decisions are thus, at least in theory, informed 
by a broader range of both commercial and noncommercial concerns, rather 
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than being driven by a single-product focus. DRIVE can also enter into 
licenses and contract for drug development services with third parties, and 
EIDD can perform drug discovery and development services for third parties. 
This type of structure works by simultaneously partitioning and connecting 
activities in the drug discovery and development process. By locating DRIVE 
and EIDD within the university and making these entities a part of Emory, this 
approach could not only facilitate interactions between drug discovery and 
development personnel, but also lower the transaction costs of collaboration 
with other parts of the university, as well as with other academic collaborators. 
Physical and cultural proximity will help keep informal costs low and 
organizational proximity will help keep legal costs low. Indeed, it is DRIVE’s 
relationships with EIDD and the relationship of both DRIVE and EIDD with 
other groups within the Emory University “family” that help to differentiate 
DRIVE from a non-Emory virtual development company and EIDD from its 
industry contract research organization counterparts. DRIVE and EIDD benefit 
from their organizational and contractual ties to within-Emory collaborators, 
such as the Emory Chemical Biology High-Throughput Screening Center,227 
the Emory Vaccine Center,228 the Winship Cancer Institute and its Phase I 
Clinical Trials Unit,229 the Atlanta Clinical and Translational Science 
Institute,230 and the Yerkes National Primate Research Center.231 The 
comparative advantage of universities over other private and public 
organizations lies in part in the programs and facilities they can bring together 
in this way under a connected and loosely coordinated umbrella. 
 
 227 See generally EMORY CHEMICAL BIOLOGY DISCOVERY CENTER, http://www.pharm.emory.edu/ 
ECBDC (last visited May 8, 2013). 
 228 See generally Mission Statement, EMORY VACCINE CENTER, http://www.vaccines.emory.edu/mission/ 
mission.shtml (last visited May 8, 2013) (describing the Emory Vaccine Center, established in 1996 and one of 
the largest academic vaccine centers in the world). 
 229 The Winship Cancer Institute provides a cancer research center for investigators from thirty-one 
departments at Emory, as well as outside collaborators such as the CDC, to focus on basic and translational 
research into cancer treatments. It includes clinical testing capacity. Winship Cancer Institute of Emory 
University, EMORY WOODRUFF HEALTH SCI. CENTER, http://whsc.emory.edu/home/about/components-and-
figures/Winship-cancer-inst.html (last visited May 8, 2013) (describing the Winship Cancer Institute and its 
clinical trials unit). 
 230 See generally About ACTSI, ATLANTA CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL SCI. INST., www.actsi.org/about/ 
index.html (last visited May 8, 2013) (describing the Atlanta Clinical and Translational Science Institute). This 
is a collaboration between the Morehouse School of Medicine, the Georgia Institute of Technology, and 
Emory funded as part of the NIH CTSA program designed to integrate resources to pursue translational 
research projects. Id. 
 231 See generally About, EMORY YERKES NAT’L PRIMATE RES. CENTER, www.yerkes.emory.edu/about/ 
index.html (last visited May 8, 2013) (describing the Yerkes National Primate Research Center, which 
conducts both basic and translational research).  
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B. Analysis of This Approach 
This Project diverges from mainstream approaches to university 
involvement in drug discovery and development by extending the university 
role to encompass financing and managing the drug development process 
through the valley of death.232 Part II of this Article explained how universities 
have organizational characteristics that may give them comparative advantages 
over private firms in the dual process of creating knowledge and creating 
drugs.233 These advantages included the ability to support a modular structure 
that can accommodate different kinds of intellectual production and the ability 
to provide the kinds of semipublic infrastructure, such as drug discovery 
facilities, and the diversified human capital needed to increase translational 
R&D capacity. The case study above gives us a more concrete idea of how the 
organizational advantages of the university could be combined with existing 
university drug-discovery capabilities to reach two related goals. The first goal 
is to support socially valuable drug development efforts that private firms are 
either unable or unwilling to engage in. The second goal is to produce a drug 
development process that differentiates more effectively than private firms 
between public knowledge aspects of drug development, which are made 
publicly accessible, and private proprietary aspects of drug development, with 
an emphasis on narrowing what is proprietary and how proprietary it really has 
to be. 
In the Project, the unique characteristics of the university, along with a 
combination of organizational law and intellectual property law, are used to 
design semiautonomous projects with their own governance structures that 
together create a university-controlled process of distributed pharmaceutical 
innovation.234 This design is essentially a “modularizing” or “partitioning” 
 
 232 Here the “valley of death” refers to the movement from selecting the most promising drug candidate 
and refining the properties of that candidate through to Phase II of clinical testing. See MILNE & MALINS, 
supra note 114. 
 233 These characteristics were described as: the ability of universities, as specialized entities with a public 
knowledge function, to sustain different systems of knowledge production with varying levels of openness; the 
disciplining influence of multiple stakeholders in the knowledge production process on university decision 
making; and the flexibility, varying levels of autonomy, and alternative incentive schemes that are available 
within the university’s relatively decentralized governance structure.  
 234 Eric von Hippel used the term distributed innovation to describe a system in which innovation 
emanates not just from a central producer but from many sources including users and rivals. ERIC VON HIPPEL, 
THE SOURCES OF INNOVATION 5 (1988). Scholars such as Carliss Baldwin have explored the consequences of 
modularity for distributed innovation. See Carliss Y. Baldwin, Organization Design for Distributed Innovation 
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 12-100, 2012). Concepts such as task partitioning also provide a 
useful conceptual framework on which to base an analysis of university-based innovation strategies. See von 
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approach to the governance of mixed processes of drug discovery research and 
drug development activities.235 Boundaries between the different entities in the 
innovation process are based on the separable nature of different activities and 
the need for varying degrees of openness and autonomy. The Project uses this 
structure to: (1) pursue new funding strategies that include mixed public and 
private funding; (2) minimize breakdowns in and restrictions on technology 
and knowledge transfer; (3) respond to incentive problems that impede middle 
stages of drug development and support reinforcing norms and cultures of 
innovation; and (4) minimize the impact of commercialization activities on the 
traditional research functions of the university. 
To tackle the challenge of funding drug development, along with its own 
operations, the Project creates separate entities with distinct project-
management and intellectual-property-ownership structures as vehicles for 
creating attractive investment opportunities.236 There is a clean break in the 
intellectual property rights and policies that apply to the university as a whole 
and the intellectual property rights and policies that apply once intellectual 
property has been in-licensed by DRIVE, the drug development company. The 
idea is to partition those university assets, primarily relevant intellectual 
property rights, which are essential to developing a portfolio of drugs.237 The 
 
Hippel, supra note 136 (analyzing how the ways in which projects are partitioned into smaller tasks affects 
innovation outcomes). A related concept is the use of patents to partition assets in ways that facilitate the 
governance of private firms. Heald, supra note 133, at 480–84 (showing how patents may act as affirmative 
asset partitions and resolve team production problems within firms). 
 235 The growing literature on modularization, property, and intellectual property has a number of 
applications to this analysis. While a systematic application of the insights from this literature to analyze 
partitioning approaches within universities is beyond the scope of this Article, the discussion here draws 
directly and indirectly on much of this literature. See, e.g., Smith, Institutions and Indirectness, supra note 133 
(applying information cost theory to IP and explaining how difficulty in measuring inputs and identifying 
likely outputs creates advantages for placing a given activity within a module and giving control over local 
remodularization to private actors, with IP allowing for this modularization through the right to exclude); 
Smith, Intellectual Property, supra note 133 (applying information cost theory to explain how intellectual 
property works, albeit imperfectly, in addressing complex coordination problems of attributing outputs to 
inputs); Baldwin & Henkel, supra note 133 (focusing on the link between modularity and value appropriation, 
and the role of IP in this process); Baldwin & von Hippel, supra note 133. 
 236 This touches on a related and very relevant literature on intellectual property and the boundaries of the 
firm, including work by Robert Merges, Dan Burk, Joe Miller, Scott Kieff, Paul Heald, and many others. See, 
e.g., Burk & McDonnell, supra note 143 (examining the role of IP in balancing resource allocation needs 
within the firm and between firms); Miller, supra note 143 (discussing the role of IP in allowing access lock-in 
to facilitate the joint development and use of standards). 
 237 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Toward an Economic Theory of Property in Information, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 104 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011) 
(discussing the asset partitioning function of intellectual property and other roles it plays in modular exclusion 
strategies). Intellectual property law provides a modular platform for the interactions of parties, especially 
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intellectual property license from the university to its development entity can 
define the assets over which the development entity has control, using patent 
rights as proxies for a cluster of information relevant to the development of a 
particular drug or portfolio of drugs. This approach allows investors to identify 
the boundaries of the projects they invest in and secures their investments even 
when the inputs into the process are difficult to monitor and the outputs are 
diffuse.238 
Depending on the nature of the investors, which may include a mix of 
industry investors, venture capitalists, philanthropists, and government funders, 
the investors may be anticipating first rights to license any resulting drug 
candidates, monetary returns, or in the case of nonprofit organizations or 
government funding sources, progress of a drug candidate to meet targeted 
health needs. The dual benefits of certain activities as both knowledge creating 
and commodity creating can attract a combination of different kinds of 
funding. Investors with diverging, noncompeting interests may be able to pool 
their investments to mutual advantage, and they can invest in a portfolio of 
project opportunities rather than basing investments on a single promising drug 
candidate. The ways in which investments are made can be tailored to the 
needs of different investors, although the ability of DRIVE to facilitate 
different investor interests will be constrained by the existing legal framework. 
Intellectual property rights not essential to securing investment in drug 
development can be made available for broader public use. 
Second, the Project can minimize breakdowns in and restrictions on 
technology and knowledge transfer by tailoring the governance of internal 
activities within each module or project to reflect the nature of the activities 
and the nature of the knowledge being produced. Some activities will be well 
suited to an open-commons or open-access research model, for example.239 
 
when it comes to commercialization. Although exclusive rights have their costs—and because of the 
nonrivalness of information itself these costs are more apparent in intellectual property than in property—the 
modular bundling in intellectual property can serve to manage the complexity of coordinating rival inputs to 
commercialization; the same basic architecture of defining a modular thing and using on/off exclusion rights as 
a starting point, supplemented with rules of proper use, can be discerned even in IP.  
 238 For a discussion of the role of intellectual property rights in facilitating asset partitioning in ways that 
support productive activity, see Heald, supra note 133, at 480–84, which suggests that just like organizational 
law, intellectual property has an asset partitioning function.  
 239 See, for example, the proposed Archipelago to Proof of Clinical Mechanism (Arch2POCM) initiative 
supported by the Structural Genomics Consortium and Sage Bionetworks, which aims to generate and 
disseminate data about targets for cancer/immunology and schizophrenia/autism in a way that is IP-free with 
the goal of improving the efficiency of drug development processes. See Stephen Friend, Sage Bionetworks, 
Arch2POCM: A Drug Development Approach from Disease Targets to Their Clinical Validation (Nov. 2011), 
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Other activities will require secrecy, again requiring accommodations at the 
institutional level of the university. Boundaries between different activities, or 
projects, can and should be designed to limit barriers to the flow of information 
where it is useful, but also to create barriers to the flow of information where 
proprietary uses dominate and public knowledge aspects are limited.240 We 
care more about open access to early discoveries that reveal information about 
disease mechanisms, for example, than we do about the toxicology results of a 
particular drug candidate, although we may also care about the latter. 
Boundaries can also be used to define tasks in a way that minimizes the 
problem-solving interdependencies between the tasks and minimizes the costs 
of cross-boundary problem solving where possible.241 This will be particularly 
useful as drug discovery shifts from single-disease pathways to exploring the 
molecular basis for groups of diseases.242 Organizing the innovation process in 
this way may help to minimize breakdowns in the movement of knowledge 
across different stages of development and can reduce costs in the creation and 
flow of necessary information and technology along the drug development 
path. It also allows the university to outsource those aspects of the drug 
development process that do not draw on the university’s comparative 
strengths. 
Third, the governance of separate projects can be designed in ways that 
respond to different incentive problems, such as eliciting effort levels in team 
production processes and ensuring the right amount of information sharing 
both within and across connected projects.243 Research-oriented projects must 
 
available at http://www.slideshare.net/sagebio/stephen-friend-institute-of-development-aging-and-cancer-2011 
1129.  
 240 The use of IP rights to create and navigate boundaries between different kinds of activities suggests a 
distinction between what goes on within creative groups and between creative groups. For an exploration of 
these ideas, see Katherine J. Strandburg, Intellectual Property at the Boundary (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/schools/law/doc/patconpapers/Strandburg%20Paper20Draft. 
docx. 
 241 See generally von Hippel, supra note 137 (exploring the link between how an innovation project is 
divided into tasks (“task partitioning”) and the efficiency and effectiveness of the project; suggesting the 
location of task boundaries may impact both the efficiency of task performance and project outcomes due to 
associated changes in problem-solving interdependence among tasks).  
 242 See Collins, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that “diseases once considered quite distinct can share similar 
molecular pathways,” which suggests future approaches based on cellular networks rather than individual 
disease categories); Andrew L. Hopkins, Network Pharmacology: The Next Paradigm in Drug Discovery, 4 
NATURE CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 682 (2008).  
 243 Various scholars have discussed the implications of different ownership structures. See, e.g., Burk & 
McDonnell, supra note 143 (examining the effects of intellectual property rights on allocation of resources 
within the firm, including allocation of rights between employers and employees and effects on specialization 
versus integration of activities); Erika Färnstrand Damsgaard & Marie C. Thursby, University 
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allow for peer review, publication, and replication by other members of the 
scientific community. But more routine tasks generating results specific to a 
particular drug candidate will need alternative review and monitoring 
structures and may require restrictions on the publication of results. Using 
varying incentive structures may also facilitate positive selection effects among 
university employees.244 In the Project, different intellectual property 
policies—including both ownership, benefit sharing, and disclosure rights—
apply to different units within the drug discovery and development system 
based on the nature of the activities undertaken and the types of contributions 
expected from these employees. General university intellectual property 
policies favor inventors, rewarding them for breakthrough discoveries. This 
may make sense for early-stage discovery efforts, but not for efforts directed at 
making incremental contributions to the drug development process. Moreover, 
it may impede the kind of immediate and free flow of information between 
collaborating parties that is essential to efficient drug discovery.245 The 
employer ownership model featured by DRIVE and EIDD, in contrast, 
divorces the return to employees from their inventorship contributions, if any. 
Employees have a bonus system that can be used to reward the production of 
incremental improvements and to support team production efforts. 
Along with individual incentive structures, norms and institutional culture 
are also important in the success or failure of experiments like the Project. The 
creation of separate entities contained within the university is intended to 
create enclaves dominated by a more business-oriented culture. The norms and 
institutional practices of academic research are different from the norms and 
practices of industry research.246 The focus on and resources devoted to 
 
Entrepreneurship and Professor Privilege, 22 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 183 (2013) (analyzing how differences 
in institutional regimes regarding ownership of faculty inventions affect university entrepreneurship); Robert 
P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1999). 
 244 See, e.g., Xuhong Su, Academic Faculty Affiliated with University Research Centers: Selection 
Dynamics 3–4 (Apr. 1, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2032787 
(describing how recruitment of faculty typically involves providing incentives to encourage voluntary 
participation). 
 245 See, e.g., Michaël Bikard, Is Academic Science Trapped Inside the Ivory Tower? Universities and 
Science-Based Cumulative Invention (Apr. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://druid8.sit.aau. 
dk/acc_papers/9hdurpx4qjhr1kbrde7hfg7dsved.pdf. Using a novel empirical strategy, Michaël Bikard tested 
the relative impact of the academic and corporate environments on follow-on cumulative invention. Id. He 
found that firms are a more prolific source of science-based inventions and that industry discoverers generate 
three times as many cumulative patents as academic counterparts. Id. He also found that nondiscoverer 
inventors draw scientific knowledge more from industry than academia. Id.  
 246 See, e.g., Fiona Murray, The Oncomouse That Roared: Hybrid Exchange Strategies as a Source of 
Distinction at the Boundary of Overlapping Institutions, 116 AM. J. SOC. 341 (2010) (examining collision 
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technological development, as well as linkages to innovation networks, vary 
between academic and industry groups.247 Moreover, the individual incentives 
of researchers within the university diverge from their industry counterparts.248 
The university has deliberately created separate, self-contained systems in 
order to create a more business-focused culture. Development entities such as 
DRIVE are hierarchical, they have a focused leadership, employees are 
selected in part based on their connection to a broader industry network and 
their past experience as employees of pharmaceutical companies, and they 
have clear product-focused objectives. Employment schemes and intellectual 
property policies reinforce the business-oriented, technological-development-
focused culture. DRIVE in particular is geared to the needs of a commercial 
drug development process. Its officers are drawn from industry and its 
advisory board is composed primarily of industry experts. EIDD is similarly 
staffed with individuals that have industry experience in drug development. 
They are hired not as faculty inventors, but as staff scientists engaged in 
moving a drug candidate along the drug development path. 
But while seeking to foster a distinct, product-development-focused culture 
within the university, the design of the Project also seeks to limit the scope and 
impact of the cultural divide. The cultural differences are constrained, and are 
meant to be constrained, by the not-for-profit nature of DRIVE and EIDD and 
the deliberate proximity and intentionally designed close interaction between 
research and discovery personnel. EIDD includes both development employees 
and researchers with Emory University faculty appointments, for example, and 
DRIVE will rely on and bring together the resources of the Emory research 
community around different development projects. In turn, the proximity of 
academic scientists to development-focused projects might foster more interest 
 
between academic and commercial science as exacerbated by patenting); Henry Sauermann & Paula E. 
Stephan, Twins or Strangers? Differences and Similarities Between Industrial and Academic Science (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16113, 2010) (developing a framework to compare and contrast 
academic and industrial science).  
 247 See, e.g., Bikard, supra note 245, at 6–7 (discussing the “ivory tower” view of universities, which 
emphasizes that industry scientists have stronger incentives to develop new technologies based on the 
scientific knowledge that they create, that the effectiveness of firm limits on dissemination of knowledge is 
limited and that knowledge often flows between firms, that universities often occupy peripheral positions in 
networks of innovative organizations, and that inventor collaboration networks are similarly distinct). 
 248 Richard Jensen & Marie Thursby, Proofs and Prototypes for Sale: The Licensing of University 
Inventions, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 240 (2001) (suggesting that while academic institutions have dissemination of 
knowledge as their mission, individual researchers often lack the resources and incentives to develop their 
ideas beyond very early stages of discovery). There are also pressures on individual research scientists to 
protect their research tools and early results in order to give them a comparative advantage in being the first to 
publish on advances in the area.  
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in, and desire to become involved in, pushing scientific discoveries into more 
accessible forms. Ideally, the fact that these entities are owned by the 
university and located within the university leads to greater balancing of public 
access with private development incentives and lower organizational, cultural, 
and legal barriers in the movement of knowledge between research and 
development activities. 
A fourth advantage of segmenting the different discovery and development 
activities is to minimize the impact of commercialization activities on the 
traditional research functions of the university.249 All of the activities take 
place under the umbrella of Emory University, and the success of the Project 
will require continuing collaboration with centers and departments within the 
university as well as with its external academic collaborators. This interaction 
must take place in a way that protects and supports the university’s public 
knowledge mission. The hope is that the modularizing approach, pursued 
within an overarching organization that retains oversight and responsibility for 
the process as a whole, will provide an adequate balance of the public 
knowledge and private development interests. Information can, at least in 
theory, pass more easily between discovery and development entities due to 
reduced organizational barriers, and intellectual property policies can be used 
as a means of partitioning assets into commercial and noncommercial uses in 
ways that can balance public knowledge and private development needs.250 
Moreover, because the discovery and development activities take place within 
a single organization, the university can make choices about when not to 
protect information through the use of intellectual property rights as well as 
making choices about the scope and nature of intellectual property rights that it 
does obtain.251 Ideally, internalizing proprietary development and public 
 
 249 See generally Damsgaard & Thursby, supra note 243 (discussing the implications of institutional 
choice including income sharing, investment in reputation, and ability to attract commercial partners); Jerry 
Thursby & Marie Thursby, University Licensing: Harnessing or Tarnishing Faculty Research, in 10 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159, 166–67 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2010) (discussing 
trade-off between harnessing tacit knowledge of faculty for development and diverting faculty from more 
basic duties at the university). 
 250 This idea of using a modularizing architecture to strategically manage barriers and balance access and 
appropriation interests in processes of innovation is drawn from a very different context—the strategic use of 
modularity by entrepreneurial firms. See Carliss Y. Baldwin, When Open Architecture Beats Closed: The 
Entrepreneurial Use of Architectural Knowledge 1 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 10-063, 2010) 
(describing how entrepreneurial firms can use superior architectural knowledge to open up a technical system 
to gain strategic advantage, identifying and modularizing and supplying key bottlenecks while outsourcing 
supply of nonbottleneck components).  
 251 For the challenges inherent in managing information for the public good and the importance of 
responsible knowledge management, see for example, Madison, Knowledge Curation, supra note 148. 
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knowledge processes within a single organization, one that has a public 
knowledge mission, will also reduce current industry problems of 
underinvestment in information and undersharing of information that has a net 
public benefit. The university does not have to worry as much about value 
appropriation when designing the innovation process. This is because it at least 
partially internalizes the public knowledge benefits and is at least partially 
subsidized in its development activities. The university can select and engage 
in socially beneficial projects and pursue knowledge-sharing strategies for 
projects in ways that might not be attractive or available to private firms.252 
Ultimately, the activities remain subject to the university’s oversight, 
constrained by its overriding interest in ensuring that the public knowledge 
mission of the university, along with its not-for-profit tax-exempt status and 
valuable academic reputation, is not compromised by development 
activities.253 
Despite these notes of optimism about balancing public and private 
interests to make both knowledge and drugs, the tension between public 
knowledge and private development interests as universities pursue 
development roles is a very real one. Managing the balance between 
sometimes competing interests in public knowledge and product development 
and preserving a strong foundation of disinterested, curiosity-driven science 
remain the biggest challenges in pursuing a shifting university role in the 
innovation process.254 The framework in its current form leaves open key areas 
 
 252 Universities may be better able to take advantage of modularity to create value because they do not 
have to worry as much about appropriating the commercial value from collaborative activities, although the 
ability to appropriate value still plays an important role in the optimal design of the system. Carliss Baldwin 
and Joachim Henkel have discussed the relationship between creation and appropriation of value and the use 
of IP to facilitate this process. See Joachim Henkel & Carliss Y. Baldwin, Modularity for Value 
Appropriation—How to Draw the Boundaries of Intellectual Property 2 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
No. 11-054, 2010) (“[I]n a modular system, a firm must simultaneously decide on the technical boundaries of 
the modules and the IP deployed in each one. Controlling too much of the system’s IP is problematic if it 
deters innovation by others. But controlling too little—or the wrong parts—may prevent the focal firm from 
capturing value for itself.”).  
 253 Analogies can be drawn between the organizational strategies and objectives discussed here and efforts 
to create a hybrid organization for social entrepreneurship goals. I suspect that efforts to use the L3C may run 
into more problems than efforts at modularizing innovation within a university, but both approaches involve 
inherent challenges as well as opportunities. For a critical evaluation of the L3C, see Rachel Culley & Jill R. 
Horwitz, Profits v. Purpose: Hybrid Companies and the Charitable Dollar (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 272, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2055368. 
 254 Concerns about university involvement in money-making initiatives are not new. For influential work 
highlighting the tensions between academic and commercial science more generally, see DEREK BOK, 
UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2003), which 
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of discretion in how the balance between competing public and private 
interests is maintained, particularly in project selection choice and university 
decisions about how to structure license terms with DRIVE, but also in broader 
decisions about where to target growth in research capabilities. 
IV.  LEGAL RESPONSES TO A CHANGING UNIVERSITY ROLE 
The challenges of making universities attractive sites for proprietary drug 
development while also protecting their core public knowledge functions are 
evident.255 Universities must seek to sustain and balance different cultures in a 
way that promotes the health and vitality of both research and development 
groups.256 They must wear a business hat while preserving their commitment 
to a mission of public knowledge and education. They will have a growing 
stake in commercial outcomes while seeking to preserve curiosity-driven 
science.257 They will be conflicted in their approach to the disclosure and 
 
examined whether everything in the university is for sale and argued that universities must be vigilant to avoid 
compromising the primary mission and purpose of an academic institution. See also JENNIFER WASHBURN, 
UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (2005) (arguing that 
universities are selling out to corporate sponsorship and intellectual property is being transferred too readily to 
industry). For a thoughtful review of the tensions between public and private interests in university science, 
see STEPHEN M. MAURER, PROMOTING AND DISSEMINATING KNOWLEDGE: THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE INTERFACE 
(2002). For a discussion of the tension that patenting may create with the university mission, see for example, 
Geertrui Van Overwalle, Reconciling Patent Policies with the University Mission, 13 ETHICAL PERSP. 231 
(2006), which examined how to reconcile the traditional academic mission of knowledge production and 
science sharing with the current trend in universities toward knowledge protection and appropriation through 
patenting and suggested mechanisms designed to provide oversight of conflicts and modifications to patenting 
to respect public interests.  
 255 Concerns about the commercialization of academic institutions have been highlighted by scholars such 
as Derek Bok. See BOK, supra note 254.  
 256 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This 
Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION 
POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 223, 225 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001). Other scholars 
have a different view of the role of patents and industry partnerships on the dissemination and use of 
biomedical discoveries, suggesting that patent rights may actually increase the sharing and use of research 
results and support norms important to basic science. See F. Scott Kieff, Forum, Facilitating Scientific 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. 
U. L. REV. 691, 694 (2001) (suggesting that patents may actually improve rather than dampen norms 
supporting basic research, contrasting it with the imperfect operation of the market for “kudos,” and discussing 
the positive effects of patents on encouraging more and broader forms of funding for scientific research); F. 
Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2001) 
[hereinafter Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules] (noting the role of patents as property rights in 
supporting commercialization of inventions by encouraging coordination and bargaining to achieve efficient 
investment in and use of discoveries); see also Lee, supra note 67.  
 257 See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology Transfer, in 
UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL 
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sharing of information and the management of early-stage patenting and 
licensing because of their involvement as licensees and developers of these 
same inventions.258 I have suggested that for some universities, those with 
well-developed drug discovery capabilities, the social benefits of pursing these 
dual activities may sometimes outweigh the costs. But to achieve these benefits 
without jeopardizing the integrity and autonomy of academic science, policy 
makers need to respond simultaneously to the frequently conflicting needs of 
product-driven and curiosity-driven science. This concluding Part of this 
Article suggests a few ways in which policy makers could use the legal 
framework governing universities and their technology development and 
transfer activities to respond more directly to the opportunities and challenges 
of universities that expand their role in processes of innovation. 
Concerns about the harm that commercial technology transfer activities 
may have on the public knowledge functions of universities are not new.259 
The existing literature includes detailed proposals for protecting the public 
knowledge function of universities through patent law change. These proposals 
advocate creating robust research-use or fair-use defenses,260 increasing control 
 
PROPERTY, supra note 148, at 93, 97–122 (suggesting the importance of funding for curiosity-driven science 
and the need to preclude researchers from using patenting to control follow-on research). 
 258 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh–Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 289 (expressing concerns with the erosion of open science 
and the increasingly proprietary character of university biomedical research and suggesting that federal 
funding agencies should have more discretion in determining when to require that publicly funded research 
discoveries be dedicated to the public domain). 
 259 See, e.g., MAURER, supra note 254 (noting the need for intervention to protect the public interest in 
academic science, including a survey of activities by universities and governments that impact the public 
domain); Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601 (2005); Rai & Eisenberg, supra 
note 258, at 289, 313 (expressing concerns about inadequate motivation of universities to take social costs of 
patenting decisions into account); Strandburg, supra note 257, at 97–122 (noting the importance of preserving 
adequate funding for curiosity-driven research); Katherine J. Strandburg, User Innovator Community Norms: 
At the Boundary Between Academic and Industry Research, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2237 (2009) (exploring the 
implications of convergence of academic research with commercial interests and the implications for norms of 
sharing research tools and materials and suggesting need for policies to enhance sharing). Changes that 
diminish the public knowledge orientation of universities could interfere with core organizational principles 
such as autonomy, creativity, and diversity that are essential to the university’s public knowledge functions. 
See, e.g., BUSCH ET AL., supra note 191, at 16 (“There are arguably three central principles and associated 
practices that must stand at the core of any university that is worthy of the title: creativity, autonomy, and 
diversity.”). 
 260 Numerous scholars have put forward detailed and carefully tailored proposals for research-use and, 
even more broadly, fair-use defenses. See, e.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science: 
Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 464 (2004); Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1017 (1989) (proposing research-use defense that distinguishes between situations requiring payment and 
those not requiring payment, with a focus on protecting robust domain for basic research uses); Donna M. 
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by funding agencies over patenting decisions by universities,261 protecting the 
disclosure of research results in the face of proprietary interests in restricting 
disclosure,262 and limiting early-stage patenting and restrictive licensing 
practices.263 The problems that these measures seek to address become even 
bigger in a world in which university innovation capacity expands. But in 
reconsidering the need for measures such as these, we also need to consider 
whether they will impede or even foreclose potentially beneficial university 
development roles.264 It may be difficult to encourage more private investment 
in university development activities while also introducing a broad research-
use exemption for universities into patent law, for example. Moreover, the 
 
Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European 
Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1684–90 
(2001); Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent 
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2001); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward 
a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1205 (2000); Katherine J. Strandburg, What 
Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 130–46 (proposing a 
research-use exemption based on characteristics of the invention and distinguishing between experimenting on 
a patented invention and experimenting with the patented invention). 
 261 Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 258 (advocating for greater NIH control over patenting decisions for 
federally funded research).  
 262 See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their 
Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 217 (2006) (proposing protections to disclosure norms by creating “an opt-
in extended grace period that would provide more time for academic researchers to publish and present early-
stage research before having to file a patent application,” combined with early application publication); 
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
1363, 1363–404 (1988). 
 263 Various scholars have put forward proposals for requiring or encouraging open-access licensing and 
supporting other modes of open science by universities. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Commons-Based Strategies 
and the Problems of Patents, 305 SCIENCE 1110, 1110–11 (2004); Kapczynski et al., supra note 147, at 1090–
1109; Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 917 (addressing the role 
of public institutions in supporting distributed commons through ownership stakes and leverage from funding); 
Lemley, supra note 259 (noting concerns that university interests may not align with optimal use of building 
block inventions in nanotechnology); Van Overwalle, supra note 254 (suggesting mechanisms such as public 
patents, open patents, and two-tiered licensing strategies as mechanisms for balancing ethos of sharing and 
profit maximization in universities).  
 264 One set of arguments against public law interventions is that private actions may be sufficient to 
protect public policy objectives. See, e.g., Peter Lee, Contracting to Preserve Open Science: Consideration-
Based Regulation in Patent Law, 58 EMORY L.J. 889, 898–99 (2009) (suggesting that the increasing use of 
conditional research support by government and nonprofit funders can be used to contractually construct a 
biomedical research commons and reflecting the use of consideration-based contracting to effectuate policy 
goals). Another set of arguments is that public law interventions such as fair use will introduce uncertainty, be 
costly to implement, and will lower incentive costs and thus dampen innovation. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, 
The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 
HASTINGS L.J. 921, 950–51 (2006); Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: The 
Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169, 2176–85 (1991); see also Kieff, Property Rights and 
Property Rules, supra note 256 (emphasizing the importance of property rights in encouraging 
commercialization of inventions). 
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organizational innovations behind university experiments complicate the 
application of rules that rely on clear boundary drawing between commercial 
and research activities. This is one of the main problems with the existing legal 
framework—it works through boundary drawing instead of responding to the 
governance challenges created by the dual nature of university research and 
development activities. 
As Emory University is discovering during the course of its experiment 
with drug development capacity, there are a number of internal and external 
rules and policies that create difficulties for funding university-driven drug 
development. In addition, organizational strategies designed to support drug 
development activities create new areas of tension within the university 
between competing public and private interests and even between competing 
public interests. This Article’s contribution to the policy debate is to focus 
attention on ways in which the legal framework can improve university 
governance of commercial activities rather than preclude them. While a 
comprehensive blueprint for legal and regulatory change is beyond the scope 
of this Article, it suggests some modest changes to the Bayh–Dole Act and to 
tax rules impacting university-managed innovation that are designed to 
enhance the governance advantages of the university in mixed processes of 
research and drug development. This Part focuses in particular on changes in 
existing rules that limit university strategies for financially supporting their 
development activities, changes that can reduce tensions between pursuing 
academic science and pursuing proprietary drug development, and collective 
action problems among competing universities that may harm collective 
innovation outcomes. Part IV looks first at whether the Bayh–Dole Act, in its 
current form, might interfere with strategies for self-sustainable drug 
development within the university. 
The funding structure and legal rules governing university activities are 
geared primarily toward supporting traditional forms of scientific research.265 
The NIH and other federal funding agencies provide significant research 
funding to universities, much of it in the form of grants made to principal 
investigators for scientific projects that are selected through peer review by 
other scientists.266 This system tends to reinforce existing patterns of research 
 
 265 See, e.g., MATTHEWS, supra note 15.  
 266 See, e.g., JUDITH A. JOHNSON & PAMELA W. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41705, THE NATIONAL 
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (NIH): ORGANIZATION, FUNDING, AND CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES 6–7 (2011) (noting 
more than 80% of NIH funds are spent on extramural awards and more than 75% of this amount goes to 
researchers in higher education institutions, particularly the 131 U.S. medical schools).  
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funding.267 Discoveries made at least in part using these federal funds are 
subject to the requirements of the Bayh–Dole Act, which governs how 
universities manage inventions that are developed at least partly through the 
use of federal funds.268 As previously discussed, the Bayh–Dole Act was 
designed to support the transition from publicly funded, publicly available 
research into privately funded, proprietary research and development based on 
a linear model of technology transfer.269 Universities could decide to elect title 
to federally funded inventions provided that they took subsequent efforts to 
patent and commercialize these inventions, typically through licensing to 
industry.270 The Bayh–Dole Act avoided dealing directly with the tension 
between public knowledge and private commercial development by presuming 
that product development would occur in the private sector.271 Where the 
university instead retains and begins to develop its federally funded inventions, 
as intended in the Project, certain clarifications and modifications to the Bayh–
Dole Act such as those suggested below may be needed. 
The Bayh–Dole Act requires that the university share funds from any 
subject inventions with inventors, with the remaining funds to be used for 
scientific research and education.272 It focuses on rewarding inventions, to the 
neglect of valuable but nonpatentable improvements. As the Project suggests, 
university proceeds from the licensing of inventions subject to the Act may 
provide a natural source of funds for drug development. But it is unclear 
 
 267 See, e.g., Pierre Azoulay et al., NIH Peer Review: Challenges and Avenues for Reform (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18116, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18116. 
pdf?new_window=1. 
 268 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006). For an extensive overview and review of the Bayh–Dole Act and its 
implementing regulations, see SEAN O’CONNOR ET AL., LEGAL CONTEXT OF UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (2010). 
 269 One of the most significant legal measures is the Bayh–Dole Act, a 1980 amendment to the Patent Act 
that allows research institutions to elect title to inventions that are produced using federal funds. Pub. L. No. 
96-517, § 6, 94 Stat. 3015, 3018–27 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–211 (2006)). 
 270 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (amended 2011). For a discussion of patenting and technology transfer 
activities by universities, see Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and 
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503 (2012). 
 271 See, for example, NIH discussions of preserving access to research tools in ways consistent with the 
Bayh–Dole Act. The discussions focus on concerns with how universities will license research tools to the 
private sector, and provides principles and guidelines to govern how universities make research tools broadly 
available to the research community. See Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and 
Contracts on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090 
(Dec. 23, 1999); see also NIH Sharing Policies and Related Guidance on NIH-Funded Research Resources, 
NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH OFF. EXTRAMURAL RES., http://grants.nih.gov/grants/sharing.htm (last updated Mar. 5, 
2013). 
 272 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(7)(B)–(C). 
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whether drug development activities are encompassed within the statutory 
meaning of scientific or educational purposes. In addition, the Bayh–Dole Act 
in its current form may restrict the ability of the university to differentiate 
between the revenue-sharing policies covering initial drug discovery, made 
using federal funds and subject to the requirements of the Act, and those 
covering later-stage incremental improvements on the same initial discovery. 
Where research and development activities mix, and facilities, equipment, and 
knowledge are shared between different projects, inventions made within a 
proprietary-development-focused project may be considered “subject 
inventions” and fall within the ambit of the Act.273 Even when research and 
development activities are distinct, the continued development of a subject 
invention may bring with it the continuation of Bayh–Dole obligations, 
including its restrictions on how revenue is distributed and used. These 
concerns about what is covered by the Act and how it impacts revenue flows 
may limit the types of funding strategies that universities have available for 
supporting drug development efforts, particularly efforts to secure private 
investment in post-discovery development activities. 
The Bayh–Dole Act also includes reserved rights to subject inventions for 
government use.274 For any subject invention that the university elects title to, 
the federal agency that provided the relevant funding “shall have a 
nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have 
practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout 
the world.”275 The role of the government as a consumer of pharmaceuticals 
through programs such as Medicare and Medicaid raises interesting questions 
about the consequences of the Act for university-developed drugs. If the 
university develops a drug, and the government is the primary purchaser of the 
drug, can the government use its reserved rights under Bayh–Dole to argue that 
it should not have to pay as much for the drug? Or at least should the 
government be able to have a generic form of the drug made by a government 
contractor? Where the government, through federal agencies such as the NIH, 
is financially supporting research leading to the discovery of drugs, particularly 
 
 273 See id. § 201(e). The Bayh–Dole Act applies to “subject inventions” as defined in § 201(e), 
encompassing “any invention of the contractor conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the 
performance of work under a funding agreement.” Id. Where the university continues to work on a discovery 
that is made using federal funds, and where the university mixes research that is federally funded with 
development work that is not, questions may arise as to whether the results of the development activities are 
subject to the requirements of the Act.  
 274 See id. § 202(c)(4).  
 275 Id. 
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drugs that satisfy a critical health need, pressures arise on the government to 
make the resulting drugs accessible and affordable, with or without the 
cooperation of patent owners.276 The reserved rights for government use 
provided in the Act are supplemented at the international level by provisions in 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), a key international intellectual property agreement, that allow for 
compulsory licensing to meet public health needs.277 While reserved rights for 
government use may indeed be important to protect public interests in access 
to the fruits of federally funded research, the ways in which government use 
rights can and should be exercised in the context of academic drug 
development need to be further clarified. 
This Article suggests that in order to harness the organizational advantages 
of the university to solve problems of developing socially desirable drugs, the 
Bayh–Dole Act should allow for the use of Bayh–Dole funds to support 
university-managed drug development activities. Moreover, the university 
should be able to draw a reasonable line between research activities covered by 
the Act and development activities that are not subject to the requirements of 
the Act unless the development activities are themselves publicly funded. 
Where public funds are used for development activities, in contrast, these 
activities should fall under the provisions of the Act. This would facilitate 
different intellectual property policies and investment strategies for the 
development entities in the Project, for example. In addition, clear guidelines 
about how government use rights can be exercised should be developed with 
the goal of balancing needs to attract private capital and needs to ensure access 
to the resulting knowledge and drugs. These guidelines should be designed to 
manage competing objectives, and they should be informed by accurate data 
about the costs and benefits of alternative drug development processes and the 
consequences of government use rights. 
In addition to the Bayh–Dole Act, federal tax laws may limit university 
strategies to fund their own drug development efforts.278 The federal tax code 
 
 276 See, e.g., Colin Macilwain, NIH Urged to Cap Profits Made on Publicly Funded Research, 406 
NATURE 5 (2000); Taxpayers May Be Paying Twice for Some Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1994, at C3.  
 277 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS 
Agreement]. Article 31 of TRIPS addresses compulsory licensing. 
 278 For a general discussion of the problems inherent in the way that tax laws handle commercial activities 
by nonprofit organizations, see John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 491 (2002). Issues discussed include how engaging in commercial activities may 
impact the tax-exempt status of the organization, whether the income from these activities is taxable, and 
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includes restrictions on the ability of universities, as nonprofit institutions, to 
engage in commercial activities based on their nonprofit tax status.279 Even 
when permissible, revenue from such activities may be treated as taxable 
income.280 There are also other tax provisions specific to nonprofit 
organizations, such as those accompanying the financing of university 
buildings using tax-exempt bonds, which restrict the types of activities that 
universities may engage in. Universities can issue tax-exempt bonds that yield 
advantageous tax-exempt interest for bond purchasers. But the university must 
use the funds and facilities financed by the funds in ways that are consistent 
with Internal Revenue Service regulations in order to retain the tax-exempt 
status of the bonds. This imposes significant restrictions on the private 
business use of the university’s property.281 How drug development activities 
will be treated and private interests measured when universities manage 
innovation processes will be important in determining how much existing tax 
rules restrict university innovation strategies. Matters become even more 
complicated when the university wants to attract angel and venture capital 
investors, who demand premiums on their investments, to fund drug 
development efforts. Universities will likely need to be able to offer 
commercially attractive returns to at least some private parties in order to 
attract needed private capital for drug development projects. Philanthropic 
capital may be increased if entrepreneurial donors can also participate 
financially in the results of a university’s portfolio of drug prospects—a part-
gift, part-investment strategy that may attract donations from entrepreneurial 
alumni. But the tax laws governing nonprofit organizations limit both 
compensation schemes and the ways in which the assets of the nonprofit may 
 
whether commercial activities by some entities within a complex organizational structure are imputed to other 
entities within that structure. Colombo concludes that the laws governing these issues are a mess and need to 
be fixed.  
 279 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
 280 The tax code includes a definition of unrelated business income, which is income from activities 
regularly carried on by the organization that are not substantially related to furthering the exempt purpose of 
the organization. See id. §§ 512(a), 513(a). 
 281 See, e.g., id. § 145; see also IRS, PUB. 5005, YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES AS A CONDUIT ISSUER OF TAX-
EXEMPT BONDS (2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5005.pdf. Federal tax law generally 
requires that property that is financed by a nonprofit organization using tax-exempt bonds must be owned by 
the nonprofit organization and must be used to further the charitable, educational, or other exempt purpose of 
the nonprofit organization. Only an insubstantial use (generally less than three percent) of the property may be 
for non-exempt or private business purposes. See, e.g., TAX-EXEMPT BOND PRIVATE USE MONITORING 
PROCEDURES 1 (2010), available at https://www.finance.emory.edu/home/accounting_svcs/Fiscal%20 
Accountability/FINAL%20PBU%20Monitoring%20Procedures.pdf.  
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be transferred or disposed of.282 As this and other forms of public–private 
partnerships become increasingly common and new financial models are 
required to sustain them, tax laws that impede these models may need to be 
revisited. 
Overall, the tax rules that govern both the ability of universities to engage 
in and the tax treatment of commercial activities need to be reevaluated in light 
of their consequences for promising models of supporting university 
innovation. In some cases the rules may need to be revised to ensure that the 
university has the flexibility it needs to engage in financially self-sustainable 
development work. This may include defining the purpose of the university as 
encompassing drug development activity and careful consideration of whether 
income from drug development activities that is reinvested in drug 
development should be taxable. In other cases the rules may simply need to be 
clarified to guide the university in its handling of different activities. While 
there are costs associated with any such change to the tax code, at the very 
least tax laws should be examined to determine their impact on university 
product development and to assess whether the cost of change is worth 
undertaking. Just how to get the balance of public and private concerns right in 
adjusting, or not adjusting, these kinds of tax regulations remains a question 
for further study. 
In addition to difficulties in financing development activities, universities 
also run into challenges in balancing the needs of academic science with the 
needs of proprietary drug development. While protecting open access to and 
use of scientific knowledge, the university also needs the ability to keep certain 
kinds of information private and to restrict the use of certain uses of 
intellectual property in order to secure the funding needed to push forward 
drug development. While supporting autonomous, curiosity-driven scientific 
research, universities also need to pursue more focused and centrally controlled 
development approaches for promising drug candidates. The organizational 
strategies discussed earlier in this Article seek to manage this tension through 
the use of a modularizing or partitioning strategy. Projects will be separately 
grouped and managed based on whether the interests of academic science 
predominate, and rules of access and use will be devised accordingly. But there 
are changes in the law that could go further in reducing the tension between 
 
 282 See, e.g., IRS, PUB. 4221, COMPLIANCE GUIDE FOR 501(C)(3) PUBLIC CHARITIES (2009), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4221pc.pdf (discussing restrictions on private benefit and inurement and other 
restrictions on how public charity assets are transferred and distributed).  
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academic science and proprietary drug development. Avenues of change in 
patent law suggested in the existing literature include giving longer grace 
periods for inventions published in academic journals and later patented to 
allow for publication.283 Changes such as this could be incorporated into the 
Bayh–Dole Act for inventions produced using federal funding, since these are 
the kinds of discoveries that are most likely to be the subject of academic 
publications and the most in need of early disclosure and dissemination. 
Research-use exemptions and other ways of protecting access to and use of 
scientific knowledge may also help to maintain this balance, as discussed 
further below, although the cost of such measures on drug development efforts 
needs to inform the scope and implementation of any such measures. 
The changes suggested above will provide universities with more discretion 
and more flexibility in how they structure their drug development activities. 
But increases in discretion and flexibility should be accompanied by increased 
university accountability and responsibility for protecting the public interest 
when managing development activities. As a start, universities should clearly 
articulate their missions in the context of expanding innovation capacity and 
should work together to establish best practices for university-driven 
innovation.284 As part of this process, universities should work in collaboration 
with their stakeholders, including members from the public and private sector 
and from different constituencies within the university, to identify acceptable 
experiments with university innovation capacity and to adopt guidelines for 
engaging in development. They should find ways of building socially 
beneficial innovation practices into traditional metrics used to evaluate 
university performance. This governance-focused approach to managing an 
expanded university role in development builds on recommendations made in a 
recent report by the National Academies on universities and technology 
transfer. The report emphasized the need for universities to place “IP-based 
technology transfer squarely within the university’s core mission to advance 
discovery and learning and to contribute to the well-being of society.”285 This 
 
 283 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 262, at 217, 254 (proposing protections to disclosure norms by creating 
“an opt-in extended grace period that would provide more time for academic researchers to publish and present 
early-stage research before having to file a patent application,” combined with early application publication). 
 284 Analogies can be drawn to efforts by university technology transfer managers to establish best 
practices for university technology transfer in the form of In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in 
Licensing University Technology. See, e.g., CAL. INST. OF TECH. ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS 
TO CONSIDER IN LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY (2007), available at http://www.autm.net/Nine_Points_ 
to_Consider1.htm. In the Public Interest is endorsed by a number of leading U.S. research universities and 
provides principles to guide technology transfer decisions with the public interest and social benefit in mind.  
 285 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18, at 4.  
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report went on to articulate the need for university accountability to ensure 
compliance with this mission.286 
Allowing universities to expand their role in commercial product 
development activities should not be taken lightly. The idea behind these 
proposed changes is not to encourage all universities to move into drug 
development, but rather to allow for development activities by those 
universities that may have a comparative advantage in socially beneficial drug 
development, and to allow it only when they undertake the investments 
required to manage the process in ways that protect the public interest. 
Investment by both universities and policy makers in a system that will oversee 
this balancing of public and private interests is an essential part of expanded 
university innovation capacity. 
Policy makers should therefore accompany increased flexibility to pursue 
development activities with expanded monitoring and reporting requirements 
for universities to ensure compliance with existing rules and with socially 
beneficial goals. Both universities and policy makers should also explore 
additional measures designed to increase the transparency and accountability 
of the university as it engages in product-focused activities such as drug 
development. The Bayh–Dole Act provides a natural place to begin instituting 
more comprehensive and meaningful systems of reporting and monitoring drug 
development activity. Current reporting requirements under the Act are tied 
mainly to disclosure of subject inventions and brief summaries of how patented 
inventions are being developed.287 These reporting requirements should be 
expanded both in detail and in scope. Where substantial development activities 
are undertaken, for example, reports should include a showing of how this 
expanded role will further the university’s mission. Reports should include 
details about how the development activities are financed and how they are 
expected to progress. Where public funds support development activities, such 
as the building of a high-throughput screening facility, reporting requirements 
should extend to the management and use of these facilities. In addition, some 
kind of meaningful review of university reports and university compliance 
with their responsibilities should be implemented both within the university 
and by an independent government regulator. Universities should have an 
internal review process for new drug development projects and modifications 
of existing projects that is transparent to stakeholders in the university. There 
 
 286 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 18. 
 287 See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c) (2006) (amended 2011). 
VERTINSKY GALLEYSPROOFS1 6/3/2013  10:13 AM 
2013] MAKING KNOWLEDGE AND MAKING DRUGS 819 
should be a public component to their reporting process. There should be 
established lines of authority and accountability within the university to ensure 
that university activities are consistent with the university mission and 
performed in compliance with rules and regulations. University activities 
should also be reviewed periodically by some kind of external, independent 
committee, perhaps one comprised of members from public funding agencies 
like the NIH, along with representatives from some of the main research 
university associations. 
The changes discussed above relate to the individual governance issues of 
each university. This Article concludes with some ways in which the law can 
address collective action problems that impede the sharing of research tools 
and data. The competitive pressures on universities engaged in drug 
development may discourage the kinds of industry-wide collaborations needed 
to improve drug development efforts. Proposals for research-use exemptions 
are worth revisiting in this area, at least in a limited way. I suggest that the 
reserved rights for federal use of subject inventions provided in § 202 of the 
Bayh–Dole Act could be amended to include not just government use, but use 
by any research institutions for research use.288 Guidelines for what constitutes 
“research use” should be established based on input from both public and 
private stakeholders. This exemption would ensure a certain level of openness 
to inventions useful in follow-on innovation even along proprietary 
development paths. It would also address collective action problems faced by 
the university community in making research tools and other discoveries with 
broad applicability to further innovation available to the research 
community.289 Critiques of expanding research-use exemptions highlight the 
negative effects of such changes on private incentives to invent and invest in 
commercialization, problems of over-inclusiveness, and the cost and feasibility 
of making such changes to the patent system through either legislation or 
common law.290 While these remain important concerns, it seems unlikely that 
 
 288 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) provides that “[w]ith respect to any invention in which the contractor elects 
rights, the Federal agency shall have a nonexclusive, nontransferrable, irrevocable, paid-up license to practice 
or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout the world.”   
 289 Interesting questions arise as to the effect of such a change on the use of patented inventions for 
research on U.S. entities versus non-U.S. entities.  
 290 See, e.g., O’Rourke, supra note 260 (discussing and evaluating objections to patent fair use); Katherine 
J. Strandburg, The Research Exemption to Patent Infringement: The Delicate Balance Between Current and 
Future Technical Progress, in [2 PATENTS AND TRADE SECRETS] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 107 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (discussing some of the 
concerns with different kinds of research-use exemptions as part of argument in support of a research-use 
exemption). 
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the costs would outweigh the benefits for the following reasons. Many 
university researchers already act as if there is a broad research-use 
exemption,291 and as research and development activities merge, clear 
guidelines clarifying what is and is not permissible might have a positive rather 
than a negative effect on private incentives. Moreover, private actors are 
themselves increasingly interested in sharing costs by collaborating in the 
creation and use of research tools and in some cases contribute the results of 
their research efforts to the public domain.292 As invention and innovation 
become more collaborative and alternative open systems of innovation emerge, 
a carefully tailored exemption may be favored by the private as well as the 
pubic sector. Starting with a research-use exemption that is limited to 
inventions developed with the use of federal funding would also provide an 
opportunity to learn about how lines between research and nonresearch use 
could be drawn and how such an exemption might function more broadly in 
the law. 
As the recent passage of the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act 
demonstrates, legal change is inevitably accompanied by uncertainties and 
costs and often falls far short of the problems motivating the legal change.293 
But this Article argues that these costs and uncertainties may be well worth 
undertaking to bring the legal framework more in line with the modern 
organizational challenges and opportunities facing research universities. This 
Article has suggested some preliminary ideas for adjusting the legal and 
regulatory framework to allow for changing innovation capacity in some of the 
U.S. research universities while preserving their core public knowledge 
functions. The adjustments proposed are relatively modest in scope, and deal 
largely with ways of enhancing the characteristics that may make universities 
comparatively good at managing at least some downstream stages of 
pharmaceutical innovation. 
 
 291 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19. 
 292 See supra Part II.  
 293 See generally Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified 
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). The Act was a result of years of congressional deliberations and is now the 
subject of scrutiny and discussion by multiple constituencies trying to understand how the new rules impact 
them. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Patent Reform in the United States: Lessons Learned, REGULATION, Winter 
2012–2013, at 20 (discussing limits of America Invents Act). 
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CONCLUSION 
U.S. research universities with biomedical research capabilities are 
reconsidering the roles that they play in drug development as they both reach 
for and are pushed further downstream in the pharmaceutical innovation 
process. They are being pushed by funding needs and pulled by scientific 
opportunities into experiments with university innovation capacity. They are 
moving slowly and cautiously, interested to be among the leaders in attracting 
new funds and prestige for innovative translational research models, but also 
anxious to remain among the followers in deviating from traditional university 
functions. In many cases, they have antiquated administrative structures and a 
set of academic norms that are resistant to change. While the pace of change is 
not rapid, organizational innovation in some of the larger U.S. research 
universities is nevertheless outpacing innovation in the legal framework that 
governs the role of universities in processes of innovation. To the extent that 
universities are making changes in how they engage in technology 
development and transfer, they are doing so against the backdrop of a legal 
landscape that has remained relatively unchanged for the past thirty years. 
This Article has suggested the importance of revisiting this legal 
framework as universities expand their roles in the innovation process. The 
case study of Emory University’s foray into a domain once reserved for 
pharmaceutical companies illustrates the kinds of organizational changes that 
such a move requires and highlights the tensions that may emerge in balancing 
research and development activities and interests. Although universities may 
offer unique advantages in supporting the kinds of knowledge production and 
sharing that are critical to revitalizing pharmaceutical innovation, harnessing 
these advantages in a financially sustainable, yet also socially productive way, 
is challenging. Expanding the role of universities in product development 
carries with it both costs and potential benefits. For the small number of 
universities with established drug discovery capabilities who are already 
heading in the direction of drug development, the benefits may outweigh the 
costs if properly managed. The law should assist rather than impede these 
universities in managing the balance of public interests and private 
requirements implicated in making knowledge while also making drugs. 
 
